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ABSTRACT 
This study develops and tests a theory that an interaction exists amongst the information attributes of 
strategic performance measurement systems (SPMS), the board control role and the organisation's 
strategy as measured by a composite index of firm performance(Muth & Donaldson, 1998). Research 
suggests that organisational control is accomplished through performance evaluation, which 
emphasises the information aspects of control (Eisenhardt, 1985). In addition it is argued that there is 
a parallel between the use of organisational control systems (financial control and strategic control) by 
boards and top management teams (TMTs) (Goold & Quin, 1993; Gupta, 1987; Hitt, Hoskisson, & 
Ireland, 1990). What is unclear is the role information aspects may play. A significant three-way 
interaction exists when performance is observed by the accounting return EBIT, but is, however, not 
significant when associated with shareholder returns as the performance measure. The findings 
contribute to board SPMS practices, information attributes, and the corporate governance literature.  
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 CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research is to identify those combinations of board role, strategy choice, and 
Information Attributes which, when incorporated into a board’s Strategic Performance Measurement 
System (SPMS), are associated with superior firm performance. 
“Over time, the definition of the roles and responsibilities of corporate boards has changed.  But 
there’s general agreement that a board has a fiduciary duty to represent a corporation's interest in 
protecting and creating shareholder value and must determine whether the company has managed to 
realize long-term success” (Epstein & Roy, 2004, p. 3). 
To fulfil these responsibilities effectively, boards must have relevant and reliable information to 
manage the cause and effect relationship of the drivers of corporate success and, thus, improve the 
company’s performance. However, the literature regarding the characteristics and nature of the 
information that boards require in order to help them achieve this is limited and, in many instances, is 
of a general nature, not specific. 
Boards and, consequently, their information requirements are complex by nature as they have dual 
responsibilities to the corporate organisations they serve and to the shareholders and external 
stakeholders. To be competitive, grow, or take advantage of core competencies and synergies, 
organisations either diversify or remain in a single industry and as such, have complex information 
characteristics and requirements. 
In addition, boards are limited in their ability to meet all the expectations placed upon them when 
setting priorities and allocating time, and as a result, they focus only on the roles for which they are 
held accountable and where they have the greatest leverage or influence (Lawler, Finegold, Benson, & 
Conger, 2002).  
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Research from an organisational and management control perspective introduces theories, typologies, 
and contingency frameworks that provide evidence of Information Attributes seminal to board 
effectiveness, which presents opportunities to explore the question of what Information Attributes in 
SPMS are associated with superior firm performance. 
Information Attributes are qualities or characteristics inherent in information. The Information 
Attributes: lead/lag, subjective/objective, feed-forward/feedback, and non-financial/financial are 
common in both Organisational Control theories (OC) (Eisenhardt, 1985) and Management Control 
Systems (MCS) and Strategy (Langfield-Smith, 1997), and also in SPMS (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) 
and the Hendry and Kiel (2004) typology, which explains the board’s role in strategy. This research 
tests a theory that the interaction among Information Attributes found in SPMS, the Board’s Control 
Role, and the organisation’s Strategic Configuration is associated with Firm Performance.  
1.1 MOTIVATION 
The purpose of this research is to improve board and corporate governance efficiency by identifying 
Information Attributes in SPMS that are associated with superior firm performance. It is the intention 
of this research to add to the organisational control and board literature by increasing our 
understanding of the circumstances and knowledge demands that different types of boards, with 
different strategies, deploy in this quest to deliver firm superiority.  
1.1.1 Information Practices 
Research provides evidence that boards which adopt certain key ‘best practices’ are able to govern 
more effectively and produce better financial performance for the firm (Lawler et al., 2002). The 
primary findings are that boards with ‘better information’ practices (Pingying, 2010), are the most 
effective (Lawler et al., 2002). In addition, Lawler et al. (2002) attribute board effectiveness (Payne, 
Benson, & Finegold, 2009) to efficient governance practices and strategic practices. They find that 
boards with a high use of best practices rate information and strategic practices as the most important 
practices. In addition, the importance of adopting better information practices is evident when Lawler 
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et al. (2002) test their impact on Firm Performance.  
1.1.2 Corporate Governance 
Given the board’s role in corporate governance, this study is motivated by the need to extend what is 
considered the dominant corporate governance and firm performance framework (Dalton, Daily, 
Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003) by integrating board theories to open up the black box of actual board 
behaviour (Huse, 2005). In addition, an alternative approach to the dominant corporate governance 
model (Principal-Agent model) also motivates this study. 
Best Practice Corporate Governance 
The late twentieth century’s dominant corporate governance model, the Principal-Agent or Finance 
Model (Letza, Sun, & Kirkbride, 2004), associates governance with Agency Theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The corporate purpose of maximising shareholder wealth with the focus on 
shareholder rights as a result of the separation of ownership and control (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997b) is 
a central theme of this model. However, when common themes, which are accepted as best practice 
corporate governance, are tested for their association with higher corporate financial performance, a 
substantial body of empirical research yields disparate and conflicting findings (Dalton et al., 2003; 
Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998).  
Dalton and Dalton (2005) consider two arguments at the centre of corporate governance best practice: 
structural independence and alignment of interests. Structural independence is captured by two 
measures: board composition (independent directors) and board structure (CEO duality). These are 
common themes to both the Higgs Report and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Also referred to as board 
power, they are regarded as the metaphorical lightning rod in corporate governance debates (Dalton & 
Dalton, 2005).  
However, even after a substantial body of corporate governance, agency theory, and firm financial 
performance empirical research, a meta-analyses of 457 studies over 70 years (Dalton et al., 2003; 
Dalton et al., 1998) finds that these studies demonstrate little consistency and yield disparate findings 
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and “are in stark contrast to current admonitions regarding corporate governance ‘best practices’” 
(Dalton & Dalton, 2005).  
Dalton and Dalton (2005) suggest that structural independence must be accompanied by effective 
board processes. By the mid-2000s, with the evolution of boards and governance research, it had 
become evident that there was a need for an expanded and alternative framework (Roberts, McNulty, 
& Stiles, 2005). Huse (2005) offered an extended framework, using a contingency and integrated 
theories approach, to open the black box of actual board behaviour. The framework is centred on 
creating board accountability where pluralistic board theories (i.e. resource dependent, stewardship, 
and, managerial hegemony) create board role expectations. 
An Alternative Approach to Agency Theory Corporate Governance 
In acknowledging the limitations of the Agency Theory Corporate Governance Model, this research 
develops an alternative “information” approach to governance and firm performance, that of 
Information Asymmetry and Governance (Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). Agency theory assumes that 
the key role of governance is curbing opportunistic behaviour. Knowledge-based arguments applied to 
formulation of the theory of the firm (Conner & Prahalad, 1996) question the assumption of 
opportunism. The Resource-Based-Knowledge-Based-Theory of the Firm is regarded as the fourth1 
seminal contribution to the theory and articulates a knowledge-based perspective that is independent 
of opportunistic considerations. The assumption is that the actors in the governance system—in this 
case, boards of directors—have different experiences, insight, skills and tacit knowledge (knowledge 
learned through personal experience). While these differences influence managerial decision-making, 
                                                          
1 The other three contributions are: 1. Coase (1990) originally established a comparative organisational 
reasoning crucial to the theory of the firm and also introduced the fundamental concept of transaction costs. 2. 
Simon (1957) advanced the motivating behavioural assumption of bounded rationality and also established the 
employment -- authority -- relationship as the incisive distinction between a firm and market contracting.  3. 
Williamson (2010) explored the concept of bounded rationality in the context of choosing an organisational 
mode: opportunistic potential. Williamson's predictive theory operationalised an important aspect of the 
transaction cost approach.  
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they are akin to Milgrom and Roberts’ (1987) theory on the existence of private information or 
information asymmetry. They suggest that the “recognition of informational asymmetries and the 
strategic possibilities they engender yield models that begin to capture the richness of behaviour that 
marks the real world” (p. 185).  
1.1.3 Policy Reforms 
Boards of directors face new risks and burdens as a result of the dramatic changes in disclosure and 
corporate governance rules and penalties in the wake of recent scandals. Qualified individuals are 
increasingly reluctant to serve on public boards (Kerr & Werther Jr., 2008). Many publicly traded 
companies are contemplating whether it would be advisable to terminate their public company status. 
‘Going private’ bears testimony to the significant new imposed personal liability2 (Block, 2004; Engel, 
Hayes, & Wang, 2007).  
Responding to public policy reforms almost twenty years ago, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) 
suggested tailoring corporate governance to the information requirements of different strategies rather 
than board structure. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) stated that this “should be considered before 
new board reforms are implemented” (p. 85). Yet today, without knowing the impact of information 
on the board and its performance in delivering superior firm performances, board reforms are being 
promulgated in most jurisdictions. 
1.2 SPECIFIC PROBLEM 
Research from an organisational and management control perspective introduces theories, typologies, 
and contingency frameworks that suggest Information Attributes are seminal to board effectiveness. 
  
                                                          
2 In the USA, board members and members of audit committees who violate new personal certification 
requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are subject to civil actions and in criminal proceedings may 
be fined up to $5 million and imprisoned for up to 20 years.  
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1.2.1 Board’s Control Role 
Hendry and Kiel (2004) propose a board typology and a contingency framework that allow this 
research to propose an association between the  Board’s Strategic Control Role and Information 
Attributes. By recognising a board’s ‘passive (rubber stamp)/active (board as management) 
continuum’ in strategy and the board as a control mechanism, Hendry and Kiel (2004) characterise a 
board’s strategic role based on two control constructs: financial control and strategic control. The 
Information Attributes of financial control are described as outcome, objective, post-implementation, 
and associated with lag indicators. The Information Attributes of strategic control are described as 
behavioural, subjective, pre-implementation, and associated with lead indicators (Hendry & Kiel, 
2004). They propose that, depending on contingencies, their constructs (financial control and/or 
strategic control) and information characteristics will differ depending on whether the board’s 
strategic roles are active or passive.  
In recognising the board as a control mechanism, Hendry and Kiel (2004) draw on combined 
Organisational Theory and Control (Ouchi, 1979) and Economic (Agency Theory) Control 
(Eisenhardt, 1985) perspectives. Both perspectives accomplish control through performance 
evaluation, which emphasises the information aspect of control. In addition, the control perspectives 
parallel both boards of directors and Top Management Teams (TMT) (Goold & Quin, 1993; Gupta, 
1987; Hitt et al., 1990), thus affording the opportunity to place Performance Measurement Systems 
(PMS) and Management Control Systems (MCS) within the scope of this study. 
1.2.2 Board’s Strategic Role 
There is general agreement in the literature that boards have three key roles: strategy, control, and 
service (Johnson, Ellstrand, & Daily, 1996; Stiles & Taylor, 2001; Zahra & Pearce II, 1989). However, 
as perceived by boards of directors, most time is spent on implementing, monitoring, and shaping 
(Weitzner & Peridis, 2011) the firm’s strategy (Lawler et al., 2002; Pugliese, Bezemer, Zattoni, Huse, 
Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2009). In addition and as mentioned previously, Lawler et al. (2002) 
have identified strategic board practices (e.g. identifying potential risks to the firm and spending time 
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on long-term strategy) as highly important on their board effectiveness scale.  
Other management disciplines also support the strategic role of boards. For example, Organisational 
Behaviour suggests that strategic advice and counsel are essential in the running of modern 
corporations and are critical of ‘rubberstamp’ boards (Finegold, Lawler III, & Conger, 2001). From a 
legal perspective, the board's fiduciary duty is generally considered to include the review and 
monitoring of strategy (Stiles & Taylor, 2001). Finance considers how particular strategic initiatives 
will lead to superior financial returns for the company. Since financial metrics tend to be lagging 
indicators, the board must therefore determine relevant leading indicators. Typically these will be 
non-financial and will indicate where the strategy is going and what foundations are being laid for the 
future (Frigo, 2003).  
An approach by governance disciplines proposes a system characterised as a ‘strategic board’ to fulfil 
a board’s strategic role and ensure effective corporate governance process (O'Neal & Thomas, 1996). 
Kerr and Werther Jr.’s (2008) ‘Next Frontier in Corporate Governance’ describes an evolving role in 
approaching strategy as the logical extension of its fundamental fiduciary responsibility to represent 
and protect shareholder interests. The management literature on the board’s strategic role is extensive 
and will be discussed in the literature review. However, of particular relevance to this study is the 
‘active/passive’ continuum, which describes the potential important roles directors are capable of 
playing in shaping the strategic direction (Zahra, 1990).  
Having identified strategy as a key board role, this research adopts the view of strategy as providing 
the basis for an iterative process of objective setting and resource allocation (Burgelman, 1983, 1991; 
Noda & Bower, 1996).  
The evidence provided from organisational and management control perspectives above presents a 
framework for observing if Information Attributes are associated with a Board’s Control Role Type 
and are, in turn, linked to the firm’s Strategic Configuration and ultimately associated with superior 
Firm Performance.  
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To test these associations, data will be collected using the ‘written questionnaire’ survey methodology 
and supplemented with archival data about firm performance. The research population is boards of 
publicly listed companies on the ASX in 2008 and 2009. The respondent representing each board will 
be the chair of that board.  
1.3 CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH 
The objective of this research is to test a theory that an interaction among Information Attributes 
found in SPMS, the Board’s Control Role, and the organisation’s Strategic Configuration is associated 
with superior Firm Performance. In doing so, this research will contribute to four areas of study: 
research, regulation, practice, and education. 
1.3.1 Contribution to Research 
This research will contribute to the information attribute, board of directors, and firm performance 
research. This research will add to the body of corporate governance and firm performance research, 
responding to the call 20 years ago by Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) to tailor corporate governance 
to the information requirements of different strategies. The study will attempt to validate typologies 
and frameworks in the strategic and organisational control discipline and associate information 
attributes with firm performance. By understanding more about the information received by boards, 
this research will contribute to the discussion of how boards of directors can more effectively acquit 
their obligations to implement strategy and deliver firm performance. 
1.3.2 Contribution to Regulators 
The implication for regulators arises from the observation that information provided to boards can 
make a difference to governance and company performance. Regulators and boards will be provided 
with guidance as to which information should be regarded as best practice in certain defined 
circumstances. By identifying performance relevant information to boards in process and in strategy, 
regulators will then be able to form opinions as to whether boards have chosen to follow demonstrated 
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best practice. 
1.3.3 Contribution to Practice 
This research will enable boards to design and implement performance control mechanisms that have 
a greater chance of contributing to better firm outcomes. The control system requires relevant 
performance measures to be an effective mechanism in directing management activities. It will 
contribute to the practice of organisational control and specifically to the implementation of strategy. 
Observing relevant lead and lag performance measurements provides firms with early warnings as to 
whether they are on target to achieve strategic goals. In addition, cause and effect relationships enable 
firms to take pre-emptive actions in improving the chances of achieving strategic goals.  
1.3.4 Contribution to Education 
At present, management accounting education tends to emphasise the information needs of Top 
Management Teams (TMT) through to lower levels of management within an organisation. While 
there is a belief amongst business scholars that information is useful and relevant, there is limited 
empirical evidence to support this from the board’s perspective. The contribution of this research to 
teaching is that it may assist educators to make control system learning relevant, and extend this 
relevance to boards as well as management.  
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature and Chapter 3 develops the 
theory and hypotheses to be tested. Chapter 4 describes the research methodology, while Chapter 5 
determines the variables. Chapter 6 presents the analysis and findings from statistically testing the 
hypotheses and discusses the impact and meaning of the findings and their contribution to practice 
and theory. Chapter 7 summarises and concludes the study. 
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1.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter introduces the study and its purpose. It discusses the complex nature of boards and their 
information requirements. The recognition of important board information practices, together with an 
alternative corporate governance approach and implications for policy reforms, motivates this study. 
The chapter then describes the board’s control role in strategy with different information attributes 
(the nature and characteristics of information). The chapter concludes by outlining the contribution of 
this research to research, regulators, practice, and education. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this research is to develop and test a theory that an interaction, if observed, between 
Information Attributes found in Strategic Performance Measurement Systems (SPMS), the Board’s 
Control Role, and the firm’s Strategy Configuration will be associated with Firm Performance.  
Research suggests a shift away from a passive board control role to a more active board control role 
(Hendry & Kiel, 2004). In addition, the board as ‘no more than a sign off on strategy’ appears to be 
rare (Stiles, 2001) .  
The board of director literature (more specifically the role of the board), board process, and the impact 
of boards on corporate performance is reviewed. The gap and paucity in the board literature on the 
role that information plays in supporting effective boards is established.  
Chapter 2 proceeds as follows: Section 2.1 reviews the board role literature from a multi-disciplined 
board theory perspective and a three-period review is presented. Section 2.2 reviews the board and 
strategy literature, and Section 2.3 reviews strategy and Management Control Systems. Section 2.4 
reviews the board and information literature. Section 2.5 reviews the corporate performance literature 
and Section 2.6 summarises the chapter. 
2.1 BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Board effectiveness refers to the board's ability to perform its roles, move the company closer to its 
strategic goals, and satisfy shareholders’ interests (Petrovic, 2008).  Two streams conceptualise the 
roles that boards of directors perform (Petrovic, 2008). The first considers that board roles are 
direction (strategic guidance) and control (strategic implementation). The second stream is board role 
theories (Huse, 2005) and/or estimates of board actions (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003).  
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 The Zahra and Pearce II (1989) seminal paper is regarded as the starting point in board and corporate 
governance research (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Johnson et al., 1996). The 
extent to which boards undertake their roles is guided by the theoretical perspectives (Zahra & Pearce 
II, 1989). The theory has its origins in diverse disciplines, which are reviewed from two perspectives: 
Economic and Finance (agency theory) (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003) and Organisational, 
Sociological and Managerial (stewardship, class/managerial hegemony and resource dependent 
theories) (Huse, 2005; Pettigrew, 1992; Zahra & Pearce II, 1989). To identify the literature relevant to 
this research, the focus then shifts to a three period review: 1990s and earlier; 1990 to around 2000; 
and 2000 to present.  
2.1.1 Economic and Finance Perspective 
While the formal economic theory on boards is quite limited, the empirical literature is well 
developed (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). Smith (1776) first articulated what is referred to as the 
agency problem, an important theory for corporate governance and boards of directors (Huse, 2005; 
Roberts et al., 2005). Economists, some 150 years later, take a similar view (Berle & Means, 1932).  
One potential answer to the question of why boards exist is that they are simply a product of 
regulation (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). However, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003, p. 9) offer a more 
plausible hypothesis: “boards are a market solution to an organizational design problem, an 
endogenously determined institution that helps to ameliorate the agency problems that plague any 
large organization”. As such, agency theory provides solutions to the dilemma of separation between 
ownership and control (Fama & Jensen, 1983), with the board positioned as a mechanism to align 
interests. Public discussion and corporate governance reforms still, however, dominate the economic 
and financial perspectives, suggesting aspects are not adequately explained by agency theory.  
A notable key issue in the empirical work is how to proxy for the board’s degree of independence 
from the CEO. Often, an implicit assumption is that observable board characteristics such as size or 
composition are related to the level of independence (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). According to 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), two important concerns complicate empirical work on boards of 
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directors. First, almost all the variables of interest are endogenous (actions of previous directors’ 
influence subsequent directors). Second, empirical results can be interpreted as either an equilibrium 
or an out of equilibrium phenomena (refer to Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1 Board Equilibrium Phenomena (Hermalin & Weisbach 2003, p. 8)  
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical literature on the studies on boards of directors are characterised by estimating equations 
(refer to Figure 2.2) (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). In interpreting the illustration, firm performance 
(i.e. accounting, economic and share performance measures), as a dependent variable, can be 
explained by the independent variables: board actions (i.e. takeovers), poison pills, executive 
compensation and CEO turnover, and board characteristics (i.e. composition) and board size. Firm 
performance as an independent variable can also explain board characteristics as a dependent variable. 
In addition, board characteristics as an independent variable can explain board actions as a dependent 
variable. 
Figure 2.2 Board Empirical Equations (Hermalin & Weisbach 2003, p. 12) 
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Equations 1 and 2 have the advantage of being less prone to any unobservable factors contaminating a 
statistical relationship and it is less likely that endogeneity will affect the results (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003). Despite the fact that the composite Equation 4 is more prevalent than the studies of 
component Equations 1 and 2, making it possible to establish a direct board characteristic and firm 
performance relationship, the equilibrium phenomenon needs to be addressed. 
2.1.2 Organisational, Sociological and Managerial Perspectives 
As a result of the call for greater theoretical pluralism in understanding board and governance 
phenomena, the dominant agency theory grip on governance research (Huse, 2005) (Roberts et al., 
2005) has been challenged and supplemented by resource dependence, stewardship, class and, 
managerial hegemony theories (Barroso, Villegas, & Pérez-Calero, 2011; Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson, 1997; Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Zahra & Pearce II, 1989). With their theoretical origins in 
organisational, sociological, and managerial disciplines, they characterise board roles in reference to 
board effectiveness (Petrovic, 2008). 
 The board effectiveness literature described as structural analysis and board dynamics (Petrovic, 
2008) or structural and process analysis (Dalton & Dalton, 2005; Pettigrew, 1992), are mechanical 
issues often addressed by regulation and organic issues that cannot be regulated (Sherwin, 2003).  
Mechanical issues or structural analysis are predominantly grounded and guided in agency and 
managerial hegemony theory (Dalton & Dalton, 2005; Pettigrew, 1992) and studied in the input-
output model between the ‘usual suspects’ (i.e. board structure and size) and in the corporate financial 
performance framework (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004).  Organic issues or board dynamics/process 
analysis, on the other hand, are studied under the behavioural framework where it is suggested that 
multiple theoretical perspectives are required to fully understand board behaviour (Gabrielsson & 
Huse, 2004).  
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The literature, in questioning board effectiveness (structural and process analysis), identifies with the 
following phenomena:  
x Inferential Leaps: The imbalance between structural analysis (agency theory studies) and 
process analysis (multiple theoretical perspectives) (Pettigrew, 1992), quoted as “easily 
measurable demographic characteristics used as surrogates for unobserved intervening 
processes and inferential leaps are then made to a range of organisational outcomes” 
(Pettigrew, 1992, p. 177).    
x Black Box: A potential solution to the imbalance between structural analysis (agency theory 
studies) and process analysis (multiple theoretical perspectives), argues for the need to open 
the black box of actual board behaviour to bridge the gap between board role expectations and 
board effectiveness (Huse, 2005). 
x Unicorns: The continuing imbalance among structural analysis (agency theory studies), 
process analysis (multiple theoretical perspectives), and board research.  A meta-analysis of 
457 studies over 70 years on structural independence (structural analysis) and corporate 
financial performance in 2005 still found no evidence that the “unicorn" exists (Dalton & 
Dalton, 2005). 
2.1.3 Three Period Review on Boards 
Up to 1990 
Still in its infancy by the early 1990s (Pettigrew, 1992), the late 1970s observation (Tricker, 1978) 
that boards of directors were the most under-researched management topic was still accurate. 
Methodological difficulties and poor response rates from questionnaire-based studies contributed to 
inconclusive theoretical and empirical findings. However, policy interest in boards in the UK and the 
US produced a constant stream of prescriptive literature under differing themes: board composition, 
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firm performance, director roles, corporate governance initiatives, board effectiveness, take-overs, 
CEO responsibilities, CEO duality, board power, greenmail, legal charges, parachutes, and poison 
pills (takeover defence), and decision behaviour.  
Huse (2005) offers an interesting perspective on boards in the 1980s, describing it as a first wave of 
shareholder activism led by institutional investors and guided by agency theory. They wanted boards 
sufficiently independent to resist managerial dominance or hegemony.   
In the 1990s, the first framework for studying boards was introduced by Zahra and Pearce II (1989). 
The study reviewed empirical research published at that time on the contribution boards of directors 
made to corporate financial performance and is regarded in most disciplines (management, economics, 
finance and sociology) as the starting point of board and corporate performance research (Gabrielsson 
& Huse, 2004; Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Johnson et al., 1996). Guided by four distinct theoretical 
perspectives (legalistic3, resource dependence, class hegemony, and agency theory), Zahra and Pearce 
II (1989) present an integrative model (refer to Figure 2.3) and propose specific links amongst 
attributes, roles, and contingencies.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The literature addressing a director’s control role suggests legal theory is less specific in identifying a 
director’s duty to shareholders than agency theory. The agency theory perspective (Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
Eisenhardt, 1989) differs from the legal perspective. In practice, most courts have rejected the agency 
perspective (Budnitz, 1990); however, the primary difference, though more similar than different, between these 
two perspectives is in the source of director’s power.  Legal theory emanates from law, whereas agency theory 
suggests director’s power is derived from shareholders (Budnitz, 1990). 
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Figure 2.3 Integrative Model (Zahra & Pearce II 1989, p. 305)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model suggests that the impact of boards on company performance can link both directly and 
indirectly. The direct link is through the association between board attributes (i.e. composition 
influences characteristics, which in turn influences structure etc.) and company performance. Zahra 
and Pearce II (1989) acknowledged at the time that most empirical studies have sought to establish a 
direct link, but suggested an indirect link via board roles to take into account the effective execution 
of directors’ roles.  
1990 to 2000 
During the early 1990s, institutions such as public pension funds and institutional investors called for 
board reforms (Useem, Bowman, Myatt, & Irvine, 1993). The literature acknowledges that theoretical 
approaches such as institutional investor control (Useem et al., 1993), shareholder activist (Mizruchi, 
1983), agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983), and resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) addressed aspects of the nature and functioning of the board and assisted in reform efforts  
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(Johnson et al., 1996). Board composition was a frequent research focus (85% of 134 studies 
reviewed from this period).  
Prior to the turn-of-the-century, and having generated considerable attention, research on boards of 
directors still provided little consensus as to the specific configuration of an effective corporate board 
(Johnson et al., 1996). From a management, financial, and sociological perspective, Johnson et al. 
(1996) state that the literature “does not provide a vehicle for sustaining strong consensus across the 
subsets of empirical research.  More commonly, findings are inconsistent and where there may be 
consistency, associations are modest” (p. 429).  In support, research on boards of directors from a 
managerial and organisational perspective is weak and ambiguous (Dalton et al., 1998), and models 
and theory needed to be critically questioned (Forbes, 1999; Huse, 1998; Pettigrew, 1992). Finkelstein 
and Mooney (2003) suggested that researchers needed to be willing and ready to explore new and 
alternative directions.  
2000 to Current 
By the early 2000s, the empirical research on boards and firm performance had left us no better 
informed (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella Jr., 2003; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). A sorting taxonomy of 
research in the US and in international academic journals explored alternative research directions and 
labelled four groups, described as (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004): 
x Input Output Studies: Characterised by the Lamp and Hammer syndrome; ‘usual suspects’ 
input-output studies are by far the largest contribution of the four groups. Research questions 
look to find the optimal balance in board size, structure, shareholding, and duality 
(Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). 
x Contingency Studies: Contingency or contextual studies identify with strategic adaptation in 
internal and external environments (Grundei & Talaulicar, 2002; Westhead, 1999), regulation 
and interdependent elements (Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001), and stakeholder power 
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(Huse & Rindova, 2001) in its research stream. Conclusions drawn from contingency studies 
are that the roles of boards vary depending on the firm’s internal and external context. 
x Behavioural Studies:  Behavioural studies explore processes, decision-making, and 
interactions inside and outside of the boardroom.  Divided into two subgroups, the first 
studies identify with working structures and processes in and around the boardroom that split 
board structure and firm performance links in intermediate steps, predicting an impact on 
board efficiency. The second subgroup focuses on behaviours, decisions, and activities in and 
around the boardroom more directly (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). 
x Evolutionary Studies: The evolutionary perspective compares and contrasts longitudinal data 
to better understand changes in board dynamics and the development of relationships with 
internal and external stakeholders (Christensen & Westenholz, 1999; Pye, 2002). 
By 2005, in an attempt to draw conclusions with a substantial body of board structure and firm 
performance, empirical studies yielded disparate findings and researchers adopted an analytical 
technique referred to as meta-analysis, but to no avail (Dalton & Dalton, 2005). An earlier meta-
analysis study found a greater presence of outside directors associated with higher performance, but 
also a greater presence of insiders, suggesting the existence of a curvilinear homogeneity effect 
(Wagner III, Stimpert, & Fubara, 1998). Another study found that not only are inside, outside, and 
affiliated directors not associated with higher or lower firm financial performance, but also found no 
evidence of a systematic relationship between board composition and firm performance (Dalton et al., 
1998). This led to the conclusion that board structure must be accompanied by theoretical pluralism, 
as well as a greater understanding of board process and board efficiency (Dalton & Dalton, 2005; 
Huse, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005).   
By the mid-2000s, with the evolution of boards and governance research, it had become evident that 
there was a need for an expanded and alternative framework (Roberts et al., 2005). The research on 
boards and corporate performance fortresses (contentious publish or perish research drive (Huse, 
2000), the focus on the ‘usual suspects’ (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003) with easily available data 
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(lamp syndrome), and accepted and easy to use methods (hammer syndrome) (Gabrielsson & Huse, 
2004) needed to be dismantled (Daily et al., 2003). Huse (2005) offered an extended framework, 
using a contingency and integrated theories approach, to open the black box of actual board behaviour 
(refer to Figure 2.4). The framework is centred on creating board accountability where pluralistic 
board theories create board role expectations. The contingencies consider context and actors (internal, 
external, and board members) and integrate board role theories, which link to board role expectations 
and thus, define accountability. Board process theories (grouped into the three subcategories: 
interactions and reactions to pressure; formal and informal structures; and decision-making culture) 
help understand actual board behaviour.  
Figure 2.4 An Agenda for Black Box Research on Boards (Huse 2005, p. S67) 
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independent oversight to ensure that firms stay focused on creating value. However, the demands on 
boards have been growing at an even more rapid rate.  It is important not to overestimate what boards 
can achieve as they remain, by necessity, relatively removed from the running of a business. The 
multiple tasks, as well as the practical issues, shape the boards’ roles and responsibilities, as well as 
what they are capable of doing. They have legal responsibilities, responsibilities to shareholders and 
to communities, and to members of the organisation (refer to Figure 2.5).  The dilemma is that all of 
these groups put pressure on boards to engage in somewhat different activities. 
Figure 2.5 Board Responsibilities 
     
 
 
Many of the changes that are occurring in the business environment and the failures of board 
oversight are redefining the roles and activities of boards in ways that raise important questions about 
board effectiveness (Rankin, Windsor, & Wahyuni, 2011). In order to be more effective, it is 
important for boards to identify with these changes (Lawler et al., 2002, p. 310):  
x An increase in the volume of corporate mergers and acquisitions and the accelerating pace 
and uncertainty of competition in the emerging global economy dictates that boards need to 
forge strategic alliances and partnerships.  This accompanies the need for careful due 
diligence. 
x The increasing public scrutiny of financial reporting in the wake of several high-profile 
corporate failures. 
x The greater attention focused on corporate governance by institutional investors who are 
growing less patient with underperforming companies and weak inactive boards. 
Shareholders Board Corporate Dual Responsibilities: 
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x The accelerating turnover rate of CEOs, placing pressure on boards to be far more proactive 
in planning for management succession. 
The focus on board processes is grounded in agency theory, which addresses inefficiencies that arise 
from the separation of companies' ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1968; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997a). The seminal work 
suggests that managers do not have sufficient equity in the firms they manage to give them the 
incentive to turn their full attention to profit maximisation. Instead, managers may pursue self-
interested initiatives at the expense of shareholders. One monitoring mechanism that may temper that 
tendency is oversight by the board of directors. This oversight, or control function, of a board is often 
described as the most critical of directors’ roles (Fama, 1980; Mizruchi, 1983; Zahra & Pearce II, 
1989). 
2.1.5 Corporate Governance Models 
Research and reviews to date of corporate governance (Hawley, 1996; Keasey, Thompson, & Wright, 
1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997b; Turnbull, 1997) suggest four schools of thought or models: principal 
agent or finance model, myopic market model, the abuse of executive power model, and the 
stakeholder model. Focusing on shareholder rights, the dominant model in the late 20th century is the 
finance view concerned with the universal agency theory problem (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997b). The 
principal agent or finance model values the mechanism of market governance, while the other three 
rely on non-market measures, such as shareholder loyalty, institutional monitoring, director 
empowerment, and stakeholder participation (Letza et al., 2004). Letza et al. (2004) note current 
perspectives on corporate governance as being categorised into two contrasting paradigms: 
shareholding and stake-holding. This research looks to better understand the shareholding paradigm 
and the finance model, incorporating markets and value. 
2.2 BOARDS AND STRATEGY  
Boards of directors have come under increasing scrutiny in the wake of serious corporate frauds and 
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failures.  Stiles (2001) offers an empirical examination on the impact of boards of directors on 
strategy. Showing support for a number of theoretical frameworks, the examination suggests that a 
multiple perspective is required to fully understand the nature of the boards’ strategic activity. Agency, 
stewardship, and resource dependence theories place a premium on the board’s strategic contribution, 
and view the board as strategically active. Managerial hegemony theory describes the board as a de-
jure legal fiction dominated by management and strategically ineffective, adopting a mere rubber-
stamping function. 
While the underlying concept of strategy is a deliberate formal planning process, Stiles (2001) 
supports the view that strategies are emergent (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) and boards of directors are 
involved in both deliberate and emergent models of strategy. Stiles (2001) also identifies with the 
major role board power plays in strategic decision-making. Board power is inherently situational, 
dynamic, and non-transferable (McNulty, 1998). It is derived from structural factors which are based 
on formal authority positions, legislative right, control over rewards and sanctions, and forms of 
relations, such as abilities, personnel prestige, or status power. In addition, strategic decisions are by 
nature uncertain and laden with ambiguity, leaving space for the exercise of power (Finkelstein, 1992).  
Boards ensure companies maintain focus and do not stray too far from the strategic framework in their 
gatekeeper, confidence builder, and selection of directors and CEO roles. As gatekeepers, boards 
ensure that the concept of strategy outlined by the board is matched by strategic behaviour at 
operational levels (Burgelman, 1983). Stiles (2001) finds evidence that scrutinising strategic proposals, 
making judgements, and setting tolerant standards encourages confidence and innovation. The study 
identifies with strategic content and context that impacts the process of strategy and are characterised 
as: 
x Business Definition: factors that include industry sector, size of the firm, capabilities of its 
workforce, strength of competition, and level of technology. 
x Corporate level strategy: where boards are expected to make a contribution. 
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x Strategic activity occurs at multiple levels within the firm. 
x Establishing the strategic boundaries of the organisation. 
x The determination of corporate objective setting in terms of business portfolio and resource 
allocation derives its content chiefly through the deliberations of the executive committee. 
x Boundary spanning: where directors use their access to external information in strategic 
discussion and as a result, reduce environmental uncertainty. It could be construed as 
involving non-executives in the strategic arena. 
2.3 STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS (MCS) 
Langfield-Smith (1997) reviews the relationship between MCS and strategy and offers a three 
dimensional approach (refer to Figure 2.6), which considers the changing domain of MCS. By 
introducing terminologies and frameworks (strategic typology, strategic mission, and strategic 
positioning) from the strategic literature, Langfield-Smith (1997) then proposes a strategic 
configuration (refer to Figure 2.7). 
Figure 2.6 Strategy Dimensions (Langfield-Smith 1997, p. 212) 
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Figure 2.7 MCS and Strategy Configuration (Langfield-Smith 1997, p. 213) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prospectors compete via differentiation and pursue a build mission, and defenders pursue cost 
leadership with hold and harvest missions, leading to two approaches of performance evaluation. 
Objective performance evaluation supports defender strategies, while prospectors rely on subjective 
(behaviour controls) performance evaluations. 
2.4 BOARDS AND INFORMATION 
A literature search in Business Source Complete of the Ebsco Megafile Complete database titled 
‘boards,’ ‘information,’ and ‘performance’ revealed no studies. As a result, in the context of this study, 
the literature is reviewed from both the board’s role and the information role perspective.  
2.4.1 Board Role Perspective  
A review of the literature is conducted in context of the Hendry and Kiel (2004) typology (refer to 
Figure 2.8), which provides a framework of the board’s role in strategy. More specifically, the 
typology suggests that boards take a financial and/or strategic control role in strategy. 
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Figure 2.8 Board Control Role Typology (Hendry & Kiel 2004, p. 512) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An initial search on board role literature found 117 studies. A sorting process found 45 of the 117 
studies considered the board’s financial and strategic control role. In addition, the sorting process also 
considered the relevance of information required by the board, given the role and context or reason for 
each of the 45 studies (refer to Tables 2.1A and 2.1B). The 45 studies provide useful insight into the 
board’s information requirements given their financial (FC in the table) and/or strategic (SC in the 
table) control role. Eighty-six percent are considered a strategic control role and 55% a financial 
control role. This is consistent with the strategic role shift in the last 20 years (Hendry & Kiel, 2004).   
Table 2.1A Summary of the Strategic/Financial Control Role Literature Review 
Hendry and Keil Typology 
No of 
studies 
% 
Contribution 
Strategic and Financial Control 19 42% 
Strategic Control 20 44% 
Financial Control 6 13% 
Total 45   
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Table 2.1B Strategic/Financial Control Role Literature Review 
Record Author Year Role Context/Reason (cause) 
Information 
Requirement 
1 Sheehan 2009 
Risk/reward identification and 
selection Organisational risk SC 
2 Melkumov 2009 Internal and external Corporate governance SC and FC 
4 
Andres and 
Vallelado 2008 Banking governance 
Corporate governance 
(composition/size), organisational 
performance (banks) SC and FC 
8 Lee 2008 Supervision in risk management Credit crisis FC 
12 Fernandes 2008 Independents not effective 
Agency theory problem (align share 
holder management)   
15 Roach 2007 Compliance and ethics Criminal violations SC 
16 Williams 2007 Information security Business assets SC 
17 
Ferris and 
Yan 2007 Mutual fund governance Fund scandals FC 
19 Cohen et al. 2007 Monitoring vs. strategic Audit assessment decisions (risk) SC and FC 
20 Fields 2007 Planning and implementing Organisational change SC and FC 
21 Kakabadse 2007 
Governance due 
diligence/financial and 
competitive strength Demographic pursuit SC and FC 
22 Glaser 2007 IT agendas Implementing strategy FC 
24 
van den 
Heuvel et al. 2006 Control and service SME SC and FC 
36 Long et al. 2005 
Unlisted company: Strategic 
development/overall board 
control. Listed company: 
Monitoring and management Listed vs. unlisted companies SC and FC 
37 
van den 
Berghe et al. 2005 Vigilant monitoring Delegation policy FC 
38 Jonsson 2005 
Changing roles as circumstances 
change Study (Icelandic) SC and FC 
41 
Obeng and 
Ugboro 2005 Decision-making (strategic) Study (transit boards) SC 
43 Kula 2005 
Control/service/resource 
acquisition Firm performance (Turkish SME) SC and FC 
44 
Hass and 
Pryor 2005 Corporate renewal Reduce corporate failure SC 
45   2005 Strategic direction Case study/research review SC 
47 
Hendry and 
Kiel 2004 Strategic role Theory perspectives SC 
48 Stephens et al. 2004 
Control/service/resource 
dependence 
Organisational commitment, corporate 
governance SC and FC 
49 Iecovich 2004 Decision-making Non-profit organisations SC and FC 
50 Nadler 2004 Strategic engagement Framework to engage SC 
51 Allio 2004 Strategy and leadership Interviews SC and FC 
52 
Jonk and 
Schaap 2004 Strategy development Framework SC 
53 
Mordaunt and 
Cornforth 2004 Turnaround (non-profit) Non-profit failure SC 
57 Goldschmidt 2004 Preventing economic crime Abuse of companies SC 
60 
Cornell and 
Doyle 2004 Care and loyalty Compliance matters/programs SC and FC 
62 Xie et al. 2003 Earnings management Financial sophistication FC 
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66 
Ingley and 
Van der Walt 2001 
Giving direction and strategic 
implementation 
Governance challenges/proposed 
framework SC and FC 
67 
Inglis and 
Weaver 2000 
Strategic activity/resource 
planning operation Not for profit budget agendas SC and FC 
69 Oliver 2000 Strategy and planning Driver seat or rubber stamp SC 
72 Hillman et al. 2000 Resource dependence Environmental change SC 
74 Myllys 1999 Managing change Survival SC 
82 Goold 1996 
Corporate governance and 
strategy "Cadbury" SC 
87 
Gopinath and 
Siciliano 1994 Strategy Theories perspective SC 
89 Sadtler 1993 
Strategy more than command and 
control Large and complex organisations SC and FC 
97 Millich 1988 Merger agreements Corporate law SC 
98 Pinnell 1986 
Planning (strategy formulating 
and implementation/monitoring) Stage perspective SC and FC 
101 Wilider 1985 Technology push Market change innovation SC 
104 Molz 1985 
Not as trustees for S/H. Exercise 
control/economic decisions Focus SC and FC 
106 
Tashakori et 
al 1983 Strategic planning Examine the current status SC 
112 Boulton 1978 Information needs 
Increases dramatically with increased 
board activity FC 
114 Boulton 1978 "Socially oriented" Public and government regulation SC 
 
2.4.2 Information Role Perspective 
Similar to the board role perspective, the literature is reviewed from an information role perspective. 
An initial search on information role literature found 458 studies of which 384 are in the general 
information category and 74 are in the specific information category (accounting and finance 
information) (refer to Table 2.2A). A sorting process then required the reviewed studies to offer useful 
insight into this study’s information objectives namely the board’s decision-making; monitoring and 
control roles; firm performance, and strategy.   
The sorting process of the 384 studies in the general information category considered each study’s 
findings, type and use of information; the context; and the responsibility level the information was 
aimed at (refer to Table 2.2B). Seventy-six of the 384 studies, providing useful insight into the role of 
information, are summarised into the eight general categories (refer to Table 2.2A). The sorting 
process suggests that the literature, offering studies from an information perspective, could be seen as 
relevant and useful to the type of information boards require. However, the "level aimed at" analysis 
does not include boards or directors. Similarly, 32 out of the 74 studies from the specific information 
29 
 
 
category (refer to Table 2.2C) offering useful insight into decision-making and monitoring of 
performance from an accounting and finance perspective, did not include boards or directors. 
Table 2.2A Summary of the Information Role Literature Review 
Category General Information Category Ref Code Surveyed Useful % contributed 
1 Decision-making 7 97 10 10% 
2 Performance monitoring 5 42 1 2% 
3 Financial performance  8 43 5 12% 
4 Decision-making and performance 3 25 9 36% 
5 Firm performance 6 58 7 12% 
6 Strategy 4 62 18 29% 
7 Management 2 30 12 40% 
8 Management decision-making 1 27 14 52% 
    Total 384 76 20% 
  Specific Information Category         
9 Performance: Finance 10 31 18 58% 
10 Performance: Accounting 9 43 14 33% 
    Total 74 32 43% 
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Table 2.2C Specific Information Category Review 
Record Role Type Use 
9.01 Prediction Financial statement information Book return on owners’ equity 
9.02 Bench-marking Management account information Performance measurement 
9.03 Audit judgment Audit processing information Judgment reference 
9.04 
Benefits of alternative income 
statement format Matrix income statement format Performance reporting 
9.05 Government organisation 
Citizenship vs customer 
perspectives Performance information 
9.06 Interface/integrate 
Management accounting, resource 
cost, customer needs Product level decisions 
9.07 Impact of workers trust Shared account information Management performance 
9.08 Provide relevant information 
Account information for investment 
decision-making Residual income model 
9.09 Competitive disadvantage Segmented information Segmented reports (ASB 22) 
9.10 Executive bonus plans 
Account rated returns vs earnings 
alone Executive performance evaluation 
9.11 
Information content in impairment 
test Goodwill accounting 
Discrimination viable investment 
projects 
9.16 Measuring resources Information assets (IP) 
Knowledge-based company 
performance 
9.19 
Management accounting 
information improves ability to 
develop relevant information Task vs domain experience Provide high quality information advice 
9.26 
Value relevance of financial and 
non-financial information 
Non-financial (effective) financial 
only when combined 
Share valuation (communications 
industry) 
10.01 Stock splits Information content Operational performance 
10.02 Option markets Information content Stock/share returns 
10.03 Mutual funds Public and private Fund manager performance 
10.06 Inflation Forecast Forecast performance 
10.07 Security breaches Event study Abnormal returns performance 
10.08 Earnings pre-announcements Information content Earnings performance 
10.10 Inflation Monetary indicators Euro area (Division M3 M1) 
10.11 Macro economy 
Forecasting horizons (market 
information) Forecasting performance 
10.12 Fund management Maximum information ratios Risk adjustment performance 
10.15 Cross listing Mexican company with USA Financial performance 
10.16 Ethics, equity, social justice Financial information Social score 
10.18 Equity offerings Information content Future operations performance 
10.19 Role of financial analysts Staging information Critic between firms and investments 
10.20 Extension of CAPM Conditioning information Asset pricing 
10.21 Foreign acquisitions Information signalling Stock price effects 
10.22 Mutual funds Premiums and discounts on CECFs Future returns 
10.23 Voluntary disclosure Private information of firms Insider trading 
10.27 Review of studies Budgetary information Performance evaluation 
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2.5 OBSERVING CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 
The Zahra and Pearce II (1989) seminal study offers firm financial performance as the criteria related 
to shareholder wealth. It refers to two financial performance measures, namely accounting 
performance, which includes return on assets, return on equity and dividend per share, and market-
based criteria. Zahra and Pearce II (1989) also refer to systemic (focus on a firm's survival and growth) 
and social performance (corporate response to changing societal expectations); however, studies prior 
to the early 1990s, from a theoretical perspective, focus mostly on financial criteria. For example, 
while resource dependence theory studies include only financial performance of the organisation, and 
class hegemony theory includes systemic performance, accounting-based financial performance 
dominates these studies. The situation is the same for agency theory studies, except market-based 
financial performance is more prevalent. By the start of 2000 there was no consensus as to what 
constituted appropriate measures of corporate financial performance (Johnson et al., 1996). Studies in 
this period include return on assets; return on equity; and return on investment, profit margins and 
price earnings ratios. In addition, these measures were reported in single and multiple lagged years, 
adjusted for industry effects and to account for risk. Johnson et al. (1996) conclude that the lack of 
consensus on choice and operationalisation of dependent variables severely limits the generalisability 
of governance research findings (p. 430). In the same period, Wagner, Stimpert et al.’s (1998) meta 
analysis study, though specific to board structure, coded organisational performance according to 
accounting or non-accounting measures, where non-accounting performance included sales and share 
performance. By the mid-2000s, Dalton, Daily et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis suggests both accounting 
and market-based measures are relevant as a result of the differing functions in the nature of the 
performance measure. Essential behavioural distinctions argue accounting-based measures are subject 
to managerial manipulation and difficult to interpret across industry context, while market-based 
measures are sometimes beyond a manager’s direct control.  
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2.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter establishes the gap and paucity in the board literature on the role that information plays 
in supporting effective boards. The board role literature is reviewed from a multi-disciplined 
perspective, and a three period review is presented. In addition, the board and strategy and MCS and 
strategy literature is reviewed. A sorting process of 458 studies revealed 108 studies are seen as 
relevant and useful to the type of information boards require, but none included boards or directors. In 
addition, 45 studies are consistent with the board’s strategic role shift and as such, their information 
requirements, over the last 20 years. Chapter 3 develops the theory and propositions.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
There is research evidence that certain board practices are associated with board effectiveness and 
organisational performance (Lawler et al., 2002). Boards that have better information practises, for 
example having a range of indicators for organisational success and benchmarking against top 
performance in comparable industries, perform their roles more effectively, as evident in the firm’s 
accounting and share market returns (Lawler et al., 2002). Most of the board’s time is spent on 
implementing, monitoring and shaping the firm strategy (Lawler et al., 2002). There is, however, no 
evidence as to the nature of the information that is associated with board effectiveness and, in turn, 
higher organisational performance.  
Research from an organisational control perspective does, however, offer theories and frameworks 
that identify with information attributes, the board’s control role and firm strategy, which are 
promising in this regard. This research argues that boards are more effective in delivering better firm 
performance when an interaction is observed among information attributes found in Strategic 
Performance Measurement Systems (SPMS) (Kaplan & Norton, 1996), the firm’s strategic 
configuration (Langfield-Smith, 1997) and the board’s control role (Hendry & Kiel, 2004). This 
chapter develops the theory on this argument and determines the independent and dependent variables 
used to test this theory in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
In determining this research’s theory, three constructs (independent variables) are investigated (refer 
to Figure 3.5): Construct S – the firm’s strategic configuration, Construct B – the board’s control role 
type, and Construct I – the information attributes in SPMS. In addition, a Composite Index of Firm 
Performance (dependent variables) is determined where the firm’s financial performance measures 
fall into two categories, accounting and shareholder returns (Cochran & Wood, 1984; Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998). 
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This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.1 develops the theory that determines the three constructs:  
S, B and I, which are the independent variables. Section 3.2 develops the theory to determine the 
Composite Index of Firm Performance, which is the dependent variable. Section 3.3 presents the 
research propositions, diagram, and hypotheses. Section 3.4 summarises the chapter.  
3.1 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE CONSTRUCTS 
This section develops the strategy, board control role, and information constructs.  
3.1.1 Strategic Configuration  
Relying on the accepted position that performance measurement directs attention and motivates 
management to act in strategically consistent ways, Langfield-Smith (1997) proposes a Prospector 
(entrepreneur) and Defender (conservative) strategic dichotomy (refer to Figure 3.1).  
Figure 3.1 MCS and Strategy Configuration (Langfield-Smith 1997, p. 213)  
 
 
 
 
 
Langfield-Smith (1997) argues that prospectors compete via a differentiation strategic positioning and 
pursue build strategic missions, while defenders compete with cost leadership strategic positioning 
and hold/harvest missions. In PMS evaluation, prospectors identify with behavioural, ex-ante, and 
pre-implementation information characteristics, which are of a feed-forward nature and subjective 
(Langfield-Smith, 1997). The PMS evaluation of defenders has outcome, output, and results 
information characteristics, which are of a feedback nature, often financially orientated and objective. 
In addition, Gupta (1987) found subjective performance assessment to be consistent with a 
Prospector (entrepreneur) Defender (conservative)   
2 
3 
2 ? 
2 2 
 Build     Hold     Harvest 
Cost leadership 
Differentiation 
2 
2 
3 3 
? ? 
 Build     Hold     Harvest 
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differentiation positioning, build mission, and prospector combination, but inconsistent with cost 
leadership positioning. 
Prospectors are described as continually searching for market opportunities and as being the creators 
of change and uncertainty to which their competitors must respond. The marketing and research and 
development functions dominate finance and production, so efficiency and profit performance are not 
as important as maintaining industry leadership in product innovation (Langfield-Smith, 1997). 
Defenders have a narrow product range and undertake little product or market development. The 
functions critical for organisational success are finance, production, and engineering, with less 
emphasis on marketing and research and development (Langfield-Smith, 1997). 
In developing Construct S, this research sees the prospector/entrepreneur and defender/conservative 
strategic configurations as being a dichotomous strategic choice taken by each board. 
3.1.2 Board Control Role 
Boards of directors are a legal requirement for incorporation, and are responsible for governance and 
as such, they have become the source of much research. The Economics and Finance (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003), Management (Pye, 2001; Zahra & Pearce II, 1989), Accounting (Cravens & 
Wallace, 2001), and Corporate Governance (Denis, 2001; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997a) disciplines 
describe the impact boards have on their immediate environment. As an institution, boards of 
directors, inherent in the separation of ownership and control (agency theory), are an efficient form of 
economic organisation (Fama, 1980) and are endogenous. However, whilst formal theory on boards is 
quite limited, the literature has expanded as a result of empirical studies (Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2003). This research seeks to understand the board’s control role in relation to Management Control 
Systems (MCS) and strategy and as such, two arguments become evident. First, board theoretical 
perspectives support an active or passive board role in strategy, with the academic literature 
demonstrating a shift away from passive to an active role; and second, the board’s control role is 
based on a strategic and financial control dichotomy (Hendry & Kiel, 2004).   
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Board Active / Passive Strategic Role  
Seminal work by Zahra and Pearce II (1989) introduces an integrative model in the study of boards. 
Considered by many to be a good research starting point (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; Johnson et al., 
1996), it presents four distinct theoretical perspectives that guide the roles of boards of directors: 
legalistic, resource dependence, class/managerial hegemony and agency theory. These perspectives 
draw their theoretical origins from diverse disciplines, such as sociology, corporate law, economics, 
finance, and organisational theory and differ meaningfully in their views of what directors do. With its 
theoretical origins in corporate law, the legalistic perspective is outside the boundaries of this study. 
However, given the emphasis and argument that the strategic role of the board contributes to the 
overall stewardship of the firm (Hung, 1998), the study does consider stewardship theory (Davis et al., 
1997). The nature of a board’s contribution and, consequently, the expectations placed upon it, means 
that its information requirement depends crucially on which theoretical perspective is adopted. 
Hendry and Kiel (2004) align the board theoretical perspectives to introduce a “two schools of 
thought” approach, referred to in the literature as strategic “active” and “passive” boards (Golden & 
Zajac, 2001). Supported by both board theory and academic literature, the passive school views 
boards as rubber stamps or as tools of top management whose only contribution is to satisfy the 
requirements of company law (Stiles, 2001). Across the continuum, the active school sees boards as 
independent thinkers who shape the strategic direction of their organisations (Walsh & Seward, 1990). 
Board Strategic and Financial Control Role 
Hendry and Kiel (2004) develop a typology for the board's control role in strategy, based on two 
constructs: strategic and financial (Gupta, 1987; Hitt et al., 1990) and argue that “there is a parallel 
between these control systems and those exercised by boards over top management” (Hendry & Kiel, 
2004, p. 511). Strategic control involves behavioural and subjective assessment of strategic decisions 
pre-implementation. Boards that emphasise financial control favour an outcome role in strategy, 
setting mostly financial targets and exerting influence over management at the end of the resource 
allocation decision process. 
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Strategic control boards shape the: 
1. Context of strategy by setting the conditions under which the strategy process happens in 
firms;  
2. Content of strategy by requiring that management justify their intentions by evaluating 
alternatives and by continuously monitoring progress during this formulation and assessment 
stage; and  
3. Conduct of strategy by continuously monitoring implementation and results and by making 
changes where appropriate. 
Strategic control involves the board exerting a continuous process of formal and informal influence 
over management, beginning early in strategy development and involving iterative consultation from 
development through to implementation and evaluation. 
It also involves the board evaluating management based on their strategic proposals pre-
implementation, as well as on the financial results post-implementation. 
Financial control boards:  
1. Set financial targets only and take strategic decisions relative to these targets by approving, 
rejecting, or referring strategic proposals back to management;  
2. Exert episodic influence over management at formal board meetings and only at the end of 
the resource allocation decision process; and  
3. Evaluate management primarily on the financial results of the firm. 
To illustrate the board’s control role in strategy, Hendry and Kiel (2004) develop a typology for 
characterising a board’s control role in strategy (refer to Figure 3.2). Consistent with agency, 
stewardship, and resource dependent theory perspectives, both strategic and financial controls would 
be associated with an active board role. Conversely, neither strategic nor financial controls would be 
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associated with a passive board role (consistent with a managerial hegemony theory perspective). The 
academic literature demonstrates a shift away from a passive (rubber stamp) role to an active (board 
as management) role (Hendry & Kiel, 2004). 
Figure 3.2 Board Control Role Typology (Hendry & Kiel 2004, p. 512) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In PMS evaluation, Hendry and Kiel (2004) define strategic control as behavioural and involving 
subjective assessment of strategic decisions pre-implementation and financial control as outcome and 
involving primarily financial performance post-implementation.  
In developing Construct B, this research identifies with the board’s strategic and financial control 
roles in firm strategy.  In addition to developing Construct B, Hendry and Kiel (2004) propose that the 
board’s relative emphasis between strategic and financial control is contingent upon three factors: 
environmental uncertainty, board power, and information asymmetry. Hendry and Kiel (2004) 
propose that high levels of environmental uncertainty and board power are positively (negatively) 
related to strategic control (financial control). Information asymmetry is negatively (positively) 
related to strategic control (financial control). Environmental uncertainty is measured using the survey 
questions developed by Gordon and Narayanan (1984) (refer to Appendix 3A). Board power is 
measured by CEO duality, relative tenure, co-opting, and outside share ownership as proposed by 
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Zajac and Westphal (1996). Information asymmetry is measured using the survey questions offered 
by Rutherford and Buchholtz (2007) (refer to Appendix 3B).  
3.1.3 Information Attributes  
Integrated organisational control theory and an economic control (agency theory) approach, 
accomplishes control through two performance evaluation types: behavioural-based and outcome-
based (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979). These evaluation types emphasise the information aspects of 
control. Behavioural control is seen as a set of rules with regards to the organisation’s transformation 
process or task programmability (Ouchi, 1979). From an MCS and strategy point of view, they are a 
feed-forward or ex-ante control requiring ongoing monitoring and decisions and are subjective in 
nature (Langfield-Smith, 1997). Outcome control is an appropriate evaluation of performance when 
the organisation’s goals and objectives can be clearly stated and the outcomes clearly measured 
(Eisenhardt, 1985). Characterised as feedback controls from an MCS and strategy point of view, they 
are objective in nature. They include output or results controls and are financially orientated 
(Langfield-Smith, 1997).  
Information that easily translates into “the ongoing monitoring of a set of rules,” “strategic programs 
of a feed-forward nature,” and “low outcome measurability” is associated with strategic control in the 
Hendry and Kiel (2004) typology. Information of a feedback nature, which includes output or results 
control and where task programmability is imperfect, is associated with financial control in the 
Hendry and Kiel (2004) typology. 
This research identifies with Information Attributes of Strategic Performance Measurement Systems 
(SPMS) in developing Construct I. While traditional performance measurement systems identify with 
past performance and comply with pre-established plans, contemporary performance measurement 
systems, for example, the balanced scorecard, are used as communication, information, and learning 
systems (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). This research identifies with the information attributes in the 
drivers of outcome measures and outcome measures found in SPMS (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). 
Information attributes of drivers of outcomes are: (a) subjective, (b) pre-implementation, and (c) lead 
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indicators of controls that articulate the strategy of the business but only for two perspectives of the 
balanced scorecard. Information attributes of outcomes are: (a) objective, (b) post-implementation, 
and (c) lag indicators of controls but only for two perspectives of the balanced scorecard (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996).   
Measuring Information Attributes 
In determining Construct I, this research identifies with the information attributes found in the drivers 
of outcomes and outcomes in SPMS. To measure Construct I, Kaplan and Norton (1996) offer generic 
measures found in two of their four Balanced Scorecard perspectives: financial and customers. 
Financial: The measures found in three financial themes: revenue growth/mix, cost 
reduction/productivity improvement, and asset utilisation/investment strategy can be categorised into 
a business unit’s growth (build), sustain (hold), and harvest missions (refer to Figure 3.3) (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996). The financial themes correlate with the firm’s strategy (refer to Figure 3.1). The 
information attributes of drivers of outcomes found in the financial theme of growth strategies (sales 
growth rates, percentage revenue from new product, services and customers, investment, and R&D 
percentage of sales) are consistent with a prospector/entrepreneur strategy (refer to Figure 3.1) and a 
strategic control board (refer to Figure 3.2). Similarly, the information attributes of outcomes found in 
the financial themes of sustain and harvest strategies are consistent with a defender/conservative 
strategy (refer to Figure 3.1) and a financial control board (refer to Figure 3.2).  
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Figure 3.3 Measures for Strategies and Financial Themes (Kaplan & Norton 1996,   
p. 58) 
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Customer: Kaplan and Norton (1996) offer three categories of Customer Value Propositions (refer to 
Figure 3.4): products/service attributes (encompassing functionality, price and quality), 
image/reputation (proactively defining the firm for its customers), and customer relationship (includes 
delivery, response time and purchasing experience dimensions). The customer value propositions 
have lead indicator information attributes and are associated with drivers of outcomes. The generic 
customer measures: satisfaction, acquisition, and retention (refer to Figure 3.4) have lag indicator 
information attributes and are associated with the outcomes. It would be consistent for strategic 
control boards to identify with customer value information and financial control boards to identify 
with customer satisfaction, acquisition and, retention measures (refer to Figure 3.2).  
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Figure 3.4 Customer Measures (Kaplan & Norton 1996, p. 62) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The board literature identifies with both accounting and market-based measures as a function of the 
nature of firm performance (Dalton & Dalton, 2005; Wagner III et al., 1998; Zahra & Pearce II, 
1989). The literature argues that there are essential distinctions between the two measures. 
Accounting-based measures (return on equity - ROE, return on assets - ROA, profit margins, earnings 
per share - EPS, sales, and sales growth) are subject to managerial manipulation and are difficult to 
interpret across industry contexts, while market-based measures (share performance and shareholder 
returns) are sometimes beyond management's direct control. As such, Muth and Donaldson (1998) 
and Hamilton and Shergill (1992) generate a Composite Index of Firm Performance that subjects 
multiple firm performance measures to factor analysis based on weightings. Common in board 
studies, the Composite Index of Firm Performance’s multiple measure (accounting and shareholder 
returns) approach is used because of the inherit limitations in any single performance measure 
(Rechner & Dalton, 1991). In addition, Cochran and Wood (1984) suggest performance measures fall 
into two broad categories, namely investor returns and accounting returns.  
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3.3 RESEARCH PROPOSITION, DIAGRAM AND HYPOTHESES 
Contemporary performance measurement systems argue that performance measures that describe 
aspects of the implementation of the firm’s strategy are more likely to be associated with better firm 
performance. The theory developed in Section 3.1 and 3.2 presents a framework for hypothesising an 
interaction among information attributes found in SPMS, the board’s control role, and the firm’s 
strategy that will be associated with enhanced firm performance. This proposition is represented in the 
below formula and research diagram (refer to Figure 3.5).   
FP = ƒ (Strategic Configuration [S]; Board Control Role Type [B]; Information Attributes [I]) 
Figure 3.5 The Research Diagram            
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(Lawler et al., 2002). Research also suggests that SPMS drivers of outcomes (outcomes) have lead 
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with prospector (defender) strategies (Langfield-Smith, 1997). In addition, the lead and subjective (lag 
and objective) information attributes are also associated with the board’s strategic control role 
(financial control role) (Hendry & Kiel, 2004).  
As such, this study argues that there is a three-way interaction among Information Attributes, the 
firm’s Strategic Configuration, and the Board’s Control Role Type. This research hypothesises a 
three-way interaction among the three independent variables as follows:  
P1:  Proposes a three-way interaction among Strategic Configuration, Board Control Role Type, 
and Information Attributes, which when aligned will be associated with superior Firm 
Performance. 
Stated in the Null:                                                         
H10: There is no association with the three-way interaction among Strategic 
Configuration, Board Control Role Type and Information Attributes, and Firm 
Performance. 
Stated in the Alternative: 
H1a: The three-way interaction among Strategic Configuration, Board Control Role 
Type and, Information Attributes is associated with superior Firm Performance. 
Statistically: FP = β0 + β1 (S*B*I) + β2 (S*B) + β3 (S*I) + β4 (B*I) + β5 (S) + β6 (B) + β7 (I) + r 
Hypotheses 2(a) and 2(b) 
Should the three-way interaction null hypothesis be supported, the sample will be split into prospector 
and defender strategy groups, and two-way interactions will be tested as follows: 
Prospector Group: 
Research suggests that SPMS drivers of outcomes (lead and subjective) and information attributes 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1996) are associated with the board’s strategic control role (Hendry & Kiel, 2004) 
in prospector strategies. As such:  
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P2(a):  Proposes that for prospector firms, the alignment of the strategic Board Control Role system 
and Information Attributes will be associated with superior Firm Performance. 
Stated in the Null: 
H2(a)0: For prospector Strategic Configuration firms there is no association between 
the interaction of strategic Board Control Role system and Information Attributes and 
superior Firm Performance. 
Stated in the Alternative: 
H2(a)a: Prospector Strategic Configuration firms whose boards choose a strategic 
Control Role system, incorporating driver information measures, are associated with 
superior Firm Performance. 
Statistically: FP = α0 + α1 (B*I) + α2 (B) + α3 (I) + r 
Defender Group: 
Research suggests that SPMS outcomes (lag and objective) and information attributes (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996) are associated with the board’s financial control role (Hendry & Kiel, 2004) in 
defender strategies.  
As such:  
P2(b):  Proposes that for defender firms the alignment of financial Board Control Role system and 
Information Attributes will be associated with superior Firm Performance.  
Stated in the Null: 
H2(b)0: For defender Strategic Configuration firms there is no association between 
the interaction of financial Board Control Role system and Information Attributes and 
superior Firm Performance. 
 
 
 
52 
 
 
Stated in the Alternative: 
H2(b)a: Defender Strategic Configuration firms whose boards choose a financial 
Control Role system, incorporating output information measures, are associated with 
superior Firm Performance. 
Statistically: FP = α0 + α1 (B*I) + α2 (B) + α3 (I) + r 
Hypotheses 3 
Should no significant two-way interactions be observed, then the main effects will be tested for 
association with superior Firm Performance. 
 
P3(i):  Proposes that Strategic Configuration is associated with superior Firm Performance. 
Stated in the Null:  
H3(i)0: There is no association between Strategic Configuration and Firm 
Performance. 
Stated in the Alternative:  
H3(i)a: Strategic Configuration is associated with superior Firm Performance. 
Statistically: FP = γ0 + γ1 (S) + r 
 
P3(ii):  Proposes that Board Control Role type is associated with superior Firm Performance. 
Stated in the Null:  
H3(ii)0: There is no association between Board Control Role type and Firm 
Performance. 
Stated in the Alternative:  
H3(ii)a: Board Control Role type is associated with superior Firm Performance. 
Statistically: FP = γ0 + γ1 (B) + r 
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P3(iii):  Proposes that Information Attributes are associated with superior Firm Performance. 
Stated in the Null:  
H3(iii)0: There is no association between Information Attributes and Firm 
Performance. 
Stated in the Alternative:  
H3(iii)a: Information Attributes is associated with superior Firm Performance. 
Statistically: FP = γ0 + γ1 (I) + r 
3.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter develops the theory that determines both the independent variables: Constructs S, B, and 
I; and the dependent variable: the Composite Index of Firm Performance. Construct S is the firm’s 
Strategic Configuration and identifies with the Langfield-Smith (1997) prospector/entrepreneur and 
defender/conservative strategic dichotomy. Construct B is the Board’s Control Role and identifies 
with the Hendry and Kiel (2004) strategic control and financial control typology. Construct I is the 
Information Attributes and identifies with drivers of outcomes and outcomes as offered by SPMS and 
are measured by the generic financial and customer measures in the Balanced Scorecard offered by 
Kaplan and Norton (1996).  
The dependent variable is the Composite Index of Firm Performance as offered by Muth and 
Donaldson (1998) and Hamilton and Shergill (1992). To generate the Composite Index of Firm 
Performance, multiple performance measures are subjected to factor analysis.  
The methodology to test the theory and hypotheses developed in this chapter is presented in Chapter 
4. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
4.0  INTRODUCTION 
The discussion in Chapter 2 and the theoretical development and hypothesis in Chapter 3 propose a 
three-way interaction between the firm’s Strategic Configuration, the Information Attributes 
associated with implementing the firm's strategy, and the Board’s Control Role type. In Chapter 3 it 
was hypothesised that the proposed three-way interaction among these variables will be associated 
with enhanced Firm Performance. Firm Performance is the dependent variable and is the criterion 
against which the hypothesised three-way interaction will be tested. This chapter describes the 
research methodology used to obtain the data to test this proposition. In testing the proposition, this 
research relies on the requirement for companies registered on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
to have a board of directors and in addition, either implicitly or explicitly stated, that they will have 
strategies. As such, the data collected are from the publicly listed companies registered on the ASX.  
The chapter is structured in the following manner: Section 4.1 presents an overview of the data 
collection, survey methods, and the board chairperson. Section 4.2 describes and summarises the 
survey, details the pilot testing, and presents the cover letters; Section 4.3 explains the archival 
sources of data; Section 4.4 details the statistical methodology; and Section 4.5 discusses the survey 
outcomes and response bias. Section 4.6 summarises the chapter.  
4.1  OVERVIEW 
4.1.1 Data Collection 
Two methods of collecting data were used: archival and a survey. Archival data was sourced from 
data bases of public company disclosures and reports, which provided firm performance and corporate 
governance data, but represents less than 20% of the variables required. A survey was used for the 
remainder of the variables. It asked about the extent to which boards draw on certain types of 
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information in implementing their strategies, the extent to which boards identify with the strategic 
roles described in the literature, and the firm’s Strategic Configuration. The combination of both 
archival and survey methods has often been deployed in this type of research. For example, a study 
investigating the relationship between board characteristics and board information adopted the survey 
and archival database method of data collection (Rutherford & Buchholtz, 2007). Use of surveys is 
also established; for example, a study examining the relationship between strategy and subjective and 
objective information attributes, where the performance measures were department specific, uses a 
survey method of data collection (van der Stede, Chow, & Lin, 2006). 
4.1.2 Survey Methods 
While it is necessary to acknowledge that survey methods expose studies to internal validity threats, 
this research is concerned with eliciting facts and beliefs from the board’s experiences in the context 
examined. Survey methods offer this strength when, as is the case in this research, external validity is 
at a premium. This research selected a written survey questionnaire via a mail or web option. The 
survey was sent to a specifically identified individual, thus avoiding anonymity, to elicit a candid and 
a more carefully considered response. In addition, and consistent with the decreasing response rate 
norm on all types of surveys (Brooks, Oliver, & Veljanovski, 2009; Toourangeau & Source, 2004), a 
low response rate of 7.2% experienced in this research is acknowledged.  
4.1.3 Chairperson 
The methodology requires that each company complete one survey, thereby eliminating contradicting 
or conflicting data in the collection process. The board “chairs” of Australian companies are reported 
(Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2007) as being held accountable for both the board and firm performance 
and are “stewards” of the vision of the company. In addition, Australian chairpersons, jointly with 
CEOs, determine the nature of the role delineation of the board (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2007). As 
such, each survey was addressed to the chairperson of the Australian company registered on the ASX. 
Where the ASX Company did not identify a chair of the board (which equated to 6.7% of the total 
sample of companies surveyed), the director with the longest tenure was selected. 
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4.2  THE SURVEY 
The survey was structured into six sections: A to F (refer to Appendix 4A). Each section has specific 
questions that are used to develop and measure the variables in testing the research hypotheses 
detailed in Chapter 3. Each question elicited responses on a seven-point Likert scale to allow the 
board chairperson flexibility in a more carefully considered response. In addition, each section’s 
questions are specifically related to and address the variables described in Chapter 3, resulting in four 
sets of questions directed at measuring the four required variables. To manage this relationship, the 
four constructs in the research diagram in Chapter 3 were named (refer to Figure 4.1). Three 
constructs represent the independent variables and the fourth represents the dependent variable. 
Construct S relates to questions that are specific to the firm’s Strategic Configuration. Construct B is 
the Board’s Control Role type and Construct I is Information Attributes. The Firm Performance 
Construct (FP) draws its inputs from archival data. Each of the survey sections (A to F) relative to the 
constructs are discussed after Figure 4.1.  
Figure 4.1 The Four Constructs 
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Survey Questions Section A: Construct I 
Construct I 
Question 
Number Survey Question Source 
Section A 
Please indicate to what extent your Board draws on the following 
financial information:   
Q1 Sales growth Kaplan, R. S. and D. P. Norton (1996) 
Q2 
Sales in new markets and to new customers and/or Sales from new 
products and services Kaplan, R. S. and D. P. Norton (1996) 
Q3 
Investment and spending levels in for e.g. product and process 
development (R&D), systems and employee capabilities Kaplan, R. S. and D. P. Norton (1996) 
Q4 
Investment in the establishment of new marketing, sales and 
distribution channels Kaplan, R. S. and D. P. Norton (1996) 
Q5  
Traditional Measures such as Return on Capital Employed, operating 
income, gross margins etc Kaplan, R. S. and D. P. Norton (1996) 
Q6 
Traditional measures for investment projects e.g. Discounted Cash 
flow and  Capital Budgeting Analysis Kaplan, R. S. and D. P. Norton (1996) 
Q7 Cash Flow Kaplan, R. S. and D. P. Norton (1996) 
Q8 
Asset utilisation for e.g. working capital ratios, paybacks and 
throughput Kaplan, R. S. and D. P. Norton (1996) 
 
Modern strategic performance measurement systems (SPMS) have information attributes that offer a 
balance between desired outcomes (hard objective measures) and drivers of those outcomes (softer 
more subjective measures) (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). These measurements also have information 
attributes that are characterised as either "before the event" (known as ‘lead’ measures), which are of 
a strategic and behavioural control nature; or "after the event" (known as ‘lag’ measures), which have 
a financial and outcome control nature. Kaplan and Norton’s (1996) experience in observing and 
building scorecards offers generic “outcome” and “driver of outcome” measures in both the financial 
and customer perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard. 
Kaplan and Norton (1996) categorise financial performance measures into three financial themes that 
differ depending on the strategy situation of the firm: growth, sustain, or harvest strategies. This 
research re-categorises the generic financial measures into two relevant prospector/entrepreneur 
(growth) and defender/conservative (sustain/harvest) strategies consistent with Langfield-Smith 
(1997).  
Section A of the survey includes questions addressing both the generic financial outcomes and drivers 
of outcome measures in Construct I. 
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Familiar financial performance measures, such as return on capital employed; operating income and 
gross margins, together with investment discounted cash flow and capital budgeting measurements; 
cash flow and asset utilisation are the generic financial outcomes measures and are consistent with the 
defender/conservative strategy (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). 
Sales growth, sales in new markets, and sales from new products and services, together with 
investment and spending levels in research and development, and the establishment of new markets 
and distribution channels are the generic drivers of outcomes measures and are consistent with the 
prospect/entrepreneur strategy (Kaplan & Norton, 1996).  
The theory developed in Chapter 3 proposes that strategic information attributes, which are 
characterised as drivers of outcomes, are likely to best support a prospector Strategic Configuration 
and strategic Control Type boards. Similarly, financial information attributes are characterised as 
outcomes and will support defender strategies and financial control type boards. 
The objective of the survey, arising out of the theoretical proposal of this research, was to capture the 
data that will in turn be used to examine the relationship of strategic information attributes and 
financial information attributes to the firm’s Strategic Configuration and the Board’s Control Role 
type. 
The first four questions (1-4) in Section A of the survey explore the firm’s reliance on strategic 
information attributes. As the drivers of the financial outcomes, they are the lead measures. The 
second four questions (5 - 8) in Section A are about financial information attributes and are lag 
outcome measures. All questions in Section A probe the extent to which the board draws on financial 
information. 
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Survey Questions Section B: Construct I 
 
Kaplan and Norton (1996) offer generic measures of customer outcomes and drivers of outcomes. 
Described as value propositions, the drivers, together with the outcome, are organised into three 
categories: 
x Product/Service Attributes encompass the functionality of the product/service, its price, its 
uniqueness, and quality. The attributes drive customer acquisition outcomes. 
x Image and Reputation dimensions enable the company to define itself for its customers in the 
form of brand equity and drives customer satisfaction outcomes. 
x Relationship dimensions include delivery, convenience, trust, and response and drive 
customer retention outcomes. 
Six questions (9 -14) in Section B of the survey, three lag and three lead measures, ask about the 
extent to which the board draws on customer/client information. The customer value proposition 
drivers have strategic information attributes, while the customer outcome measures are consistent with 
Construct I 
Question 
Number Survey Question Source 
Section B 
Please indicate to what extent your Board draws on the following 
customer/client information:   
Q9 Customer/client satisfaction measures Kaplan, R. S. and D. P. Norton (1996) 
Q10 
Image and reputation dimensions which enables the company to pro-
actively define itself for its customers e.g. brand equity Kaplan, R. S. and D. P. Norton (1996) 
Q11 Customer/client acquisition measures Kaplan, R. S. and D. P. Norton (1996) 
Q12 
Product/service attributes (encompass the functionality of the product 
/service, its price, its uniqueness, and its quality) Kaplan, R. S. and D. P. Norton (1996) 
Q13 Customer/client retention measures Kaplan, R. S. and D. P. Norton (1996) 
Q14 
Customer/client relationship dimension (includes product/service 
delivery e.g. convenience, trust and response) Kaplan, R. S. and D. P. Norton (1996) 
Section F     
Q41 
To what extent can the information your Board receives be described 
as “outcomes” which is characterised as objective, financial, 
feedback and after the event type information Not applicable 
Q42 
To what extent can the information your Board receives be described 
as “drivers of outcomes” which is characterised as subjective, 
behavioural, feed-forward and before the event type information Not applicable 
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financial information attributes being objective and lag measures. 
Kaplan and Norton (1996) describe the learning and growth and internal business process of the 
Balanced Scorecard using case studies. Further research, using case study methodology, could 
determine the board’s use of driver of outcomes and outcome information attributes from the learning 
and growth and internal business process perspectives. However, given there are no generic measures 
for the learning and growth and internal business process perspectives, they are not included in the 
survey or as part of this research.  
In addition to using the generic financial and customer perspectives in strategic performance 
measurement systems, a more direct approach was used to elicit information about boards’ reliance on 
strategic and/or financial information attributes. Questions 41 and 42 of Section F describe outcomes 
and drivers of outcome measures respectively, and then ask to what extent boards agree that their own 
information could be characterised as either outcomes or drivers of outcomes. 
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Survey Questions Section C and E: Construct B 
Construct B 
Question 
Number Survey Question Source 
Section C How intense is each of the following in your industry?   
Q15 Bidding for purchases or raw materials 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
Q16 Competition for manpower 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
Q17 Price competition 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
    
Q18 
How many new products and/or services have been marketed during the 
past 5 years by your industry? 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
    
  
How stable/dynamic is the external environment (economic and 
technological) facing your firm? 
Q19 Economic 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
Q20 Technological 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
    
Q21 
How would you classify the market activities of your competitors during 
the past 5 years?     
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
Q22 
During the past 5 years, the tastes and preferences of your customers have 
become 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
Q23 
During the past 5 years, the legal, political and economic constraints 
surrounding your firm have 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
Q24 How often do new technological advances emerge in your industry? 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
Section E 
Q31 In general, the information available to the board is very reliable 
 Rutherford, M. A. and A. K. 
Buchholtz (2007) 
Q32 In general, the available information is relevant to the board’s needs 
 Rutherford, M. A. and A. K. 
Buchholtz (2007) 
Q33 In general, the board receives information in a timely fashion 
 Rutherford, M. A. and A. K. 
Buchholtz (2007) 
Q34 
At a typical board meeting, the board actively probes for information 
necessary to carry out their duties 
 Rutherford, M. A. and A. K. 
Buchholtz (2007) 
 
Hendry and Kiel (2004) developed a theoretical perspective to explain the role of the board in strategy. 
Integrating organisational control and agency theory, they argue that boards exercise a system of 
financial and strategic control. In their typology, Hendry and Kiel (2004) argue that boards that 
exercise a system of both financial and strategic control are classed as “board as management”. Those 
that exercise neither are classed as “rubber stamp” boards. Boards exercise their control in a parallel 
or similar manner to those used by corporate managers and top management teams (TMT). The 
degree to which boards exercise financial or strategic control is dependent upon three contingent 
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factors: environmental uncertainty, board power, and information asymmetry. Taking an indirect 
approach, this research makes use of these contingent factors to establish the Board’s Control Role in 
strategy. 
x Environmental uncertainty: Gordan and Narayanan (1984), in finding that decision-makers 
seek management accounting information (i.e. non-financial and lead indicators) under 
greater perceived environmental uncertainty, offer a series of questions designed to predict 
industrial, economic, technological, competitive, and customer environmental uncertainty. 
Ten questions (15 to 24) in Section C of the survey, adapted from the Gordon and Narayanan 
(1984) design, determine the extent of the board’s perceived environmental uncertainty. 
Hendry and Kiel (2004) propose perceived environmental uncertainty will be positively 
(negatively) related to strategic control (financial control). 
x Board power: Archival data was used to determine CEO duality, CEO tenure relative to board 
member’s average tenure, chairperson’s seniority, and percentage of ordinary shares owned 
by outside directors. These are measures used by Zajac and Westphal (1996) to establish 
board power. Hendry and Kiel (2004) propose board power will be positively (negatively) 
related to strategic control (financial control). 
x Information asymmetry: Board composition, outside tenure, quality of information, proactive 
information seeking, and frequency of board interaction are regarded as particularly important 
when boards consider reducing information asymmetry (Rutherford & Buchholtz, 2007). Two 
of the five measures—quality of information and proactive information seeking—were 
included in the survey as Questions 31 to 34 of Section E. The remaining three measures were 
collected using Archival data. Hendry and Kiel (2004) propose information asymmetry will 
be positively (negatively) related to financial control (strategic control). 
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Survey Questions Section D: Construct B 
Construct B 
Question 
Number Survey Question Source 
Section D 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following 
statements:   
Q25 
The board shapes the context of strategy by setting the conditions 
under which the strategy process happens in the organisation Hendry, K. and G. C. Kiel (2004) 
Q26 
The board shapes the content of strategy by requiring that 
management justify their intentions, by evaluating alternatives and 
by continuously monitoring progress during formulation and 
assessment stage Hendry, K. and G. C. Kiel (2004) 
Q27 
The board shapes the conduct of strategy by continuously 
monitoring implementation and results and by making changes where 
appropriate Hendry, K. and G. C. Kiel (2004) 
Q28 
The board sets financial targets only and takes strategic decisions 
relative to these financial targets by approving, rejecting or referring 
strategic proposals back to management Hendry, K. and G. C. Kiel (2004) 
Q29 
The board exerts influence over management at formal board 
meetings after resources have been committed and spending 
approved Hendry, K. and G. C. Kiel (2004) 
Q30 The board evaluates management on the financial results of the firm Hendry, K. and G. C. Kiel (2004) 
 
Hendry and Kiel (2004) define strategic control boards as those shaping the context, content, and 
conduct of strategy; and financial control boards as those setting financial targets, exerting influence 
after resource allocation, and evaluating performance using financial results. To determine the degree 
that boards exercise financial or strategic control, the survey uses questions that Hendry and Kiel 
(2004) used to define boards as strategic or financial control boards.  
Three questions (25 to 27) of Section D in the survey relate to strategic control boards as shaping the 
context, content, and conduct of strategy. Also defined as behaviour control and involving subjective 
assessment of strategic decisions pre-implementation, these are consistent with strategic information 
attributes.  
The final three questions (28 to 30) of Section D relate to financial control boards as setting financial 
targets, exerting influence after resource allocation, and evaluating on financial results. Also defined 
as outcome control involving financial performance post implementation, they are consistent with 
financial information attributes.  
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Survey Questions Section F: Construct S 
Construct S 
Question 
Number Survey Question Source 
Section F 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following 
statements:   
Q35 
Our firm’s strategy does not aggressively pursue markets but finds 
and maintains a relatively stable and secure market Langfield-Smith, K. (1997) 
Q36 
Our firm’s strategy is to expand into new markets, stimulate new 
opportunities and obtain additional market share Langfield-Smith, K. (1997) 
Q37 Operations (e.g. production and engineering efficiency) Langfield-Smith, K. (1997) 
Q38 Finance Langfield-Smith, K. (1997) 
Q39 Marketing Langfield-Smith, K. (1997) 
Q40 Research and development Langfield-Smith, K. (1997) 
 
Langfield-Smith (1997), in suggesting that MCSs should be explicitly tailored to support the strategy 
of the firm, configured the prospector/entrepreneur and defender/conservative strategic combination. 
Prospectors expand into new markets and stimulate new opportunities to obtain additional market 
share. The functions critical for prospector strategies are marketing and research and development. 
Defenders maintain relatively stable and secure markets and do not aggressively pursue new 
opportunities. The functions critical for defender strategies are finance and operations. Six questions 
(35 to 40) of Section F in the survey require an indication as to what extent the board identified the 
firm’s strategy as being more a prospector or defender type. The reliance on behaviour controls 
implies subjective performance evaluation; it is associated with prospector strategies and is consistent 
with strategic information attributes and the boards’ strategic role. The reliance on outcome controls 
implies objective performance evaluation and supports defender strategies and, therefore, is consistent 
with financial information attributes and the board’s financial role. 
4.2.1 Survey Summary 
Both Sections A and B of the survey have eight questions each that draw on financial and 
customer/client information from strategic performance measurement systems. Each question 
establishes the financial and/or strategic Information Attributes (Construct I). Section C has ten 
questions specific to environmental uncertainty and will be used, along with other contingencies, to 
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indirectly determine a Board’s Control Role type (Construct B). Section D has six questions that 
directly attempt to determine a Board’s Control Role type (Construct B). Section E’s four questions 
are the second contingency, information asymmetry, used indirectly to determine a Board’s Control 
Role type (Construct B). The final section, Section F, has six questions to establish the firm’s 
Strategic Configuration as either prospector/entrepreneur and/or defender/conservative combinations.  
4.2.2 Survey Pre-Test 
The survey was pre-tested by administering it to three practising board directors. Based on their 
observations and comments it was redesigned, edited, and corrected. Three academic professors, 
knowledgeable in survey methodology, offered their time to comment and review the survey. 
Three practising board directors were asked to complete the survey and comment on any parts that 
they found unclear or difficult to answer. In addition, they were asked to critically comment on how 
they found the whole experience and process. They were also asked, with the intention of it taking no 
more than ten minutes, how long it took to complete the survey. The directors were also asked for 
advice on the covering letter from Bond University and the university’s ethical compliance. 
The comments and suggestions from the three practising directors and academic professors are 
detailed in Appendix 4B and edited so as to protect anonymity.  
Once all comments and suggestions had been considered, the survey was finalised and prepared for 
mailing and web. QuestionPro Survey Analytical Engine was used to source the web option data. 
Email addresses were correlated to the main data list and only 84 company addresses where not 
available.  
4.2.3 Covering letter 
The next step was the design of the covering letter (refer to Appendix 4C) and the supporting web 
option cover (refer to Appendix 4D), which summarised the objective of the survey. A short 
paragraph described the survey and its significance, both to the academic and practitioner 
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stakeholders. In addition, it acknowledged that responses were to be combined with publicly available 
information and, in recognising the sensitive nature of the responses, it assured confidentiality. The 
covering letter included Bond University's ethics protocol and quoted its project number R0427. 
Morris International coordinated the mail merge and sent out the surveys.  
4.3 ARCHIVAL DATA  
Archival databases were used to collect the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) companies, addresses, 
and the board chair data, plus corporate performance and corporate governance data on survey 
respondents. 
Australian Stock Exchange Data 
Two databases: Bloomberg Reuters (1772 records) and DatAnalysis (Morning Star) (1545 records) 
were coordinated to populate the final survey list of 1911 records. Each record contained the ASX 
code, registered company address, chair name, salutation, and/or title in the survey list. 
Corporate Details 
The archival database DatAnalysis (Morning Star) was used to source Board Power, the final 
contingency and independent variable data in determining the board’s strategic role. Four measures: 
CEO duality; CEO tenure relative to board member’s average tenure; chairperson’s seniority; and 
lastly, the percentage of ordinary shares owned by outside directors are the measures Zajac and 
Westphal (1996) used to establish board power. Hendry and Kiel (2004) propose board power will be 
positively (negatively) related to strategic control (financial control). 
Cochran and Wood (1984) argue that corporate performance measures fall into two broad categories: 
shareholder returns and accounting returns. In support, prior board research with corporate 
performance as a dependent variable used a composite index of corporate performance and 
performance factors as the measure (Hamilton & Shergill, 1992; Muth & Donaldson, 1998). The 
measures used for the composite index of corporate performance are sourced from the FinAnalysis 
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Database and comprise earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), return on equity (R0E), return on 
assets (R0A), and sales growth for the periods 2008 and 2009. Two separate measures of shareholder 
returns were calculated – one where shares were held for one year, and the second where shares were 
held for three years. 
4.4 STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY 
The statistical process is summarised into the following steps:  
1. Descriptive Statistics 
The process of data screening (assessing normality), transformation, descriptive statistics 
(measures of central tendency), and correlations were undertaken. Summaries of mean, median, 
mode, standard deviation, range, number of valid responses, skewness, and kurtosis will be 
presented. 
2. Developing the Factors and Reliability Analysis 
Factor analysis, common in board studies (Dey, 2008; Hamilton & Shergill, 1992; Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998) is used to reduce the large number of variables into a smaller set of underlying 
factors that describe the independent and dependent variables. For the reliability analysis, 
Cronbach’s alpha is used to measure internal consistency, which has a relationship with factor 
analysis (Zinbarg, Revelle, Yovel, & Li, 2005). 
3. Hypothesis Testing 
Multiple regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3.  
4.5  SURVEY OUTCOMES AND SUMMARY 
The circulation of surveys and collection replies was processed over a period of eight months, which 
included one reminder for both the mail and web surveys (refer to Table 4.1A). The first mail surveys 
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were sent out in February/March of 2010, and the last reply finalised at the end of September 2010. 
Over 89 courteous replies declining to participate were received stating company policy, non-
relevance, and non-availability. One hundred thirty-seven complete, usable survey replies were 
received. While expecting a response rate of approximately 9% (Graham & Harvey, 2001), a low 
response rate of 7.2% is acknowledged (refer to Table 4.1B), but is consistent with the decreasing 
response rate norm as evidenced by Brooks et al. (2009) and Toourangeau and Source (2004). 
However, 137 replies is a higher outcome than Kakabadse and Kakabadse’s (2007) survey, which 
resulted in just over 100 responses. Stiles (2001) regards 51 interviews at board, CEO, and top 
management team (TMTs) as sufficient.       
Table 4.1A  Survey Replies 
Mode of Survey No. Sent Replies 
Mail 1 1911 58 
Mail 2 1787 35 
Web 1 1833 20 
Web 2 1726 24 
 Total   137 
 
Table 4.1B  Data Summary 
Description No.  % 
Total requests 1911 100 
- Replies can’t complete 89 
- non responses 1685 
Responses 137 7.2 
- missing data (independent variables) 22 
Listwise N (refer to Table 5.10) 115 6 
- missing data (dependent variables) 55 
Total 60 3.1 
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Twenty of the 24 GICS industry group sectors are represented in the survey replies. A Chi-square 
goodness-of-fit test (refer to Table 4.2 calculated in Microsoft excel) reveals there is no significant 
difference, χ2 (23, N=137) = 0.3061, p = 1, between the percentage of ASX companies and the survey 
replies represented in the GICS industry sectors. However, a low response rate would suggest the 
research results might not be representative of the entire population of ASX listed companies.    
Table 4.2 Chi-square goodness-of-fit Test  
  Observed   Expected   
GICS Industry Group  Survey Percentage ASX Percentage χ2 
Automobiles & Components   0% 10 0% 0.0049 
Banks 1 1% 12 1% 0.0004 
Capital Goods 7 5% 112 5% 0.0002 
Commercial & Professional Services 10 7% 57 3% 0.0734 
Consumer Durables & Apparel 3 2% 32 2% 0.0025 
Consumer Services 1 1% 42 2% 0.0085 
Diversified Financials 6 4% 201 10% 0.0300 
Energy 9 7% 232 11% 0.0199 
Food & Staples Retailing   0% 5 0% 0.0024 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 6 4% 39 2% 0.0323 
Health Care Equipment & Services 7 5% 66 3% 0.0111 
Household & Personal Products   0% 1 0% 0.0005 
Insurance 3 2% 11 1% 0.0509 
Materials 47 34% 747 36% 0.0012 
Media 4 3% 46 2% 0.0020 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 5 4% 87 4% 0.0008 
Real Estate 6 4% 112 5% 0.0022 
Retailing 2 1% 37 2% 0.0007 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment   0% 3 0% 0.0015 
Software & Services 10 7% 76 4% 0.0348 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 4 3% 33 2% 0.0107 
Telecommunication Services 1 1% 26 1% 0.0023 
Transportation 1 1% 29 1% 0.0033 
Utilities 4 3% 34 2% 0.0096 
Totals 137 100% 2050 100% 0.3061 
Significance level a = 0.05 
p value = 1 
 
Response Bias 
Response bias is the threat that respondents to the survey are not representative of the population 
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(Armstrong & Overton, 1977). The assumption of the ‘continuum of resistance model’ (Lahaut, 
Jansen, van de Mheen, Garretsen, Verdurmen, & van Dijk, 2003; Lin & Schaeffer, 1995) is to use late 
respondents as a proxy for non-respondents. Non-response bias is estimated by comparing early and 
late respondents.  
Two types of response bias were tested: early versus late response bias and mail versus web response 
bias. Tests for response bias are based on organisational size (market capitalisation), board 
characteristics represented by number of committees (committees) and board composition (comp), 
and a board power variable (Zajac & Westphal, 1996) co-optation (co-opt). Co-optation is the 
proportion of independent directors appointed before the CEO.  
A Chi-square goodness-of-fit test is used to determine if there is any significant difference between 
early versus late and mail versus web responses. The surveys are summarised into early and late mail 
(mail 1 and mail 2) responses and early and late web (web 1 and web 2) responses (refer to Appendix 
4E). The results of the summary are reconciled into mail and web totals (refer to Table 4.3A). The 
Chi-square goodness-of-fit test results (refer to Table 4.3B) reveal there is no significant difference 
between early and late and mail and web responses: 
Mail versus Web: 
Co-optation  χ2 (2, N=35) = 0.0304, p = 0.985 
Composition χ2 (2, N=35) = 0.0088, p = 0.995 
Committees χ2 (3, N=35) = 0.2788, p = 0.960 
Market Capital  χ2 (2, N=35) = 0.1241, p = 0.940 
Early versus Late:  
Co-optation  χ2 (2, N=24) = 0.0719, p = 0.965 
Composition χ2 (2, N=24) = 0.1143, p = 0.944 
71 
 
 
Committees χ2 (3, N=24) = 0.0986, p = 0.991 
Market Capital  χ2 (2, N=24) = 0.0205, p = 0.989 
Given the above results, there is no evidence to suggest that response bias would adversely affect the 
research. 
Table 4.3A Reconciled Survey Responses 
            Mail vs Web   Early vs Late   
Variable Mail 1 Mail 2 Web 1 Web 2   Mail Web   1 2   
Co-opt 
High 17 12 3 10 29 13   20 22   
Low 15 12 8 2 27 10   23 14   
None 26 11 9 12 37 21   35 23   
Total 58 35 20 24 137 93 44 137 78 59 137 
Comp  
High 27 22 10 13 49 23   37 35   
Medium 18 10 4 8 28 12   22 18   
Low 13 3 6 3 16 9   19 6   
Total 58 35 20 24 137 93 44 137 78 59 137 
Committees 
3 25 15 8 7 40 15   33 22   
2 18 13 4 5 31 9   22 18   
1 8 6 3 8 14 11   11 14   
0 7 1 5 4 8 9   12 5   
Total 58 35 20 24 137 93 44 137 78 59 137 
Market Cap 
Large 9 6 1 1 15 2   10 7   
Medium 14 12 5 6 26 11   19 18   
Small 35 17 14 17 52 31   49 34   
Total 58 35 20 24 137 93 44 137 78 59 137 
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Table 4.3B Chi-square goodness-of-fit Test 
Test 
Variable 
Mail vs Web % Early vs Late % 
Observed Expected χ2 P value Observed Expected χ2 P value 
Co-opt                 
High 30% 31% 0.0009 0.984911 37% 26% 0.0529 0.964699 
Low 23% 29% 0.0137   24% 29% 0.0112   
None 48% 40% 0.0159   39% 45% 0.0077   
Total 100% 100% 0.0304   100% 100% 0.0719   
Comp                 
High 52% 53% 0.0000 0.995589 59% 47% 0.0298 0.944443 
Medium 27% 30% 0.0027   31% 28% 0.0019   
Low 20% 17% 0.0061   10% 24% 0.0827   
Total 100% 100% 0.0088   100% 100% 0.1143   
Committees                 
3 34% 43% 0.0185 0.960539 37% 42% 0.0060 0.991282 
2 20% 33% 0.0498   31% 28% 0.0019   
1 25% 15% 0.0657   24% 14% 0.0657   
0 20% 9% 0.1633   8% 15% 0.0310   
Total 100% 100% 0.2788   100% 100% 0.0986   
Market Cap       
Large 5% 16% 0.0832 0.939821 12% 13% 0.0007 0.989787 
Medium 25% 28% 0.0031   31% 24% 0.0155   
Small 70% 56% 0.0378   58% 63% 0.0043   
Total 100% 100% 0.1241   100% 100% 0.0205   
Significance level a = 0.05 
 
4.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed the methodology applied to obtain the data that will test the hypotheses 
presented in Chapter 3. The survey methodology was designed to elicit specific facts from the board’s 
experiences in this research context with external validity at a premium. Survey methods offer this 
particular strength, but at the cost of some loss of internal validity. The survey was sent to the board 
chair, thus avoiding anonymity and eliciting a candid and a more carefully considered response. The 
statistical analysis and results are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DETERMINING THE VARIABLES 
5.0  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes and presents the determination of the construct variables I, B and S by 
establishing patterns of correlation in the observed data as per the methodology presented in Chapter 4 
(refer to Figure 4.1). This chapter presents the reduction of data using exploratory factor analysis and 
reliability analysis to determine the construct variables. The variables will be used in Chapter 6 to test 
the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. It was argued that an interaction, if observed, among the 
firm’s Strategic Configuration, the Information Attributes found in SPMS and the Board’s Control 
Role type is associated with Firm Performance.  
To obtain the data to test the three hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 the research design includes a 
survey and archival data. A total of 59 data variables, 42 in the survey and 17 sourced from archival 
data, are used in the analysis. Forty-seven (42 survey and 5 archival data) of the 59 are independent 
variables and 12 (all archival data) are dependent variables. Factor analysis is used to reduce the large 
number of variables to a smaller set of underlying factors that describe the independent and dependent 
variables. Using factor analysis for this purpose is common in board studies (Dey, 2008; Hamilton & 
Shergill, 1992; Inglis & Alexander, 1999; Muth & Donaldson, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1995).  
Chapter 5 proceeds as follows: Section 5.1 presents the preparation of the data files from the survey 
and archival data and includes defining/naming the variables and reverse-coding the relevant variables 
for analysis. Section 5.2 describes the statistical characteristics of the data variables. Section 5.3 
develops the factors and determines the reliability analysis using Cronbach’s alpha. Section 5.4 
summarises the chapter. 
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5.1  PREPARATION OF THE DATA FILES  
5.1.1 Naming the Variables 
The 59 variables used in the analysis were placed into a data file. They are 42 survey replies and 17 
archival data variables together with their ASX code (refer to Excel Appendix 5A). The ASX codes 
are coded as a nominal measurement level and string data type and the 59 variables as a scale 
measurement level and a numeric data type. The naming of the 59 variables in the Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences (SPSS) (Version 18 Release 18.0.0 dated 30 July 2009) database is presented 
in three tables.  
Table 5.2 presents 28 of the 42 survey questions that describe the three constructs (refer to Chapter 4 
and Figure 4.1): Information Attributes (I), firm Strategy Configuration (S) and the Board’s Control 
Role type (B) and presents the data for naming the independent variables I, B and S.  
Table 5.3 presents 14 survey questions (the balance of the 42 survey questions) and 5 of the 17 
archival data variables that describe the Board Control Role contingencies (Information Asymmetry, 
Environmental Uncertainty and Board Power) as proposed by Hendry and Kiel (2004).  
Table 5.4 presents the naming of the 12 dependent variables and are the balance of the 17 archival 
data variables, describing the Composite Index of Firm Performance. 
5.1.2 Reverse-Coding 
The survey questions that ultimately describe the three constructs (refer to Chapter 4 and Figure 4.1) S, 
B and I are scored on a Likert scale where 1 indicates a low response and 7 indicates a high response. 
However each construct is represented by two opposing alternatives: for example prospector or 
defender alternatives represent Construct S. In the survey, each alternative is represented by high 
scores in different questions. As such, the data needs to be oriented in the same direction, and this is 
achieved through transforming the data by reverse-coding using the scale in Table 5.1. The reverse-
coding for each construct is detailed below. 
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Table 5.1 Reverse-coding Scale 
Old Value New Value 
1 7 
2 6 
3 5 
4 4 
5 3 
6 2 
7 1 
 
Construct S has prospector or defender alternatives that describe the firm’s Strategic Configuration. 
Survey questions 36, 39, and 40 describe prospector strategies where 7 is a high score and agrees and 
1 is a low score and disagrees. Survey questions 35, 37, and 38 describe defender strategies where 7 is 
a high score and agrees and 1 is a low score and disagrees. In representing Construct S, the defender 
strategy questions are reverse-coded. Therefore, in describing Construct S, a high score represents a 
prospector strategy and a low score represents a defender strategy on the scale after reverse-coding. 
Construct B has strategic control or financial control alternatives that describe the Board’s Control 
Role Type. Survey questions 25-27 describe strategic control where 7 is a high score and agrees and 1 
is a low score and disagrees. Survey questions 28-30 describe financial control where 7 is a high score 
and agrees and 1 is a low score and disagrees. In representing Construct B, the financial control 
questions are reverse-coded. Therefore, in describing Construct B, a high score represents a strategic 
control and a low score represents a financial control on the scale after reverse-coding. 
Construct I has drivers of outcomes or outcomes alternatives that describe the Information Attributes. 
Survey questions 1-4, 10, 12, 14, and 42 describe driver of outcomes where 7 is a high score and 
agrees and 1 is a low score and disagrees. Survey questions 5-9, 11, 13, and 41 describe outcomes 
where 7 is a high score and agrees and 1 is a low score and disagrees. In representing Construct I, the 
outcomes questions are reverse-coded. Therefore, in describing Construct I, a high score represents 
drivers of outcomes and a low score represents outcomes on the scale after reverse-coding. 
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Table 5.4 Naming the Dependent Variables for SPSS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2  CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VARIABLES  
Descriptive statistics of the independent variables are presented in the same groupings as Tables 5.2 and 
5.3 and are summarised in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 respectively. Normal distribution properties of the variables, 
though not an important consideration when using exploratory factor analysis4, are presented. Tables 5.5 
and 5.6 also illustrate skewness and kurtosis statistics; however, as exploratory factor analysis is used to 
summarise the relationships in the set of observed variables, assumptions regarding the distributions of 
variables are not enforced (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Natural logarithmic transformations to correct 
extreme skewness and kurtosis had no effect in the eventual regression analysis, and as a result, the 
untransformed variables were retained. 
                                                          
4 Limitations apply with greater force to confirmatory analysis. (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) Pg 588. 
Dependent Variables 
measured in the Survey 
Relative Variable 
Named in SPSS Source 
Composite index of firm performance 
Return on Assets 08 ROA08 Muth, M. M. and L. Donaldson (1998) 
Return on Assets 09 ROA09 Muth, M. M. and L. Donaldson (1998) 
Return on Equity 08 ROE08 Muth, M. M. and L. Donaldson (1998) 
Return on Equity 09 ROE09 Muth, M. M. and L. Donaldson (1998) 
EBIT 08 EBIT08 Muth, M. M. and L. Donaldson (1998) 
EBIT 09 EBIT09 Muth, M. M. and L. Donaldson (1998) 
Revenue Growth 08 RevGrth08 Muth, M. M. and L. Donaldson (1998) 
Revenue Growth 09 RevGrth09 Muth, M. M. and L. Donaldson (1998) 
Shareholder Returns 3yr SHRet3yr Muth, M. M. and L. Donaldson (1998) 
Shareholder Returns 1yr SHRet1yr Muth, M. M. and L. Donaldson (1998) 
Return on Investments 08 ROI08 Muth, M. M. and L. Donaldson (1998) 
Return on Investments 09 ROI09 Muth, M. M. and L. Donaldson (1998) 
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5.3 DEVELOPING THE FACTORS 
There are two types of factor analyses: exploratory and confirmatory. In this research, exploratory factor 
analysis is used, as the goal is to summarise patterns of correlation and to reduce a large number of 
observed variables to a smaller number of factors.  Tabachnick and Fiddell (2007) suggest factor analysis 
reveals patterns of correlation among variables that are thought to reflect the underlying processes 
affecting behaviour. In addition, because the number of factors is usually far fewer than the number of 
observed variables, there is considerable parsimony in using factor analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
It is acknowledged that confirmatory factor analysis performed through structural equation modelling 
(SEM) has advantages over regression analysis and advances the theoretical development of Management 
Accounting (Baines & Langfield-Smith, 2003). However, SEM was rejected due to the very large sample 
size required and the fact that this research is exploratory in its nature. Factor analysis is used to 
determine if the independent variables that are correlated with each other break down into smaller sets of 
independent related data. In addition, to determine a Composite Index of Firm Performance (Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998), factor analysis is performed on the dependent variables. This section is divided into 
two parts: Section 5.3.1 is the factor analysis of the independent variables and Section 5.3.2 is the factor 
analysis of the dependent variables.   
5.3.1 Independent Variables 
Exploratory factor analysis is used to reduce the 47 independent variables in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. The goal 
is to summarise and describe groups of variables that are correlated. The aim in this research is to identify 
an independent variable that will plausibly represent each of the three constructs in the hypothesised 
interaction and an independent variable that will represent each of the three contingencies. The steps 
involved in the process of factor analysis are illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1 Factor Analysis Process  
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Factorability of R 
criterion of 
correlation   > 0.3 
Estimate numbers of 
factors by criterion of 
eigenvalue > 1 
Exclude low-loading 
variables, and nonsense 
groupings 
Repeat quality check, 
eliminate any nonsense 
groupings 
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Assumptions and Limitations 
Missing Data and Sample Size: All variables were examined for out-of-range and missing responses. 
With respect to the survey data (refer to Table 5.5), all ranges are 6 where the minimum option selected is 
1, and 5 where the minimum option selected is 2 on the 7-point Likert scale. The entry of the data has 
been re-checked where maxima (minima) were less than 7 (1). In addition, none of the sum totals exceed 
1015, which is the maximum sum, notwithstanding missing data (Listwise N = 112). 
The Listwise total of N = 112 in Table 5.5 and 119 in Table 5.6 is more than adequate to meet the factor 
analysis Rule of 100 (Gorsuch, 1983; Kline, 1979 ; MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999). 
Hatcher (1994) recommended that the number of subjects should be the larger of 5 times the number of 
variables or 100. However, Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) suggest that loading marker variables >.80 do 
not require such large sample sizes and about 150 cases should be sufficient. Taking all these into account, 
the total of 112 in this research is adequate for exploratory factor analysis. 
Normality and Outliers: As long as factor analysis is used to summarise the relationships in a large set 
of observed variables, assumptions regarding the distribution of variables is not essential (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). However, outliers have more influence on factor solutions. A number of variables did have 
skewness and kurtosis (refer to Tables 5.5 and 5.6). Natural logarithmic transformations to correct 
extreme skewness and kurtosis had no effect in the eventual regression analysis, and as a result, the 
untransformed variables were retained.  
When performing factor analysis, univariate and multivariate outliers are identified using Mahalanobis 
distance among all cases simultaneously. Ten cases with the largest distance are presented on Table 5.7. 
Cases where the critical value is measured at (F2 (47) = 82.72 p < .001), as per the critical values of chi-
square table measured at 47 degrees of freedom, are regarded as outliers. Only one case, number 67, 
exceeds the value of 82.72. Upon investigation, case 67 revealed no mistake in data entry. Further 
analysis revealed that removing or including the case did not affect the factor analysis solution and it was 
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retained.     
Table 5.7 Independent Variable Outlier Statistic 
Mahal. 
Distance 
Case 
Number Statistic 
1 67 94.89756 
2 118 77.28526 
3 68 74.82849 
4 86 68.89045 
5 72 67.69599 
6 122 66.10093 
7 16 65.69961 
8 38 65.3556 
9 47 63.83065 
10 55 62.71939 
 
Correlation Matrix 
The results of a bivariate Pearson product-moment correlation of the 42 survey questions and 5 board 
power variables were examined (refer to Excel Appendix 5B) and revealed that 46 of the 47 variables 
correlate at above 0.3 or **significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). In addition 41 of the 47 variables 
correlated with at least .3 on at least one other variable, suggesting factorability would be likely. The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .789, which is above the recommended value 
of .6. The Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant at (F2 (253) = 1547.849, p < .001). All the 
communalities are above .5 and 40 of the 47 diagonals of the anti-imaging correlation matrix were all 
over .5, supporting the inclusion of each variable in the factor analysis. Given these measures, factor 
analysis was conducted with all 47 variables.  
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First Principal Components Analysis 
An initial factor analysis was carried out where the rule of thumb in selecting the number of factors is an 
eigenvalue greater than 1 and a visual confirmation of scree plot (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Principal 
component analysis was used to reduce the 47 observed variables to a smaller number of factors to 
operationalise the hypothesised independent variables. Consistent with the process described by 
Tabachnick and Fiddell (2007), the research proceeded using principal components extraction and 
varimax rotation.  
Repeat Principal Components Analysis and Varimax Rotation 
A total number of 12 variables failed to meet a minimum criterion of having a factor loading of .4 or 
above and were eliminated during the first three varimax rotation steps. These variables, in order, are 
survey question numbers 22, 8, 30, 42, 41, 29, 18, 34, 7, 37, 21 and 15. A further 12 variables had either 
cross loading or are single variables and did not contribute to the loading solution. These variables are 
survey questions 17, 39, 6, 1, 5, 10, 30, 28, 19, 38, “Dual” and “ShareOwn” and were therefore deleted 
from the factor analysis, leaving a total of 23 of the original 47 in the factor solution.  
A seven-factor solution, which cumulatively explained 75.3% of the variance, was ultimately selected 
using a cut-off at eigenvalues > 1 and is illustrated on the scree plot, showing seven factors. The 
communalities, explanation of the total variance, and scree plot are exhibited in Tables 5.8A, 5.8B and 
Figure 5.2 respectively.  
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With no prior research in this area, as supported by the literature review, the seven-factor loading 
solutions (refer to Table 5.9) were subsequently labelled in order as:  
x I (as information attributes) 
x assy (as information asymmetry)  
x B (as board control)  
x eu1 (as technological environmental uncertainty) 
x eu2 (as economic environmental uncertainty) 
x power (as board power)  
x S (as firm strategy)  
The final seven-factor loading solution is presented in Table 5.9 and the reliability and interpretation of 
each construct I, B, and S follows. 
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Table 5.8A Communalities of the Seven-Factor Solution  
Communalities 
Variables Initial Extraction 
BrdEU16 1.000 .694 
BrdEU20 1.000 .810 
BrdEU23 1.000 .755 
BrdEU24 1.000 .762 
BrdIA31 1.000 .874 
BrdIA32 1.000 .872 
BrdIA33 1.000 .759 
TenR 1.000 .558 
Coopt 1.000 .689 
Comp 1.000 .590 
InfoFinD2 1.000 .705 
InfoFinD3 1.000 .709 
InfoFinD4 1.000 .711 
InfoCstO9 1.000 .781 
InfoCstO11 1.000 .768 
InfoCstD12 1.000 .877 
InfoCstO13 1.000 .848 
InfoCstD14 1.000 .819 
BrdStrt25 1.000 .690 
BrdStrt26 1.000 .774 
BrdStrt27 1.000 .783 
StrtDC35 1.000 .748 
StrtPE36 1.000 .734 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
 
Table 5.8B Total Variance Explanation of the Seven-Factor Solution 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Component Total 
% of 
Variance Cum % Total 
% of 
Variance Cum % Total 
% of 
Variance Cum % 
1 6.526 28.374 28.374 6.526 28.374 28.374 6.007 26.118 26.118 
2 3.169 13.779 42.153 3.169 13.779 42.153 2.580 11.216 37.333 
3 2.001 8.700 50.853 2.001 8.700 50.853 2.281 9.919 47.253 
4 1.638 7.124 57.977 1.638 7.124 57.977 1.753 7.621 54.873 
5 1.552 6.748 64.725 1.552 6.748 64.725 1.597 6.944 61.818 
6 1.309 5.693 70.418 1.309 5.693 70.418 1.583 6.884 68.701 
7 1.115 4.849 75.267 1.115 4.849 75.267 1.510 6.566 75.267 
8 .770 3.348 78.615             
9 .670 2.913 81.528             
10 .607 2.641 84.169             
11 .571 2.485 86.653             
12 .477 2.074 88.727             
13 .459 1.996 90.723             
14 .384 1.668 92.391             
15 .348 1.512 93.903             
16 .289 1.257 95.160             
17 .241 1.047 96.207             
18 .231 1.005 97.212             
19 .194 .845 98.057             
20 .136 .590 98.647             
21 .124 .541 99.188             
22 .098 .428 99.616             
23 .088 .384 100.000             
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Figure 5.2 Scree Plot of the Seven-Factor Solution 
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Table 5.9 Final Seven-Factor Loading Matrix 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
Variables 
Component 
I assy B eu1 S power eu2 
InfoCstD12 .931 -.004 .003 .042 .088 .017 .028 
InfoCstO13 -.917 .035 -.032 -.046 -.044 -.024 -.028 
InfoCstD14 .898 -.041 -.002 -.005 -.048 .041 .078 
InfoCstO9 -.870 .049 -.078 -.048 -.037 -.021 -.111 
InfoCstO11 -.867 .066 -.084 -.037 .037 -.021 -.043 
InfoFinD2 .794 .009 .009 .158 .138 .168 -.050 
InfoFinD4 .790 -.055 .140 .191 .145 .080 -.001 
InfoFinD3 .678 -.121 .211 .220 .371 -.061 -.035 
BrdIA31 -.084 .919 .078 .076 -.065 -.019 -.080 
BrdIA32 -.107 .910 .108 .048 -.002 -.129 -.046 
BrdIA33 -.039 .827 .213 .111 .068 .097 .053 
BrdStrt27 .133 .153 .853 -.004 .057 -.056 -.089 
BrdStrt25 .018 .013 .821 .021 -.048 .017 .116 
BrdStrt26 .166 .266 .813 -.004 -.107 -.006 .056 
BrdEU24 .097 .126 .046 .837 .157 -.087 .049 
BrdEU20 .305 .104 -.019 .832 -.067 .094 .027 
StrtDC35 .036 -.059 -.173 .084 .821 .104 -.148 
StrtPE36 .252 .068 .061 -.006 .812 .006 .064 
Coopt .120 -.162 -.033 .064 .033 .793 -.115 
TenR .003 .017 .111 -.319 .034 .665 .004 
Comp .102 .143 -.158 .275 .053 .630 .243 
BrdEU23 .011 .049 .035 -.080 .022 .100 .857 
BrdEU16 .120 -.133 .051 .169 -.110 -.079 .783 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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Interpreting Factors and Calculating Reliability 
The goal of this analysis was to determine the variables for the constructs: I, B and S and to determine the 
board control contingencies: environmental uncertainty, information asymmetry and board power. 
Reliability – Chronbach’s Alpha: The source of items for the Constructs I, B and S are the 28 survey 
questions in Table 5.2. Factor analysis measures the underlying constructs in checking dimensionality of 
the items: however, Cronbach’s alpha measures internal consistency and has a relationship with factor 
analysis (Zinbarg, et al., 2005). Where a high alpha measurement is evident (rule of thumb: “_ > .9 – 
Excellent, _ > .8 – Good, _ > .7 – Acceptable, _ > .6 – Questionable, _ > .5 – Poor, and _ < .5 – 
Unacceptable” (George & Mallery, 2003 )), the variables that loaded in the factors are averaged to 
determine the Constructs I, B, and S.  
The Constructs 
Construct I measures Information Attributes and is named I in the seven-factor solution (refer to Table 
5.9). It is derived from 16 (questions 1-4, 41, and 42) of the 28 survey questions (refer to Table 5.2). 
Eight of the 16 survey questions, namely questions 2-4, 9, 11, and 12-14 (refer to Table 5.2 for the full 
questions) load on to variable I and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.945. The 8 questions’ scores are averaged 
to determine variable I. The descriptive statistics of variable I are presented in Table 5.11. A high score 
measures drivers of outcomes and a low score measures outcomes. 
Construct S measures the firm’s Strategic Configuration and is named S in the seven-factor solution 
(refer to Table 5.9). It is derived from 6 (questions 35-40) of the 28 survey questions (refer to Table 5.2). 
Two of the 6 survey questions, namely questions 35 and 36 (refer to Table 5.2 for the full questions), load 
on to variable S and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.621. The 2 questions’ scores are averaged to determine 
variable S. The descriptive statistics of variable S are presented in Table 5.11. A high score measures 
prospector strategies and a low score measures defender strategies. 
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Construct B measures the Board’s Control Role Type and is named B in the seven-factor solution (refer 
to Table 5.9). It is derived from 6 (questions 25-30) of the 28 survey questions (refer to Table 5.2). Three 
of the 6 survey questions, namely questions 25-27 (refer to Table 5.2 for the full questions), load on to 
variable B and have a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.794. The 3 questions’ scores are averaged to determine 
variable B. The descriptive statistics of variable B are presented in Table 5.11. A high score measures 
strategic control and a low score measures financial control. 
The Board Contingencies 
Notable in Table 5.9 is that no financial control board survey questions (questions 28-30) load on 
construct B. Figure 5.3 represents the Hendry and Kiel (2004) typology and suggests, in the top right 
quadrant, that boards that exercise both financial and strategic control are termed ‘Board as Management’, 
as opposed to ‘Rubber Stamp Board’ that exercise low levels of any controls.  
Figure 5.3 Proposed Board Control Typology (Hendry & Kiel 2004, p. 512) 
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Further analysis of the variables, in a bivariate Pearson product-moment correlation, that represent 
strategic and financial control (refer to Table 5.10) confirms that a significant positive correlation exists 
among the three Board Control Role variables: BrdStrt25, BrdStrt26 and BrdStrt27. It is **significant at 
the 0.01 level (2-tailed) and has a Cronbach’s alpha of .803. In addition, the output confirms a positive 
relationship between two board financial role variables: BrdFin29 and BrdFin30 (**significant at the 0.01 
level (2-tailed)) and a Cronbach’s alpha of .5. (The non-relevance of the BrdFin28 variable is attributed in 
retrospect to unclear wording of the survey question. The wording “the board sets financial targets only” 
probably created confusion in imposing an improbable constraint). 
Table 5.10 Board Control Role Correlation Matrix 
  BrdStrt25 BrdStrt26 BrdStrt27 BrdFin28 BrdFin29 BrdFin30 
BrdStrt25 Pearson Correlation 1 .563** .513** .092 .300** .191* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .287 .000 .028 
N 135 135 135 135 133 133 
BrdStrt26 Pearson Correlation .563** 1 .668** .030 .262** .352** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .728 .002 .000 
N 135 136 136 136 134 134 
BrdStrt27 Pearson Correlation .513** .668** 1 .029 .370** .269** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .734 .000 .002 
N 135 136 136 136 134 134 
BrdFin28 Pearson Correlation .092 .030 .029 1 .135 .225** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .287 .728 .734 .120 .009 
N 135 136 136 136 134 134 
BrdFin29 Pearson Correlation .300** .262** .370** .135 1 .293** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .002 .000 .120 .001 
N 133 134 134 134 134 134 
BrdFin30 Pearson Correlation .191* .352** .269** .225** .293** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .028 .000 .002 .009 .001 
N 133 134 134 134 134 134 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Figure 5.4 superimposes these results into the typology in Figure 5.3 by averaging the board control 
scores. It shows, at a score above 3, that 99% of the boards surveyed agree to their ‘Board as Management’ 
role. Further analysis reveals that none of the boards in the survey sampled regarded themselves as 
‘Rubber Stamp Boards’ and that only one (based on a score lower than 3) regarded itself as a financial 
control board.  The results of the survey suggest that in this sample, board chairs consider themselves to 
be a ‘Board as Management’ control role, as proposed by the Hendry and Kiel (2004) typology.  
Figure 5.4 Strategic and Financial Control Variables Superimposed into the (Hendry & 
Kiel 2004) Typology 
 
Board Control Contingencies:  
Having determined the board control role as ‘Board as Management’ above, further post hoc exploration 
in Appendix 5C will explore the indirect impact that the contingent variables: environmental uncertainty, 
information asymmetry, and board power have on the board control role. The contingent variables are the 
balance of the factors in Table 5.8 “assy,” “eu1,” “eu2,” and “power”. 
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In summary, the analysis performed on the independent variables determines the three constructs, I, B, 
and S, to be represented in the hypothesised interaction, which will be tested in Chapter 6. Twenty-four of 
the 47 variables were eliminated. Evidence of approximately normal distributions (refer to Table 5.10) 
suggests the variables are appropriate for multiple regression analysis, although their preceding 
observation of boards as management may be unintended impacts on any findings. 
Table 5.11 Descriptive Statistics: B, S and I 
Variable N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
B 129 1.00 7.00 5.4651 1.10115 -1.298 2.906 .794 
S 119 1.00 7.00 4.8613 1.37921 -.731 .553 .621 
I 128 1.00 7.00 4.2451 1.70531 -.578 -.919 .945 
Valid N 
(listwise) 115               
 
5.3.2 Dependent Variables 
Consistent with Muth and Donaldson (1998) and Hamilton and Shergill (1992), the basis of determining 
the Composite Index of Firm Performance, which is used as the dependent variable, is the factor analysis 
of: accounting returns, sales growth, and market returns over periods one and three years respectively. 
Four measures, namely return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on investment (ROI), and 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), totalling eight variables, represent accounting returns. A three-
year shareholder return and a one-year shareholder return represent the two market returns, and sales 
growth last year and sales growth this year represent sales growth. The data is sourced from the 2008 and 
2009 annual reports. A total of 12 variables were submitted for factor analysis.  
The results of a bivariate Pearson product-moment correlation of the 12 variables were examined (refer to 
Excel Appendix 5D) and revealed that all of the 12 variables correlate at least .3 on at least one other 
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variable, suggesting reasonable factorability. In addition, the communalities were all above .6, except 
RevGrth08 and 09, which are above .4, further confirming that all the variables shared common variance 
with other variables.  The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .667, which is above 
the recommended value of .6. The Barlett’s test of sphericity was significant at (F2 (66) = 935.129, p 
< .001) and all the diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix except RevGrth08 and RevGrth09 were 
over .5. Given these measures, factor analysis was conducted with all 12 variables.  
Multivariate outliers are identified using Mahalanobis distance among all cases simultaneously. Ten cases 
with the largest distance are presented in Table 5.11. Cases where the critical value is measured at (F2 (12) 
= 32.909 p < .001) are regarded as outliers. Mahalanobis distance identified eight multivariate outliers, 
which were examined. Further examination revealed that, unlike the independent variables, the eight 
cases were extreme outliers and were deleted.  
Table 5.12 Dependent Variable Outlier Statistic 
Mahal. Distance Case Statistic 
1 77 74.90819 
2 92 74.49877 
3 54 73.49294 
4 106 73.29733 
5 100 66.19534 
6 98 52.13447 
7 126 44.10425 
8 79 37.46631 
9 97 29.39781 
10 108 26.82037 
 
Principal components analysis using varimax rotation was used to reduce the 12 variables into a smaller 
number of factors. One varimax rotation resulted in a four-factor solution, which explained 80.1% of the 
cumulative variance. None of the variables were eliminated as they all contribute to the four-factor 
structure. The final four-factor solution’s communalities, explanation of the total variance, and scree plot 
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are presented in Tables 5.13A and 5.13B and in Figure 5.5.  
Table 5.13A Communalities of the Four-Factor Solution 
Variables Initial Extraction 
ROA08 1.000 .844 
ROA09 1.000 .919 
ROE08 1.000 .833 
ROE09 1.000 .886 
EBIT08 1.000 .991 
EBIT09 1.000 .989 
RevGrth08 1.000 .486 
RevGrth09 1.000 .576 
SHRet3yr 1.000 .848 
SHRet1yr 1.000 .881 
ROI08 1.000 .688 
ROI09 1.000 .761 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
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Table 5.13B Total Variance Explanation of the Four-Factor Solution 
 Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 Component Total % of 
Variance 
Cum 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cum 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cum 
% 
1 5.321 44.342 44.342 5.321 44.342 44.342 4.503 37.525 37.525 
2 1.786 14.881 59.223 1.786 14.881 59.223 2.072 17.266 54.791 
3 1.461 12.176 71.398 1.461 12.176 71.398 1.892 15.768 70.559 
4 1.134 9.451 80.849 1.134 9.451 80.849 1.235 10.290 80.849 
5 .854 7.114 87.963             
6 .610 5.085 93.048             
7 .385 3.205 96.253             
8 .238 1.986 98.239             
9 .150 1.250 99.490             
10 .041 .339 99.829             
11 .012 .101 99.930             
12 .008 .070 100.000             
 
Figure 5.5 Scree Plot of the Four-Factor Solution 
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The final four-factor loading solution is presented in Table 5.14. The four-factor solution is consistent 
with Muth and Donaldson’s (1998) three dependent variable solution to the Composite Index of Firm 
Performance. The only difference is an additional EBIT measure. The factors were named in the 
following order: acc (as the accounting measure), ebit (as the profit measure), sh (as the market measure), 
and rg (as the sales growth measure).  
Table 5.14 Final Four-Factor Loading Matrix 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
Components 
Variables acc ebit sh rg 
ROE09 .925 .115 .134 .022 
ROA09 .922 .233 .122 .009 
ROI09 .839 -.024 .033 .237 
ROI08 .823 .023 .088 -.047 
ROA08 .797 .206 .328 -.241 
ROE08 .758 .154 .378 -.303 
EBIT08 .123 .986 .067 .021 
EBIT09 .164 .978 .063 .044 
SHRet1yr .099 .077 .926 .093 
SHRet3yr .338 .042 .849 .105 
RevGrth09 .124 .010 .021 .748 
RevGrth08 -.163 .044 .115 .666 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
 
5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter used factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha to analyse the questionnaire variables that 
determined the independent variables I, B, and S. Factor analysis also determined the dependent variables 
acc, ebit, sh, and rg. The independent variables will be used to test the hypothesised interaction in Chapter 
6. Twenty-four of the 47 independent variables were eliminated in exploratory factor analysis. Evidence 
103 
 
 
of approximately normal distributions (refer to Table 5.11) suggests the variables are appropriate for 
multiple regression analysis. 
In regards to the dependent variables, four distinct factors underlie the Composite Index of Firm 
Performance. None of the 12 variables were eliminated and the loading is higher in comparison to the 
Muth and Donaldson (1998) structure. The four factors were saved as dependent variables: acc, ebit, sh 
and rg for multiple regression analysis.  
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CHAPTER 6 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 3 it was hypothesised an interaction among the Board’s Control Role, Strategic Configuration, 
and Information Attributes to be observed through the criterion variables of Firm Performance. Chapter 4 
describes the development and implementation of a survey instrument to collect relevant data along with 
archival data. Chapter 5 documents how these data were then processed and analysed to develop 
constructs that statistically measure Board Control Role, Strategic Configuration, Information Attributes, 
and Firm Performance. Chapter 6 describes how the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 are statistically 
tested and discusses the findings.  
The hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 are re-stated here in their alternative form. 
Hypothesis 1:  
A three-way interaction among Strategic Configuration, Board Control Role Type, and Information 
Attributes is associated with superior Firm Performance. 
Statistically: FP =  β0 + β1 (S*B*I) + β2 (S*B) + β3 (S*I) + β4 (B*I) + β5 (S) + β6 (B) + β7 (I) + r 
Should the three-way interaction hypothesis not be supported, the sample will be split into prospector and 
defender strategy groups, and two-way interactions will be tested as follows: 
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Hypotheses 2(a) and 2(b):  
Prospector Group: 
Prospector strategic configuration firms, whose boards choose a Strategic Control Role incorporating 
driver information measures, are associated with superior Firm Performance. 
Statistically: FP = α0 + α1 (B*I) + α2 (B) + α3 (I) + r 
Defender Group: 
Defender strategic configuration firms, whose boards choose a Financial Control Role incorporating 
output information measures, are associated with superior Firm Performance. 
Statistically: FP = α0 + α1 (B*I) + α2 (B) + α3 (I) + r 
Hypothesis 3:  
The main effects will be tested for association with superior Firm Performance. 
i. Strategic Configuration is associated with superior Firm Performance. 
Statistically: FP = γ0 + γ1 (S) + r 
ii. Board Control Role type is associated with superior Firm Performance. 
Statistically: FP = γ0 + γ1 (B) + r 
iii. Information Attributes is associated with superior Firm Performance. 
Statistically: FP = γ0 + γ1 (I) + r 
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Chapter 6 proceeds as follows: Section 6.1 states possible outcomes. Results of testing Hypothesis 1 are 
discussed in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 and Section 6.4 discuss the testing of Hypotheses 2 and 3 
respectively. Section 6.5 discusses the implications of the findings and concludes the chapter. 
6.1  POSSIBLE OUTCOMES 
Where a higher order interaction is observed, the lower order effects, i.e. two-way interactions in this 
research, need not be tested. Statistics texts (Aiken & West, 1991; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) 
recommend that if the interaction is significant, the lower order effects cannot be examined meaningfully 
because they do not tell the complete story. Interpreting interactions and main effects in multiple 
regressions stipulate that the interaction should be interpreted first. If the interaction is not significant, the 
lower order effects can then be examined. Thus:  
1. The null hypothesis for association with Firm Performance is rejected, signalling there is an 
association between the three-way interaction of firm Strategic Configuration, Information 
Attributes, and a Board’s Control Role.  
2. Should the null hypothesis not be rejected, then Hypotheses 2(a) and 2(b) will test a two-way 
interaction, by splitting the sample into Prospector and Defender groups, between Information 
Attributes and a Board’s Control Role.  
3. Hypothesis 3 will examine the three main effects.   
6.2  HYPOTHESIS 1 – THE THREE-WAY INTERACTION BETWEEN S, B, AND I 
Multiple regression analysis was conducted to test the hypothesis of a three-way interaction of Board 
Control, firm Strategic Configuration, and Information Attributes. This is expressed in the formula:  
FP =  β0 + β1 (S*B*I) + β2 (S*B) + β3 (S*I) + β4 (B*I) + β5 (S) + β6 (B) + β7 (I) + r 
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Since no a priori hypotheses have been made to determine the order of entry of the independent variables, 
the direct method (i.e. all variables entered simultaneously) was used in multiple regression analysis. 
Seven independent variables were entered simultaneously into the analysis. They are the variables: 
information (I), boards (B), and strategy (S), and the three two-way interactions IB, IS, BS calculated by 
multiplying each variable respectively. The seventh variable is the multiplication of the three-way 
interaction, IBS. The independent variables are regressed in turn against each of the four dependent 
variables: “acc”, “ebit”, “sh” and “rg” that represent the Composite Index of Firm Performance. Tables 
6.1A, 6.1B, 6.1C and 6.1D present the results demonstrated by the: variables, model summary, anova, and 
coefficients, by each Composite Index of Firm Performance. Discussion of the results is presented in 
Section 6.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
 
Table 6.1A Three-way Interaction with Criterion Variable: Composite Index ‘acc’ 
Variables Entered/Removedb     
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method   
 
1 IBS, B, S, I, BS, IB, ISa . Enter   
a. All requested variables entered.   
b. Dependent Variable: acc   
    
Model Summary   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate   
 
1 .256a .066 -.058 1.07648974   
a. Predictors: (Constant), IBS, B, S, I, BS, IB, IS   
    
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4.312 7 .616 .532 .807a 
Residual 61.418 53 1.159     
Total 65.730 60       
a. Predictors: (Constant), IBS, B, S, I, BS, IB, IS 
b. Dependent Variable: acc 
    
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .123 17.755   .007 .994 
B -.177 3.204 -.172 -.055 .956 
S .464 3.983 .520 .117 .908 
I -.358 3.318 -.443 -.108 .915 
IB .102 .594 .945 .172 .864 
IS .014 .742 .128 .019 .985 
BS -.037 .711 -.318 -.053 .958 
IBS -.013 .131 -.797 -.099 .921 
a. Dependent Variable: acc 
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The multiple correlation (R) between accounting performance “acc” (accounting returns: ROA, ROI and 
ROE) and the seven independent variables is not significant: .256. In addition, the combination of the 
seven independent variables accounts for less than 7% of the variation in accounting performance 
(adjusted R square): -.058. The regression equation is not significant (F 7, 53) = .532, p = .807.   
Regression Weights: None of the seven independent variables has significant standardised regression 
weights, and none has a significant association with “acc” (accounting performance). The three-way 
interaction is not significant and therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis. There is no significant 
association between I, B, S and accounting returns. 
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Table 6.1B Three-way Interaction with Criterion Variable: Composite Index ‘ebit’ 
Variables Entered/Removedb     
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method   
1 IBS, B, S, I, BS, IB, IS a . Enter   
a. All requested variables entered.   
b. Dependent Variable: ebit   
  
Model Summary   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate   
1 .774a .600 .547 .71828245   
a. Predictors: (Constant), IBS, B, S, I, BS, IB, IS   
  
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 40.970 7 5.853 11.344 .000a 
Residual 27.344 53 .516 
Total 68.314 60 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IBS, B, S, I, BS, IB, IS 
b. Dependent Variable: ebit 
  
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -24.981 11.847   -2.109 .040 
B 5.666 2.138 5.421 2.651 .011 
S 6.812 2.658 7.483 2.563 .013 
I 4.240 2.214 5.155 1.915 .061 
IB -.964 .396 -8.731 -2.432 .018 
IS -1.161 .495 -10.348 -2.346 .023 
BS -1.555 .474 -12.943 -3.279 .002 
IBS .267 .088 16.028 3.044 .004 
a. Dependent Variable: ebit 
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The multiple correlation (R) between profit performance “ebit” and the seven independent variables is 
significant:  .774. The combination of the seven independent variables accounts for 60% of the variation 
in profit performance (adjusted R square): .547. The regression equation is significant (F 7, 53) = 11.344, 
p < .001.   
Regression Weights: All of the seven independent variables, except I, have significant standardised 
regression weights. Two of the independent variables are significant at the p< .01 ** level: IBS, Beta = 
16.028, t = 3.044, p < .01; BS, Beta = -12.943, t = -3.279, p < .01). The remaining four independent 
variables are significant at the p < 05 * level: B, Beta = 5.421, t = 2.651, p = .011; S, Beta = 7.483, t = 
2.563, p = .013; IB, Beta = -8.731, t = -2.432, p = .018; IS, Beta = -10.348, t = -2.346, p = .023. The six 
independent variables have a significant association with “ebit” (profit performance). The sign of the 
regression weights B, S, IBS is in the direction with profit performance being positively associated with 
board control and firm strategy and the interaction of: Information Attributes, Board Control Role, and 
the firm’s Strategic Configuration. The two-way interaction terms IB, IS and BS are all negatively 
associated with the criterion variable ‘ebit’. 
Consequently, we reject the null hypothesis. The three-way interaction has a significant association with 
profit performance “ebit”.  
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Table 6.1C Three-way Interaction with Criterion Variable: Composite Index ‘sh’ 
Variables Entered/Removedb     
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method   
1 IBS, B, S, I, BS, IB, ISa . Enter   
a. All requested variables entered.   
b. Dependent Variable: sh   
  
Model Summary   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate   
1 .263a .069 -.054 1.03896995   
a. Predictors: (Constant), IBS, B, S, I, BS, IB, IS   
  
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4.257 7 .608 .563 .782a 
Residual 57.211 53 1.079 
Total 61.468 60 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IBS, B, S, I, BS, IB, IS 
b. Dependent Variable: sh 
  
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardised Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -6.904 17.136   -.403 .689 
B 1.184 3.092 1.195 .383 .703 
S 1.492 3.845 1.728 .388 .699 
I .373 3.202 .478 .117 .908 
IB -.055 .573 -.522 -.095 .924 
IS -.075 .716 -.702 -.104 .917 
BS -.272 .686 -2.387 -.397 .693 
IBS .014 .127 .917 .114 .909 
a. Dependent Variable: sh 
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The multiple correlation (R) between shareholder returns “sh” and the seven independent variables is not 
significant: .263. In addition, the combination of the seven independent variables accounts for less than 7% 
of the variation in accounting performance (adjusted R square): -.054. The regression equation is not 
significant (F 7, 53) = .563, p = .782.   
Regression Weights: None of the seven independent variables has significant standardised regression 
weights and none has a significant association with “sh” (shareholder returns). The three-way interaction 
is not significant and therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
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Table 6.1D Three-way Interaction with Criterion Variable: Composite Index ‘rg’ 
Variables Entered/Removedb     
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method   
1 IBS, B, S, I, BS, IB, ISa . Enter   
a. All requested variables entered.   
b. Dependent Variable: rg   
  
Model Summary   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate   
1 .495a .245 .146 .80420276   
a. Predictors: (Constant), IBS, B, S, I, BS, IB, IS   
  
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 11.141 7 1.592 2.461 .029a 
Residual 34.277 53 .647     
Total 45.418 60       
a. Predictors: (Constant), IBS, B, S, I, BS, IB, IS 
b. Dependent Variable: rg 
  
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardised Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 15.074 13.264   1.136 .261 
B -2.495 2.393 -2.928 -1.042 .302 
S -3.918 2.976 -5.278 -1.317 .194 
I -4.125 2.479 -6.151 -1.664 .102 
IB .667 .444 7.413 1.504 .139 
IS 1.035 .554 11.319 1.869 .067 
BS .653 .531 6.665 1.230 .224 
IBS -.169 .098 -12.484 -1.727 .090 
a. Dependent Variable: rg 
 
115 
 
 
The multiple correlation (R) between sales growth “rg” and the seven independent variables is: .495. The 
combination of the seven independent variables accounts for 24.5% of the variation in sales growth 
(adjusted R square): .146. The regression equation is significant (F 7, 53) = 2.461, p = .029.   
Regression Weights: None of the seven independent variables has significant standardised regression 
weights and none has a significant association with “rg” sales growth. However, the regression weights of 
the independent variables IS, Beta = 11.319, t = 1.869, p = .067 and IBS, Beta = -12.484, t = -1.727, p 
=.090, though not significant at p<.05, suggest they may play a greater role in any association. The three-
way interaction is not significant at p<.05, and therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
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6.3 HYPOTHESES 2(a) AND 2(b) SPLIT SAMPLE TWO-WAY INTERACTION 
The hypothesised three-way interaction was not significantly associated with any of the three dependent 
criterion variables: “acc”, “sh”, and “rg”. For these variables, further analysis involved the survey data set 
being first divided into defender (N = 44) and prospector (N = 53) groups based on the responses. 
Respondents who indicated a one or two on the Likert scale for either a prospector or defender question 
were excluded from that specific group. Respondents who indicated a three or more on the Likert scale 
for either a prospector or defender question were included in that specific group. 
Multiple regression analysis was conducted to test the hypothesis of a possible defender/conservative 
strategy two-way interaction and prospector/entrepreneur strategy two-way interaction statistically as:  
Defender Group: Firm Performance = α0 + α1 (B*I) + α2 (B) + α3 (I) + r 
Prospector Group: Firm Performance = α0 + α1 (B*I) + α2 (B) + α3 (I) + r 
Defender Group  
Tables 6.2A, 6.2B, and 6.2C present the results of testing within the defender groups: variables entered, 
model summary, anova, and coefficients, by each of the three dependent variables in turn. The three 
independent variables B, I, and BI were entered simultaneously into each analysis. The independent 
variables are regressed in turn against each of the three dependent variables: “acc”, “sh”, and “rg” that 
represent the Composite Index of Firm Performance.  
None of the two-way interactions are significant for “acc”, “sh”, and “rg” and therefore we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis in these three instances.  
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Table 6.2A Two-way Interaction for Defender Groups with Criterion Variable: 
Composite Index ‘acc’ 
Variables Entered/Removedb     
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method   
1 IB, B, Ia . Enter   
a. All requested variables entered.   
b. Dependent Variable: acc   
    
Model Summary   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate   
 
1 .186a .034 -.036 0.74561768   
a. Predictors: (Constant), IB, B, I   
    
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .814 3 .271 .488 .692a 
Residual 22.794 41 .556 
Total 23.608 44 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IB, B, I 
b. Dependent Variable: acc 
    
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardised Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.109 2.322 .908 .369 
I -.278 .458 -.520 -.606 .548 
B -.373 .442 -.543 -.843 .404 
IB .053 .086 -.714 -.614 .543 
a. Dependent Variable: acc 
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Table 6.2B Two-way Interaction for Defender Groups with Criterion Variable: 
Composite Index ‘sh’ 
Variables Entered/Removedb     
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method   
1 IB, B, Ia . Enter   
a. All requested variables entered.   
b. Dependent Variable: sh   
  
Model Summary   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate   
1 .217a .047 -.022 1.08056907   
a. Predictors: (Constant), IB, B, I   
  
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.374 3 .791 .678 .571a 
Residual 47.873 41 1.168 
Total 50.247 44 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IB, B, I 
b. Dependent Variable: sh 
  
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardised Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .329 3.365 .098 .923 
I -.005 .664 -.007 -.008 .994 
B -.214 .641 -.213 -.333 .741 
IB .033 .124 .311 -.269 .789 
a. Dependent Variable: sh 
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Table 6.2C Two-way Interaction for Defender Groups with Criterion Variable: 
Composite Index ‘rg’ 
Variables Entered/Removedb     
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method   
1 IB, B, Ia . Enter   
a. All requested variables entered.   
b. Dependent Variable: rg   
  
Model Summary   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate   
1 .170a .029 -.042 .96726496   
a. Predictors: (Constant), IB, B, I   
  
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1.141 3 .380 .406 .749a 
Residual 38.360 41 .936 
Total 39.500 44 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IB, B, I  
b. Dependent Variable: rg 
  
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardised Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -2.394 3.012 -.795 .431 
I .547 .595 .791 .920 .363 
B .397 .574 .447 .692 .493 
IB -.089 .111 -.931 -.798 .430 
a. Dependent Variable: rg 
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Prospector Group 
Tables 6.3A, 6.3B and 6.3C present the results of testing within the prospector groups: variables entered, 
model summary, anova, and coefficients, by each of the three dependent variables. The three independent 
variables B, I, and BI were entered simultaneously into each analysis. The independent variables are 
regressed in turn against each of the three dependent variables: “acc”, “sh”, and “rg” that represent the 
Composite Index of Firm Performance. None of the two-way interactions is significant for “acc”, “sh”, 
and “rg” and we therefore cannot reject the null hypotheses. 
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Table 6.3A Two-way Interaction for Prospector Groups with Criterion Variable: 
Composite Index ‘acc’ 
Variables Entered/Removedb     
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method   
1 IB, B, Ia . Enter   
a. All requested variables entered.   
b. Dependent Variable: acc   
    
Model Summary   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate   
 
1 .259a .067 .011 1.07678194   
a. Predictors: (Constant), IB, B, I   
    
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4.160 3 1.387 1.196 .321a 
Residual 51.973 50 1.159 
Total 62.131 53 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IB, B, I 
b. Dependent Variable: acc 
    
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardised Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -2.164 5.036 -.430 .669 
I .567 .947 .543 .599 .552 
B .522 .940 .554 .555 .581 
IB -.130 .175 -1.090 -.744 .460 
a. Dependent Variable: acc 
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Table 6.3B Two-way Interaction for Prospector Groups with Criterion Variable: 
Composite Index ‘sh’  
Variables Entered/Removedb     
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method   
1 IB, B, Ia . Enter   
a. All requested variables entered.   
b. Dependent Variable: sh   
  
Model Summary   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate   
1 .105a .011 -.048 1.08681133   
a. Predictors: (Constant), IB, B, I   
  
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .653 3 .218 .184 .907a 
Residual 59.058 50 1.181 
Total 59.711 53 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IB, B, I 
b. Dependent Variable: sh 
  
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardised Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.834 5.083 .558 .580 
I -.578 .955 -.564 -.605 .548 
B -.472 .949 -.510 -.497 .621 
IB .099 .177 .846 .561 .577 
a. Dependent Variable: sh 
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Table 6.3C Two-way Interaction for Prospector Groups with Criterion Variable: 
Composite Index ‘rg’  
Variables Entered/Removedb     
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method   
1 IB, B, Ia . Enter   
a. All requested variables entered.   
b. Dependent Variable: rg   
  
Model Summary   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate   
1 .253a .055 -.001 .91613824   
a. Predictors: (Constant), IB, B, I   
  
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.456 3 .819 .975 .412a 
Residual 41.965 50 .839 
Total 44.421 53 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IB, B, I  
b. Dependent Variable: rg 
  
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardised Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -6.421 4.285 -1.498 .140 
I 1.170 .805 1.323 1.453 .153 
B 1.289 .800 1.617 1.612 .113 
IB -.233 .149 -2.306 -.1.565 .124 
a. Dependent Variable: rg 
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6.4  HYPOTHESIS 3 
A Pearson correlation matrix was used to test the main effects for an association with each of the four 
dependent variables: “acc”, “ebit”, “sh”, and “rg” and are expressed in the formulae: 
Strategic Configuration: Statistically: FP = γ0 + γ1 (S) + r 
Board Control Role type: Statistically: FP = γ0 + γ1 (B) + r 
Information Attributes: Statistically: FP = γ0 + γ1 (I) + r 
The independent variables: information (I), boards (B), and strategy (S) and the four dependent variables: 
“acc”, “ebit”, “sh”, and “rg” that represent the Composite Index of Firm Performance were correlated. 
Table 6.4 presents the results of the main effects correlation.  
Consistent with the results in Hypothesis 1, none of the main effects are significant when associated with 
dependent variables “acc”, “sh”, and “rg” and we therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis. However, 
the correlation between “ebit” and the independent variable I is significant: Pearson coefficient of 
correlation = .371 (**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level), p = .002. The main effect is significant 
and has a significant association with profit performance “ebit”. Rejecting the null hypothesis is 
appropriate. 
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Table 6.4 Results of the Main Effects Pearson Correlation Matrix 
B S I acc ebit sh rg 
B Pearson Correlation 1 -.074 .164 -.188 -.042 -.019 -.078 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .427 .072 .130 .735 .880 .531 
N 129 118 121 66 66 66 66 
S Pearson Correlation -.074 1 .257** -.071 -.113 .018 .196 
Sig. (2-tailed) .427  .005 .577 .374 .885 .121 
N 118 119 116 64 64 64 64 
I Pearson Correlation .164 .257** 1 -.140 .371** .085 -.022 
Sig. (2-tailed) .072 .005  .263 .002 .496 .864 
N 121 116 128 66 66 66 66 
acc Pearson Correlation -.188 -.071 -.140 1 .000 .000 .000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .130 .577 .263  1.000 1.000 1.000 
N 66 64 66 70 70 70 70 
ebit Pearson Correlation -.042 -.113 .371** .000 1 .000 .000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .735 .374 .002 1.000  1.000 1.000 
N 66 64 66 70 70 70 70 
sh Pearson Correlation -.019 .018 .085 .000 .000 1 .000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .880 .885 .496 1.000 1.000  1.000 
N 66 64 66 70 70 70 70 
rg Pearson Correlation -.078 .196 -.022 .000 .000 .000 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .531 .121 .864 1.000 1.000 1.000  
N 66 64 66 70 70 70 70 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
6.5 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 6.5 summarises the three sets of hypotheses and the results of statistical testing. Hypotheses about 
the association of Information Attributes, Strategic Configuration, and the Board Control Role Type with 
Firm Performance test a three-way interaction and subsequent lower order effects. The findings are 
summarised in Table 6.5. 
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6.5.1 Findings 
Three-Way Interaction 
The results of statistically testing a three-way interaction among the Strategic Configuration, Board 
Control Role and Information Attributes and multiple performance measures is significant when 
associated with EBIT only. While the literature suggests multiple firm performance measures are used in 
governance research, this study finds shareholder returns, accounting returns (ROA and ROE), and sales 
growth are not significantly associated with these governance choices. These findings are discussed below. 
The regression equation for sales growth is significant; however, the three-way independent variable is 
not significant and therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
Two-Way Interaction 
To test the two-way interaction, the survey responses are divided into defender and prospector groups. 
Consistent with the findings in the three-way interaction, none of the two-way interactions are 
significantly associated with any of accounting returns (ROA and ROE), shareholder returns, and revenue 
growth. In addition, none of the two-way interactions are significant for the prospector group.  
Main Effects 
Similarly and consistent with the three-way interaction, none of the main effects are significantly 
associated with accounting returns (ROA and ROE), shareholder returns, and revenue growth. The 
association between EBIT and Information Attributes is significant. 
6.5.2 Implications of Findings  
This research finds a significant three-way interaction between the firm’s strategic configuration, the 
board’s strategic control role, and information attributes found in SPMS, and firm performance when 
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measured as EBIT. The implications are as follows: 
The board sample was found to overwhelming comprise a ‘boards as management’ control role. This 
means that boards take active roles in monitoring through both strategic and financial controls. Boards 
that emphasise strategic control roles shape the context of strategy by setting conditions under which the 
strategic process happens. In addition, they shape the content and conduct of strategy by evaluating 
alternatives and continuously monitoring progress, implementation, and results. Boards that emphasise 
the financial control role, set financial targets and take decisions relative to these targets; they influence 
control over management on the financial results of the firm. Boards as management do both. 
Given the firm’s strategic configuration and the ‘board as management’ control role, the findings of a 
three-way interaction suggest that boards are more likely to need a ‘balanced scorecard’ of performance 
information to support both their strategic control roles and financial control roles. Central to the findings 
in this research is the significant Information Attributes main effect, signalling that ‘information,’ 
generally, is associated with superior performance. In their strategic control roles, boards will need 
measures that will have more lead and subjective Information Attributes. To support their financial 
control role, they also will need lag and objective Information Attributes. The SPMS literature offers 
generic measures that balance between these Information Attributes (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). This 
would suggest that a strategic control ‘balanced scorecard’ should contain financial and customer lead 
indicators. Financial lead indicators include: sales growth; sales in new markets and customers; 
investment and spending levels in R&D and employ capabilities; and investment in the establishment of 
new markets. Customer lead indicators include: image and reputation dimensions, product/service 
attributes, and customer/client relationship dimensions. The financial control ‘balanced scorecard’ would 
be expected to contain financial and customer lag indicators. Financial lag indicators include: return on 
capital, operating income, gross margins, cash flow, discounted cash flows. and capital budgeting analysis. 
Customer lag indicators include: satisfaction, acquisition, and retention measures.  
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The literature suggests multiple firm performance measures (market and accounting) are used in 
governance research because of inherit limitations of any single measure (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). The 
findings in this research suggest, however, that the interaction is associated with higher EBIT, but not 
higher shareholder returns (market measure) and accounting returns (ROA and ROE). It is argued that 
EBIT performance captures performances that are largely controllable by the organisation and its 
executives and board.  By contrast, shareholder returns are a function of many things of which EBIT 
performance is only one. For example, shareholder return is also affected by market sentiment, and in this 
research, the timeframe happened to coincide with the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), which was a time 
of notable market volatility and unpredictability. There are well-documented and numerous examples of 
why shareholder returns are not necessarily related to accounting returns such as EBIT, for example (De 
Witt & Meyer, 2004; Kothan & Sloan, 1992).  
What is more difficult to explain is why only one of the accounting measures of performance yields a 
significant association and not all of them. It appears that this finding may be also a result of the 
economic environment prevailing at the time. To explore this further, we examine the change in both 
EBIT and ROA (EBIT as the numerator of ROA and assets as the denominator of ROA) in this study's 
2008 to 2009 data set. A change in EBIT from 2008 to 2009 would be expected to be consistent with a 
change in ROA from 2008 to 2009 for both EBIT and ROA to yield a significant association with the 
three-way interaction. An apparently random fluctuation in assets would explain why the 2008 to 2009 
EBIT and ROA changes are inconsistent with each other. A Chi-square goodness-of-fit test, where the 
EBIT change is the expected trend and the ROA the observed trend, reveals a significant departure from 
the expectation χ2 (72, N=73) = 104.37, p = 0.007581. Further studies in less volatile times (2008 and 
2009 were in the GFC period) may observe a significant association with ROA; this study did not.    
In addition to the Chi-squared test, the factor analysis presented in chapter 5 statistically supports the 
inconsistent findings in association with all accounting measures by examination of the patterns of 
correlation amongst the dependent variables. None of the other accounting measures loaded with EBIT. In 
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addition, the 2008 and 2009 EBIT variables loaded independently of all the other performance measures 
and, when reducing the large number of observed variables, the 2008 and 2009 EBIT variables loaded as 
one variable. 
These findings have implications for both theory and practice as described below.  
Theory  
This research has made a theoretical contribution to the Organisational Control literature as offered by 
Eisenhardt (1985) by relating Information Attributes that are found in Strategic Performance 
Measurement Systems (SPMS) to the Board Control Role typology as proposed by Hendry and Kiel 
(2004). It has developed and tested a theory that establishes an association among a three-way interaction 
of: Strategic Configuration, the Board Control Role Type, and Information Attributes, as well as superior 
Firm Performance when measured as EBIT.  
Eisenhardt (1985) suggests that accomplishing organisational control through performance evaluation 
emphasises the information aspects of control. This research contributes to the understanding of the 
information attribute aspects and organisational control. It develops the three-way interaction from the 
literature that provides evidence of lead, behavioural, subjective, and feed-forward (lag, objective, and 
feedback) attributes of information found in SPMS driver of outcomes (outcomes). These are consistent 
with the three-way EBIT interaction only, in both the Information Attributes found in the board’s strategic 
control (financial control) role and the Information Attributes found in the performance measurement of 
Prospector (Defender) strategies.  Further, the only main effect that was found to have a significant 
association with performance (EBIT) is ‘Information’. 
In addition, the literature acknowledges a role for both driver and driver of outcome measures of 
strategically linked SPMS (Ittner & Larcker, 2003; Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Wong-On-Wing, Guo, Li, & 
Yang, 2007). The literature also suggests that there is a Top Management Team (TMT) control system 
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and a Board of Directors control system parallel (Goold & Quin, 1993; Gupta, 1987; Hitt et al., 1990). As 
such, this research contributes to the control literature at the board level by observing a three-way 
interaction with Information Attributes (of which driver and driver outcomes are characteristics), Firm 
Strategy and Organisational Control, and EBIT Firm Performance. 
Practice 
The contributions to practice are as follows:  
Contribution to Corporate Governance: This research, by finding an interaction between the board’s 
control role, firm strategy, and SPMS with EBIT firm performance, supports Principle 1 and contributes 
to Principle 2 of the Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2nd Edition). It also 
contributes to Principles 4 and 8 where board structure is appropriate. 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council’s Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2nd 
Edition: with 2010 Amendments) is the principles-based framework for governance practice in Australia. 
Principle 1 in the framework places responsibility on the board in overseeing the company, which 
includes its control, by providing input into strategy, performance objectives, and the implementation of 
strategy. An association among the board’s role in organisational control; the firm strategy and 
performance measurement; and firm performance, as found in this study, supports the behaviours 
recommended in Principle 1 and is consistent with the ASX Governance Council’s governance practice.  
In addition, this study may assist governance practitioners to expand on the framework of Principle 2. 
Principle 2 requires the board to effectively structure itself (i.e. composition and independence) to 
perform its duties. However, studies demonstrate little consistency and yield disparate findings between 
board structural independence and firm performance. As a result, and given the call to open the black box 
of actual board behaviour, board practices and processes should accompany structural independence. The 
framework to achieve this is centred on board theories (i.e. agency, resource dependence, and stewardship) 
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that create expectations of a board’s role. This research adds to Principle 2 by taking this framework 
approach. The board’s strategic and/or financial control roles are underpinned by board theory and, in 
opening the black box, focuses on board information practices. 
All eight ASX Corporate Governance Council’s governance principles suggest that boards should play an 
active control role in their corporations. In this study, 99% of the boards surveyed identified with both 
strategic and financial control roles, thus strongly emphasising a board as management type. In 
contribution to governance practice, this would suggest boards are heavily involved in operations and 
classed as a de facto management team. 
Contribution to Organisational Control at the Board Level: Organisational control is achieved 
through performance measurement. Performance measurement parallels, from a strategic and financial 
control perspective, exist between TMTs and boards. This study contributes to the practice of organisation 
control by elaborating on the informational aspects of performance measurement at board level.  
Contribution to Strategic Performance Measurement Systems (SPMS): Central to performance 
measurement systems, particularly with the development of strategy maps, is the investigation of cause-
and-effect relationships. The Balanced Scorecard is an example of a SPMS where the role of causality is 
becoming increasingly central to its intellectual underpinning. Lead and lag performance measures feature 
in cause-and-effect relationships (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). To our knowledge, this is the first use of lead 
and lag performance measures within a study of information practices at board level. While not the main 
focus of this study, it would suggest that boards do seek cause-and-effect relationships within their 
information and control practices and, thus, this research contributes to board SPMS practice.  
Contribution to Control Systems and Strategy at the Board Level: Prospector (entrepreneur) and 
Defender (conservative) strategies are combinations that are consistent with build/differentiation and 
hold/harvest/cost leadership strategies respectively (Langfield-Smith, 1997). Subjective/behavioural 
performance measures are associated with the control of Prospector strategies, and objective/financial 
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performance measures are associated with the control of Defender strategies (Langfield-Smith, 1997). 
This study contributes to control systems and strategy at the board level, where firm strategies are 
Prospector and/or Defender types, by observing a three-way interaction with Firm Strategy (adopting the 
Prospector and Defender typology) Information Attributes and Organisational Control, and Firm 
Performance.  
Contribution to Information Attributes: This study does not consider all information, but takes an 
Information Attribute perspective in the firm’s systems and practices. In this study’s context, Information 
Attributes are seen as qualities or characteristics inherent in information that are common in strategic, 
control, and performance measurement systems. As information practices are regarded as important in 
board effectiveness (Lawler et al., 2002), this study contributes to the board’s information practice by 
identifying information attributes (i.e. lead/lag, feedback/feed-forward, objective/subjective, and 
behavioural/financial) associated with strategic configuration, board control role, and SPMS interaction. 
In addition, while this study is at board level, the opportunity exists to acknowledge and understand 
Information Attributes at firm operational level, e.g. Activity Based Management and business re-
engineering. 
6.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the testing of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 using the construct variables 
developed in Chapter 5. The hypothesised three-way interaction was found to have a 
significant (p=.000: Adj R Sq .547) association with profit performance “ebit”; however, no 
significance was observed in association with shareholder returns as the performance measure. 
Rejecting the null hypothesis in the association with accounting performance, EBIT, is 
appropriate. Also adding to our understanding of the role of information was the finding of a 
significant Information Attributes “main effect” in this research (Pearson Correlation = .371, p=.002), 
also associated with EBIT. 
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The implication for both theory and practice in the findings is discussed.  Eisenhardt (1985) suggests that 
accomplishing organisational control through performance evaluation emphasises the information aspects 
of control. This research contributes to the understanding of the information attribute aspects and 
organisational control.  
A contribution to practice is discussed and includes a contribution to the The ASX Corporate Governance 
Council’s principles-based framework in respect to board structure, opening the “black box” of board 
information practices and validating the “board as management” control role. A contribution to 
organisational control at board level is discussed. In addition, a contribution to the board’s information 
practices by information attributes associating with strategic configuration, board control role, and SPMS 
interaction is identified.   
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the study, restate the objectives of the research and its 
findings, acknowledge some limitations, and conclude the study. The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 
7.1 summarises the objectives and motivation of the study; Section 7.2 summarises the theory 
development and methodology; and Section 7.3 describes how the hypotheses were tested and presents 
the findings. Section 7.4 discusses the findings and their contribution to theory and practice. Section 7.5 
discusses the limitations of the research and outlines future research directions. Section 7.6 summarises 
the chapter.  
7.1 SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES AND MOTIVATION 
The purpose of this research is to identify those combinations of board role, strategy choice, and 
Information Attributes which, when incorporated into a board’s Strategic Performance Measurement 
System (SPMS), are associated with superior firm performance.  
Research provides evidence that boards which adopt certain key ‘best practices’ are able to govern more 
effectively (Lawler et al., 2002). The primary findings are that boards with ‘better information’ practices 
are the most effective. The result of adopting better information practices becomes evident when Lawler 
et al. (2002) test best practice on the impact of Firm Performance. However, the literature as to what the 
characteristics and nature of the information that boards of directors require in order to help them achieve 
this is negligible.  
In addition, boards and, consequently, their information requirements, are complex by nature as they have 
dual responsibilities to the corporate organisations they serve and to the shareholders and other 
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stakeholders. Boards focus on the roles for which they are held accountable and where they have the 
greatest leverage or influence (Lawler et al., 2002).  
Research from an organisational and management control perspective introduces theories, typologies, and 
contingency frameworks that provide evidence of Information Attributes seminal to board effectiveness 
(Eisenhardt, 1985; Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Langfield-Smith, 1997). This body of 
literature in turn suggests opportunities to explore the question of what Information Attributes in SPMS, 
and in what context, are associated with superior firm performance. 
Information Attributes are qualities or characteristics inherent in information. Relying on Organisational 
Control theories (OC) (Eisenhardt, 1985), Management Control Systems (MCS), Strategy typology 
(Langfield-Smith, 1997), SPMS (Kaplan & Norton, 1996), and the Hendry and Kiel (2004) theoretical 
perspective, which explains the board’s role in strategy, this research tests a theory that the interaction 
among Information Attributes found in SPMS, the Board’s Control Role, and the organisation’s Strategic 
Configuration is associated with superior Firm Performance.  
Research Question 
Relying on the Hendry and Kiel (2004) theoretical perspective, which explains the board’s role in strategy, 
this research tests a theory that an interaction between Information Attributes found in SPMS, the Board’s 
Control Role, and the organisation’s Strategic Configuration will be associated with superior Firm 
Performance.  
Motivation 
When common themes that are accepted as best practice corporate governance are associated with 
corporate financial performance, a substantial body of empirical research yields disparate and conflicting 
findings (Dalton et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 1998). Motivating this research is an extended framework 
offered by Huse (2005), using a contingency and integrated theories approach to open the black box of 
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actual board behaviour. The framework is centred on creating board accountability where pluralistic 
board theories create board role expectations. In addition, acknowledging the limited power of the 
Agency Theory Corporate Governance Model, this research identifies with an alternative approach to 
governance and firm performance, that of Information Asymmetry and Governance (Zahra & Filatotchev, 
2004). Lastly, some twenty years ago, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) suggested the need to tailor 
corporate governance to the information processing requirement of different strategies or industry settings. 
7.2 SUMMARY OF THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND METHODOLOGY  
Theory Development 
To implement this research, three constructs (the independent variables) are developed (refer to Figure 
7.1). Strategic Configuration (Construct S) relies on the Langfield-Smith (1997) Management Control and 
Strategy theory and aims to capture the extent to which the organisation has adopted a Defender or 
Prospector strategy. Board Control Role Type (Construct B) is the board typology theory as proposed by 
Hendry and Kiel (2004), with the possibilities being wholly Financial at one extreme, or wholly Strategic 
at the other, and various degrees of both in between. Information Attributes (Construct I) are observed in 
generic SPMS as either outcomes measures or drivers of outcomes measures, as discussed by Kaplan and 
Norton (1996). Lastly, the Composite Index of Firm Performance (Construct FP) is informed by Muth 
and Donaldson (1998).   
Hypothesis 1 proposed a three-way interaction among Strategic Configuration, Board Control Role Type, 
and Information Attributes, which when aligned, would be associated with superior Firm Performance. 
Consistent with recommended statistical process where the three-way interaction hypothesis was not 
supported, the sample was split into prospector and defender strategy groups, and two-way interactions 
were tested (Hypothesis 2). Main effects were examined in all cases for association with superior Firm 
Performance (Hypothesis 3). 
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Figure 7.1 The Research Diagram            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Methodology 
Two methods of collecting data were used: archival, which represented less than 20% of the variables 
required and was used mainly for the dependent variables, and a structured survey, which elicited 
responses that enabled the building of the independent variables. Each section of the survey had specific 
questions used to develop and measure the variables in testing the research hypotheses in the research 
diagram (refer to Figure 7.1).  
The survey was administered to companies registered on the ASX in years 2008 and 2009 and addressed 
to the company chairperson. Response rates are acknowledged as disappointing, but nevertheless 
provided sufficient data to proceed to develop constructs and test the hypotheses. A Chi-square goodness-
of-fit test revealed no significant difference between the percentage of ASX companies and the survey 
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replies represented in the GICS industry sectors, nor between early and late and mail and web responses. 
However, the low response rate suggests the research results may, nevertheless, not be representative of 
the entire population of ASX listed companies.    
7.3 HYPOTHESES TESTING AND FINDINGS 
Factor analysis was used to reduce the large number of variables to a smaller set of underlying constructs 
that describe the three independent variables: Strategic Configuration “S”, Board Control Role Type “B”, 
and Information Attributes “I”, as well as four dependent variables: Accounting returns “acc”, EBIT 
“ebit”, Shareholder returns “sh”, and Revenue growth “rg”. 
Hypotheses Testing 
Multiple regression analysis was conducted to test the hypotheses and, as no a priori hypotheses have 
been made to determine the order of entry of the independent variables, the direct method was used. 
Findings 
The findings of the hypotheses testing are summarised in Table 7.1. 
Three-Way Interaction: The results of statistically testing a three-way interaction among the Strategic 
Configuration, Board Control Role, and Information Attributes and each of the four performance criterion 
variables yielded a significant association with EBIT only. The regression equation for sales growth was 
significant, however, the three-way interaction was not significant. 
Two-Way Interaction: The sample was then split into Defender and Prospector strategy groups to test 
the two-way hypotheses using the criterion variables for accounting performance, revenue growth, and 
shareholder returns. Consistent with the findings for Hypothesis1, none of the two-way interactions were 
significantly associated with accounting returns (ROA and ROE), shareholder returns, and revenue 
growth for either group. 
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Main Effects: A significant main effect was observed between EBIT and Information Attributes. None of 
the main effects were significantly associated with performance measured as accounting returns (ROA 
and ROE), shareholder returns, and revenue growth.  
7.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
This research finds a significant three-way interaction between the firm’s strategic configuration; the 
board’s strategic control role; and information attributes found in SPMS; and firm performance when 
measured as EBIT. The implications are as follows: the board sample was found to overwhelmingly  
comprise ‘boards as management’ control role, which means they take active roles in monitoring through 
both strategic and financial controls. As such, the board shapes the content and conduct of strategy by 
evaluating alternatives and continuously monitoring progress, implementation, and results. In addition, 
they set financial targets and take decisions relative to these targets. This suggests that boards are more 
likely to need a ‘balanced scorecard’ of performance information to support both their strategic control 
roles and financial control roles. In their strategic control roles, boards will need measures that will have 
more lead and subjective Information Attributes. To support their financial control role, they also will 
need lag and objective Information Attributes. 
In addition to the significant three-way interaction as hypothesised, an important finding in this research 
is the significant Information Attributes main effect, signalling that information of all types (outcomes 
and drivers of outcomes) is associated with superior performance. The literature suggests that multiple 
firm performance measures (market and accounting) are used in governance because of inherit limitations 
of any single measure (Muth & Donaldson, 1998).  
The findings in this research are that the interaction is associated with higher EBIT, but not higher 
shareholder returns (market measure) and accounting returns (ROA and ROE).  The firm performance 
data in the sample reveal a pattern of fluctuation in assets, which is not statistically correlated with 
observed EBIT, and as a consequence, this explains the statistical finding that there is a significant 
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association as hypothesised with EBIT, but not with ROA.  In addition, there are well-documented and 
numerous examples of why shareholder returns are not necessarily related to accounting returns, such as 
EBIT. For example, De Witt and Meyer (2004) find that there are material differences in shareholder 
returns and accounting returns when assessing a company’s investment opportunities, and that 
maximising accounting returns may not necessarily lead to maximising shareholder returns. In addition, 
Guy (2000) finds that firm response to TMT remuneration is much stronger in terms of both proportion 
and statistical significance to shareholder returns, than is the response to accounting returns. This 
research’s timeframe coincided with the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), which was a time of notable 
market volatility and unpredictability, and it is argued that this may have disrupted the performance data 
in unknown ways and be a possible reason for not finding some of the hypothesised associations. 
These findings have implications for both theory and practice. This research has made a theoretical 
contribution to the Organisational Control literature as offered by Eisenhardt (1985), by relating 
Information Attributes that are found in Strategic Performance Measurement Systems (SPMS) to the 
Board Control Role typology as proposed by Hendry and Kiel (2004). In addition, this research 
contributes to board theory by opening the black box of actual board behaviour, which is an extended 
framework offered by Huse (2005). The framework is centred on creating board accountability where 
pluralistic board theories (i.e. resource dependent, stewardship, and managerial hegemony) create board 
role expectations. 
All eight ASX Corporate Governance Council’s governance principles suggest that boards should play an 
active control role in their corporations. In contributing to practice, 99% of the boards surveyed identified 
with both strategic and financial control roles, thus strongly emphasising a board as management type, 
suggesting boards are heavily involved in operations and classed as a de facto management team. In 
addition to corporate governance, this research contributes to practice at board level. Boards should select, 
given the firms strategic configuration, driver of outcome or lead performance measures and outcome or 
lag performance measures in organisational control, as they are associated with superior earnings. 
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7.5 LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
7.5.1 Limitations of Research 
While it is necessary to acknowledge that survey methods expose studies to internal validity threats, this 
research is concerned with eliciting facts and beliefs from the board’s experiences in the context 
examined. Survey methods offer this strength when, as is the case in this research, external validity is at a 
premium. Four potential threats to validity, as identified by Cook and Campbell (1979), are discussed in 
the following sections.  
Threats to Internal Validity 
Internal validity relates to events that prevent reasonable conclusions about causality being drawn. 
Concerns about internal validity are mostly raised in the context of experimental design, where strict 
randomisation procedures need to be implemented to control effects such as maturation, history, mortality, 
instrumentation changes, and statistical regression. 
A survey method, such as employed in this research, is not subject to the concerns listed above. However, 
the usual caution that correlation does not imply causation must be kept in mind when considering the 
implications of findings in this research. 
Threats to Statistical Conclusion Validity 
Data obtained through survey methods are always subject to measurement and other errors that cannot be 
controlled. If error is random, its presence will not threaten statistical conclusions; however, the presence 
of unknown systematic error within data obtained by survey methods cannot be fully discounted. 
Researchers accept this risk when they nominate an experimental risk level (alpha). Given the number of 
individual tests planned as part of this research (28 tests for the three sets of hypotheses), concerns about 
inflated type 1 error (rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true) are acknowledged.  
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Data obtained through survey methods are always subject to measurement and other errors which cannot 
be controlled. If error is random its presence will not threaten statistical conclusions, however the 
presence of unknown systematic error within data obtained by survey methods cannot be fully discounted. 
Researchers accept this risk when they nominate an experimental risk level (alpha) that they are prepared 
to accept. Given the number of individual tests planned as part of this research (28 tests for the three sets 
of hypotheses), concerns about inflated type 1 error (rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true) are 
addressed.  
A strategy for minimising type 1 error is to reduce the acceptable level of experimental error. A modified 
Bonferroni adjustment to planned experimental error of 0.05 would reduce alpha to 0.0036. At this level, 
none of the conclusions using the original experimental error of 0.05 would be altered.  
Threats to Construct Validity 
Construct validity refers to the degree to which inferences can legitimately be made from the 
representations in a study, to the theoretical constructs on which those representations were based. A 
strength of this study is that all theories, typologies, and frameworks used are validated by other 
researchers in acceptable journals. These are Kaplan and Norton (1996) for the Information Attribute 
construct, Hendry and Kiel (2004) for the Board Control Role Type construct, and Langfield-Smith (1997) 
for the Strategic Configuration construct. These representations were tested again in this research context 
and reconfirmed within the data set. 
Threats to External Validity 
The objective of this research was to develop and test a theory that an interaction among Information 
Attributes found in Strategic Performance Measurement Systems (SPMS), the Board’s Control Role, and 
the organisation’s Strategic Configuration is associated with superior Firm Performance. While the 
response rate of 7.2% is acknowledged as being low, research suggests that 137 replies are acceptable for 
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analysis of the type carried out in this research (Stiles, 2001). In addition, external validity is at a 
premium by avoiding anonymity and eliciting a rich response from the board chairperson. However, even 
though a Chi-square goodness-of-fit test revealed no significant difference between the percentage of 
ASX companies and the survey replies represented in the GICS industry sectors, the low response rate 
would suggest the research results may not be representative of the entire population of ASX listed 
companies.  Care would therefore be needed in extrapolating the findings into broader business contexts. 
7.5.2 Future Research 
This section suggests four future research directions to follow from this research. In this study’s context, 
Information Attributes are seen as the characteristics and nature of information such as lead/lag; 
objective/subjective financial/non-financial and feed-forward/feedback found in driver of outcomes; and 
outcome measure of SPMS. To our knowledge, this is the first research to adopt an Information Attribute 
methodology approach to information. The first suggestion, given the significance in this research, is for 
future research in SPMS to embrace an Information Attribute approach to information in the same context 
as this research where appropriate. For example, Ittner and Larker (2003) find companies are unable to 
demonstrate that improvements in nonfinancial measures actually affect their financial results. They 
suggest developing a model that proposes a causal relationship between the chosen non-financial drivers 
of strategic success (lead) and specific outcomes (lag). 
Secondly, the aim is to extend the research from boards of directors to Top Management Teams (TMT), 
allowing the opportunity to test this study’s theory from different management perspectives.  
In addition, while this study investigated only two of the four Kaplan & Norton (1996) balanced 
scorecard perspectives (financial and customer), future research could investigate SPMS use of the other 
two balanced scorecard perspectives, the internal business process, and learning and growth perspectives 
to add to our understanding of how boards use different performance measurement approaches and 
different information attributes. However, given the uniqueness in these perspectives, a case study 
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approach, rather than a survey, may be the better methodology. 
Lastly, this research identifies with the call by Roberts, McNulty et al. (2005) to dismantle the boards and 
corporate performance fortresses, which are variously referred to as: contentious publish or perish 
research drive (Huse, 2000), the focus on the ‘usual suspects’ (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003), with easily 
available data (lamp syndrome), and accepted and easy-to-use methods (hammer syndrome) (Gabrielsson 
& Huse, 2004). In addition, it responds to Huse’s (2005) call to use a contingency and integrated theories 
approach to open the black box of actual board behaviour (Daily et al., 2003; Huse, 2005). While this 
research focused on the board’s strategic process in SPMS, further research should consider applying this 
research methodology (i.e. an Information Attribute approach) to specific organisational strategies—for 
example, sustainability, environmental, and risk strategies.   
7.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter concludes the thesis. It presents a summary of the objectives, motivation, theory 
development, and methodology for the study. In addition, it summarised the findings of the research and 
then identified with its limitations and presented suggestions for further research. 
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Environmental Uncertainty (EU) 
QUESTIONS ON PERCEIVED ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY 
 
1. How intense is each of the following in your industry? 
Of negligible intensity       Extremely intense 
a. Bidding for purchases or raw materials:  1 2  3  4  5  6  7 
b. Competition for manpower:  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
c. Price competition:    1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
2. How many new products and/or services have been marketed during the past 5 yrs by your 
industry?     None      Many 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
3. How stable/dynamic is the external environment (economic and technological) facing your 
firms?      Very stable    Very dynamic 
(Changing slowly)      (Changing rapidly) 
a. Economic:      1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
b. Technological:    1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
4. How would you classify the market activities of your competitors during the past 5 yrs? 
Becoming more predictable. Becoming less predictable 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
5. During the past 5 yrs, the tastes and preferences of your customers have become: 
Much easier to predict.  Much harder to predict 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
6. During the past 5 yrs, the legal, political, and economic constraints surrounding your firm 
have:     Remained about the same. Have proliferated greatly 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
7. How often do new scientific discoveries emerge in your industry? 
Seldom    Frequently 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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Information Asymmetry (IA)  
Quality of Information 
In general, the information available to the board is very reliable (Reliability).  
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
 
The information available to the board is accessible when needed, not at some later time (Timeliness). 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
 
It is necessary to go back and check on the accuracy of the information the board receives (Accuracy) 
(R). 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
 
The available information is relevant to the board’s needs (Relevance).  
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
 
The board receives information in a timely fashion. 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
 
The information available is very useful in assessing organisational issues.  
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
 
The available information is just what the board needs to make effective decisions.  
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
 
Proactiveness 
The board spends a great deal of time searching for information about issues facing the board. 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
 
Board members actively search for information in order to address issues before the board. 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
 
Board members make decisions based on the information provided to them without requesting 
additional information (R). 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
 
At a typical board meeting, the board actively probes for information necessary to carry out their 
duties. 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
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Director 1 
x It took me about 15 minutes to complete the survey. 
x Is there going to also be a covering statement as to confidentiality and what will be done with 
the completed surveys and research. As a director, I’d be very hesitant to honestly complete 
the survey and then have the results released as attributed to my company. Given the surveys 
are going to ASX listed companies, the sensitivity to the market is also important. 
x It might be just because I completed this from the perspective of (a service business) … but I 
found that some of the questions weren’t applicable – maybe also have a NA option? 
x It is probably a deliberate part of the survey design, but I found it more confusing with the 
different response headings – and a mix of statements and questions. 
x I have highlighted any minor typos or grammatical errors in yellow. 
x I found section F very difficult to read and answer. In particular, Q 36 has two statements but 
you can only respond to one. 
x Also, in section F, the scale seems to have been switched around. In section E the 6 and 7 
responses are the strongly agree responses, but in section F, they are the opposite. 
x I found the statements in questions 37 and 38 very confusing. In fact, I couldn’t respond to 
these statements as I wasn’t sure what they meant. 
x I’d be interested in the results at the end of the day. 
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Director 2 
x Firstly, the wording and the content structure is not relevant or appropriate to the (not-for-
profit) ... sector. And I take it the survey is not aimed at that sector. 
x Secondly, it seems to me to be somewhat focused on enquiring around specific parameters 
and is limited in the information it is drawing out. To me, this is a good survey if that is the 
intent. 
x Thirdly, it appears to me to be somewhat limited in its applicability across all industries. That 
is, it seems limited to certain types of industries.  Is this correct, or is it my mis-reading? 
x Fourthly, the timing is around the 10-minute mark as intended. 
x Fifth: Section B, to be answered accurately could require some research and enquiry for the 
participant to clarify detail. It would depend on what degree of accuracy the participant feels 
necessary to adhere to. 
x Sixth:  I pondered the questions that begin with: ‘during the past five years…..’   With the 
significant upheavals we have experienced over the past five years (financial crunch), the 
answers could be skewed to reflect a more limited time frame. That is, only the past eighteen 
months or so. 
x Seventh: The questions in Section D are very specific and therefore limit the response to the 
design of the question. That is, they have significant detail in the question to focus the 
question to only that situation. I am not sure if this is the intent and wonder if there is a case 
for a more open-ended question regarding organisational control. 
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Director 3 
x The layout of the survey was a bit cramped and a definite lack of font size and whitespace. I 
don't know whether this was caused by the eternal PC v. Mac translation issues or whether it 
could be improved - also I wonder whether an electronic and online version would facilitate 
a better response from ASX listed entities. This could also have a "more information" box for 
explaining things in more detail so it isn't purely a quantitative exercise. 
x In Section A - I have taken "Sales" as representing "Revenue" in … case. 
x In Section B - it was a bit sobering to reflect on the fact that we probably don't know enough 
about our customers due to the way in which … is structured. But I am confident this trend 
can be reversed via the new services that we are introducing at present. 
x In Question 15, I have referred to the ….  tender process as this is the major tender that is 
associated with … operations at present. 
x I was able to complete the survey in approximately 20 minutes.  
 
Academic professors 
Useful input by the three academic professors included: multipoint questions, clarity in meaning, 
inconsistent formatting, G F C impact, punctuation, and layout. One very useful piece of advice was 
to source data by questioning both directly and indirectly.  
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Mr  
Executive Chairman 
Company Limited 
Address 
 
 
 
 
Telephone: (07) 5595 2099 
Facsimile: (07) 5595 1160 
E-mail: cgunther@bond.edu.au 
Date February 2010 
 
 
 
Dear Mr   
 
The pursuit by Boards of better information to support their corporate goals and facilitate 
accountability has generated a significant body of research at both academic and practitioner levels.  
Unfortunately it has yet to generate a sound basis for Boards to build their information and reporting 
packages with any certainty that they are ‘getting it right’. In an attempt to rectify this shortfall we are 
undertaking research that aims to provide answers to some of the questions that Boards rightly ask 
about their reporting requirements.  Our research is Australian based, and is being gathered from all 
companies listed on the ASX.  
 
To assist us with our research, we would be most grateful if you would complete the enclosed 
questionnaire and return it to us in the prepaid envelope that is enclosed. It has 6 sections (A-F), 44 
questions, is 4 pages long and will take approximately ten minutes to complete.  We do request you to 
write the name of your company and GICS sector and verify the ASX code on the questionnaire so 
that we can combine your responses with publicly available information about the company. In doing 
this, we acknowledge the confidential nature of some of your responses, and give you our absolute 
assurance that your responses will be known only to the two researchers named below, and will be 
treated confidentially. All data will be aggregated in our analysis and no individual company will be 
identifiable in any report or paper that we write. 
 
Should you wish to receive a summary of our findings please indicate this, and when they are 
available it will be our pleasure to share them with you at that time. 
 
Thank you for your assistance in this matter. 
 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
 
 
Dr Lyndal Drennan and Mr Chris Gunther. 
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Should you have any complaint concerning the manner in which this research is conducted, please do 
not hesitate to contact Bond University Research Ethics Committee, quoting the Project Number RO427 
The Complaints Officer 
Bond University Human Research Ethics Committee 
Bond University Research Institute 
Level 2, Room 232, Conference Centre 
Bond University  Gold Coast, 4229. 
Telephone (07) 5595 4194 Fax (07) 5595 5009 
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173 
 
 
1 Mr  
2 Executive Chairman 
3 Co Name 
Telephone: (07) 5595 2099 
Facsimile: (07) 5595 1160 
E-mail: cgunther@bond.edu.au 
4 Dear Mr   
 
With regards to our survey we mailed to you recently we do have a friendly “web based” survey option 
for your convenience. 
 
You will recall our research as the following:  
The pursuit by Boards of better information to support their corporate goals and facilitate 
accountability has generated a significant body of research at both academic and practitioner levels.  
Unfortunately it has yet to generate a sound basis for Boards to build their information and reporting 
packages with any certainty that they are ‘getting it right’. In an attempt to rectify this shortfall we are 
undertaking research that aims to provide answers to some of the questions that Boards rightly ask 
about their reporting requirements.  Our research is Australian based, and is being gathered from all 
companies listed on the ASX.  
 
To assist us with our research we would be most grateful if you would complete the survey at the 
“START” prompt below. The survey has 6 sections (A-F), 44 questions and will take approximately ten 
minutes to complete.  We do request you to type the name of your company and verify the ASX code 
on the survey so that we can combine your responses with publicly available information about the 
company. In doing this, we acknowledge the confidential nature of some of your responses, and give 
you our absolute assurance that your responses will be known only to the two researchers named 
below, and will be treated confidentially. All data will be aggregated in our analysis and no individual 
company will be identifiable in any report or paper that we write.  
 
Should you wish to receive a summary of our findings please indicate this, and when they are 
available it will be our pleasure to share them with you at that time. 
 
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.    
 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
 
Dr Lyndal Drennan and Mr Chris Gunther. 
 
  
174 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4E 
SUMMARY OF EARLY AND LATE MAIL AND WEB RESPONSES 
17
5 
  M
ai
l 1
 
A
SX
 
C
od
e 
So
ur
ce
 
C
o-
op
t 
Si
ze
 
C
at
 
N
o 
 
C
om
po
si
tio
n 
Si
ze
 
C
at
 
N
o 
 
C
om
m
itt
ee
s 
C
at
 
N
o 
M
ar
kC
ap
 
Si
ze
 
C
at
 
N
o 
A
EJ
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
4,
06
5,
10
3 
Sm
al
l 
  
A
G
O
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
20
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
80
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
2,
95
1,
80
3,
58
8 
La
rg
e 
  
A
JL
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
20
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
60
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
1 
  
89
,2
58
,8
46
 
Sm
al
l 
  
A
LU
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
3 
  
10
,2
46
,2
00
 
Sm
al
l 
  
A
LY
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
1 
  
19
,0
02
,2
44
 
Sm
al
l 
  
A
N
G
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
40
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
80
 
H
ig
h 
  
1 
  
36
5,
74
3,
45
5 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
A
N
P 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
60
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
2 
  
8,
88
5,
37
2 
Sm
al
l 
  
A
W
E 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
83
 
H
ig
h 
  
2 
  
75
6,
71
4,
31
4 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
A
X
I 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
40
 
Lo
w
 
  
1 
  
15
,1
63
,4
22
 
Sm
al
l 
  
B
O
L 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
50
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
14
3,
06
5,
22
0 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
B
O
Q
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
80
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
1,
89
0,
85
0,
49
9 
La
rg
e 
9 
C
C
U
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
0 
  
14
1,
12
7,
35
7 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
C
G
O
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
3 
  
23
,7
72
,3
54
 
Sm
al
l 
  
C
IR
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
29
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
71
 
H
ig
h 
  
2 
  
27
,8
38
,1
56
 
Sm
al
l 
  
C
N
B
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
2 
  
65
,1
23
,1
89
 
Sm
al
l 
  
C
SE
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
0 
  
12
,9
45
,5
57
 
Sm
al
l 
  
C
ST
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
20
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
40
 
Lo
w
 
  
2 
  
32
4,
03
1,
49
1 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
C
U
U
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
80
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
4,
55
3,
07
7 
Sm
al
l 
  
C
V
C 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
50
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
1 
  
11
2,
55
3,
71
6 
M
ed
iu
m
 
14
 
C
Y
S 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
0 
  
6,
95
8,
84
9 
Sm
al
l 
  
D
W
S 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
60
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
3 
  
17
6,
04
2,
47
4 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
EA
L 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
60
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
3 
  
15
,9
38
,8
67
 
Sm
al
l 
  
EL
D
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
63
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
88
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
19
9,
62
6,
32
3 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
EN
B
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
5,
18
3,
04
3 
Sm
al
l 
  
ES
S 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
2 
  
31
,2
43
,3
40
 
Sm
al
l 
  
17
6 
  
FL
T 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
2 
  
2,
07
7,
87
9,
29
4 
La
rg
e 
  
FP
S 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
2 
  
45
,4
28
,0
77
 
Sm
al
l 
  
FU
T 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
27
 
0 
7 
4,
92
2,
83
5 
Sm
al
l 
  
FW
L 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
40
 
H
ig
h 
17
 
0.
40
 
Lo
w
 
  
2 
  
15
,9
63
,9
71
 
Sm
al
l 
  
G
D
Y
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
38
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
65
,6
94
,1
02
 
Sm
al
l 
  
M
C
R
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
50
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
19
8,
60
2,
71
5 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
M
D
L 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
2 
  
37
8,
58
8,
26
5 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
M
G
K
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
3 
  
10
,2
86
,7
08
 
Sm
al
l 
  
M
G
Z 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
20
 
Lo
w
 
  
3 
25
 
2,
73
0,
22
4 
Sm
al
l 
35
 
M
H
C
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
0 
  
37
,8
97
,0
27
 
Sm
al
l 
  
M
IN
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
60
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
3 
  
2,
02
8,
02
4,
77
3 
La
rg
e 
  
M
LB
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
57
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
86
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
14
0,
35
2,
96
0 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
M
N
C
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
14
 
Lo
w
 
15
 
0.
86
 
H
ig
h 
  
2 
  
51
1,
95
4,
89
3 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
M
SH
/R
RP
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
2 
  
14
,8
98
,9
89
 
Sm
al
l 
  
M
V
P 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
71
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
71
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
25
,6
78
,8
25
 
Sm
al
l 
  
N
M
E 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
0 
  
15
,7
05
,1
11
 
Sm
al
l 
  
O
R
M
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
50
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
1 
  
18
,3
07
,4
11
 
Sm
al
l 
  
PD
M
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
1 
8 
3,
42
4,
27
4 
Sm
al
l 
  
PD
N
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
80
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
2,
35
6,
42
5,
59
7 
La
rg
e 
  
PE
X
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
18
 
0 
  
8,
68
7,
97
4 
Sm
al
l 
  
PN
N
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
2 
  
12
,1
09
,8
37
 
Sm
al
l 
  
Q
A
N
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
80
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
80
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
4,
59
8,
20
0,
94
8 
La
rg
e 
  
SH
L 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
56
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
3 
  
4,
69
2,
23
2,
89
0 
La
rg
e 
  
SP
T 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
43
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
71
 
H
ig
h 
  
2 
  
60
6,
99
1,
13
4 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
SR
H
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
2 
18
 
6,
50
0,
00
0 
Sm
al
l 
  
ST
P 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
40
 
Lo
w
 
  
2 
  
34
,7
89
,9
82
 
Sm
al
l 
  
SY
R
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
26
 
0.
00
 
Lo
w
 
13
 
1 
  
3,
57
0,
75
0 
Sm
al
l 
  
TB
I 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
6,
90
3,
11
1 
Sm
al
l 
  
17
7 
  
TG
R
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
83
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
20
8,
48
3,
77
5 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
TS
E 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
56
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
78
 
H
ig
h 
  
2 
  
1,
93
5,
00
0,
16
8 
La
rg
e 
  
U
R
M
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
2 
  
10
,2
44
,6
77
 
Sm
al
l 
  
V
G
H
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
57
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
57
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
3 
  
8,
90
3,
70
3 
Sm
al
l 
  
W
PL
 
M
ai
l1
 
0.
22
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
89
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
36
,2
50
,6
02
,7
74
 
La
rg
e 
  
T
ot
al
s 
  
  
  
58
 
  
  
58
 
  
58
 
  
  
58
 
         
17
8 
  M
ai
l 2
 
A
SX
 
C
od
e 
So
ur
ce
 
C
o-
op
t 
Si
ze
 
C
at
 
N
o 
 
C
om
po
si
tio
n 
Si
ze
 
C
at
 
N
o 
 
C
om
m
itt
ee
s 
C
at
 
N
o 
M
ar
kC
ap
 
Si
ze
 
C
at
 
N
o 
A
A
D
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
60
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
80
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
43
7,
45
3,
46
9 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
A
EO
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
55
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
55
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
2 
  
70
3,
35
8,
76
4 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
A
G
F 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
40
 
H
ig
h 
12
 
0.
60
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
3 
  
25
2,
24
9,
06
1 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
A
G
S 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
50
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
10
 
1 
  
86
,9
98
,9
38
 
Sm
al
l 
  
A
V
E 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
50
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
83
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
31
4,
99
1,
24
9 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
A
X
A
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
78
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
13
,2
70
,7
53
,3
98
 
La
rg
e 
  
B
K
L 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
71
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
71
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
47
5,
53
7,
89
2 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
B
X
B 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
78
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
78
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
10
,7
25
,3
41
,5
41
 
La
rg
e 
  
C
D
A
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
63
 
H
ig
h 
22
 
2 
  
20
8,
46
5,
39
4 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
C
LQ
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
15
 
3,
03
0,
69
2 
Sm
al
l 
17
 
C
LU
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
2 
13
 
5,
34
4,
99
8 
Sm
al
l 
  
C
X
Y
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
1 
  
27
,1
66
,3
65
 
Sm
al
l 
  
D
LE
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
60
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
3 
  
27
,8
67
,5
60
 
Sm
al
l 
  
FX
J 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
56
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
89
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
2,
39
8,
99
4,
83
9 
La
rg
e 
  
G
G
H
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
43
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
24
,0
20
,5
60
 
Sm
al
l 
  
G
N
C
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
86
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
86
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
1,
64
2,
08
0,
49
2 
La
rg
e 
6 
H
LX
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
11
 
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
2 
  
14
,4
12
,7
85
 
Sm
al
l 
  
H
SN
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
20
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
60
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
2 
  
14
2,
13
9,
41
8 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
H
TC
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
38
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
78
 
H
ig
h 
  
2 
  
10
,6
47
,3
96
 
Sm
al
l 
  
JB
H
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
2 
  
1,
65
2,
36
0,
89
5 
La
rg
e 
  
JY
C
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
20
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
40
 
Lo
w
 
  
2 
  
11
,1
76
,8
92
 
Sm
al
l 
  
M
FG
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
60
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
1 
  
22
5,
82
0,
67
1 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
M
TN
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
1 
6 
17
,9
80
,5
18
 
Sm
al
l 
  
O
EL
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
57
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
57
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
1 
  
10
8,
91
5,
84
6 
M
ed
iu
m
 
12
 
PA
N
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
80
 
H
ig
h 
  
2 
  
37
8,
90
2,
79
9 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
17
9 
  
PR
O
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
2 
  
10
,3
86
,1
52
 
Sm
al
l 
  
Q
B
E 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
78
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
19
,0
12
,1
89
,8
13
 
La
rg
e 
  
R
H
L 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
17
 
Lo
w
 
12
 
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
18
3,
21
4,
21
5 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
R
K
N
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
3 
2 
  
32
2,
78
9,
42
5 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
SN
O
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
2 
  
80
,8
99
,8
13
 
Sm
al
l 
  
SS
L 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
0 
1 
32
,0
29
,9
16
 
Sm
al
l 
  
SU
M
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
2 
  
36
,4
05
,1
23
 
Sm
al
l 
  
TC
Q
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
17
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
83
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
38
,6
47
,1
26
 
Sm
al
l 
  
TO
E 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
17
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
83
 
H
ig
h 
  
1 
  
80
,0
89
,7
44
 
Sm
al
l 
  
W
FL
 
M
ai
l2
 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
3 
  
45
,7
20
,9
95
 
Sm
al
l 
  
T
ot
al
s 
  
  
  
35
 
  
  
35
 
  
35
 
  
  
35
 
       
18
0 
  W
eb
 1
 
A
SX
 
C
od
e 
So
ur
ce
 
C
o-
op
t 
Si
ze
 
C
at
 
N
o 
 
C
om
po
si
tio
n 
Si
ze
 
C
at
 
N
o 
 
C
om
m
itt
ee
s 
C
at
 
N
o 
M
ar
kC
ap
 
Si
ze
 
C
at
 
N
o 
A
A
O
 
W
eb
1 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
0 
  
32
,1
97
,4
56
 
Sm
al
l 
  
A
IR
 
W
eb
1 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
80
 
H
ig
h 
  
0 
  
21
,5
48
,1
04
 
Sm
al
l 
  
A
V
X
 
W
eb
1 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
47
,4
70
,5
71
 
Sm
al
l 
  
A
X
Z 
W
eb
1 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
60
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
0 
  
44
,5
90
,0
00
 
Sm
al
l 
  
B
K
M
 
W
eb
1 
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
0 
5 
3,
20
3,
28
8 
Sm
al
l 
14
 
C
O
Y
 
W
eb
1 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
1 
  
14
,6
07
,1
43
 
Sm
al
l 
  
C
PU
 
W
eb
1 
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
63
 
H
ig
h 
10
 
3 
  
5,
13
9,
89
2,
54
5 
La
rg
e 
1 
C
R
G
 
W
eb
1 
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
82
1,
16
8,
72
3 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
C
SS
 
W
eb
1 
0.
29
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
43
 
Lo
w
 
  
2 
  
52
,8
91
,2
35
 
Sm
al
l 
  
G
LM
 
W
eb
1 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
1 
3 
3,
43
0,
66
4 
Sm
al
l 
  
II
I 
W
eb
1 
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
12
,5
07
,9
14
 
Sm
al
l 
  
M
D
X
 
W
eb
1 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
60
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
2 
  
45
,4
54
,3
70
 
Sm
al
l 
  
M
LX
 
W
eb
1 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
2 
  
32
7,
75
8,
82
7 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
M
SF
 
W
eb
1 
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
4 
0 
  
27
8,
04
4,
81
9 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
O
IL
 
W
eb
1 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
9 
0.
00
 
Lo
w
 
6 
3 
8 
6,
50
4,
28
9 
Sm
al
l 
  
PP
I 
W
eb
1 
0.
17
 
Lo
w
 
8 
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
1 
  
39
,8
33
,8
80
 
Sm
al
l 
  
ST
G
 
W
eb
1 
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
7,
83
1,
77
2 
Sm
al
l 
  
TC
N
 
W
eb
1 
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
25
 
Lo
w
 
  
2 
4 
8,
04
9,
33
5 
Sm
al
l 
  
U
X
C 
W
eb
1 
0.
20
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
80
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
17
4,
30
0,
13
9 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
W
D
S 
W
eb
1 
0.
50
 
H
ig
h 
3 
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
10
8,
04
1,
74
6 
M
ed
iu
m
 
5 
T
ot
al
 
  
  
  
20
 
  
  
20
 
  
20
 
  
  
20
 
  
18
1 
  W
eb
 2
 
A
SX
 
C
od
e 
So
ur
ce
 
C
o-
op
t 
Si
ze
 
C
at
 
N
o 
 
C
om
po
si
tio
n 
Si
ze
 
C
at
 
N
o 
 
C
om
m
itt
ee
s 
C
at
 
N
o 
M
ar
kC
ap
 
Si
ze
 
C
at
 
N
o 
A
B
Z 
W
eb
2 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
60
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
2 
  
30
,5
83
,0
00
 
Sm
al
l 
  
A
N
O
 
W
eb
2 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
8 
1 
8 
5,
87
9,
23
9 
Sm
al
l 
  
A
PK
 
W
eb
2 
0.
50
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
3 
  
91
,0
10
,3
74
 
Sm
al
l 
  
A
ZX
 
W
eb
2 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
60
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
1 
  
54
,2
08
,6
91
 
Sm
al
l 
  
C
G
T 
W
eb
2 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
  
1 
  
61
,1
32
,2
07
 
Sm
al
l 
  
C
SD
 
W
eb
2 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
12
 
0.
33
 
Lo
w
 
3 
1 
  
11
,6
58
,7
10
 
Sm
al
l 
  
C
ZA
 
W
eb
2 
0.
43
 
H
ig
h 
10
 
0.
43
 
Lo
w
 
  
2 
  
62
4,
08
9,
10
1 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
D
G
I 
W
eb
2 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
2 
5 
1,
67
0,
05
5 
Sm
al
l 
17
 
EP
L 
W
eb
2 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
3 
7 
6,
54
6,
02
6 
Sm
al
l 
  
ER
A
 
W
eb
2 
0.
50
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
83
 
H
ig
h 
  
1 
  
88
3,
11
6,
63
4 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
FB
U
 
W
eb
2 
0.
38
 
Lo
w
 
  
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
4,
61
4,
30
0,
27
6 
La
rg
e 
1 
G
O
A
 
W
eb
2 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
71
 
H
ig
h 
  
1 
  
51
,1
05
,8
03
 
Sm
al
l 
  
LR
G
 
W
eb
2 
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
3 
  
11
,0
83
,6
03
 
Sm
al
l 
  
M
O
Y
 
W
eb
2 
0.
60
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
80
 
H
ig
h 
  
0 
  
38
,9
97
,2
86
 
Sm
al
l 
  
M
R
E 
W
eb
2 
0.
43
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
63
 
H
ig
h 
13
 
3 
  
84
7,
83
2,
75
3 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
M
TE
 
W
eb
2 
0.
80
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
80
 
H
ig
h 
  
0 
  
62
,1
95
,9
07
 
Sm
al
l 
  
N
M
S 
W
eb
2 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
60
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
1 
  
59
,4
18
,8
18
 
Sm
al
l 
  
PH
K
 
W
eb
2 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
2 
  
19
,5
89
,6
13
 
Sm
al
l 
  
PN
W
 
W
eb
2 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
75
 
H
ig
h 
  
0 
4 
16
,1
07
,4
59
 
Sm
al
l 
  
PR
G
 
W
eb
2 
0.
29
 
Lo
w
 
2 
0.
57
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
3 
  
25
2,
88
3,
60
3 
M
ed
iu
m
 
6 
R
D
M
 
W
eb
2 
0.
00
 
N
on
e 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
0 
  
21
,4
03
,9
41
 
Sm
al
l 
  
SY
M
 
W
eb
2 
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
67
 
H
ig
h 
  
1 
  
81
,3
41
,6
68
 
Sm
al
l 
  
TW
R
 
W
eb
2 
0.
71
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
71
 
H
ig
h 
  
2 
  
34
7,
95
6,
55
1 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
W
C
B
 
W
eb
2 
0.
50
 
H
ig
h 
  
0.
50
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
3 
  
25
7,
73
2,
88
6 
M
ed
iu
m
 
  
T
ot
al
 
  
  
  
24
 
  
  
24
 
  
24
 
  
  
24
 
182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 5A 
THE EXCEL DATA FILES OF ALL THE VARIABLES 
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Asx Code InfoFinD1 InfoFinD2 InfoFinD3 InfoFinD4 InfoFinO5
AAD 4 5 6 6 7
AAO 1 1 2 1 1
ABZ 1 1 1 1 1
AEJ 2 1 2 2 6
AEO 7 6 6 6 7
AGF 6 6 6 6 3
AGO 3 6 5 3 6
AGS 3 1 4 1 6
AIR 7 5 4 4 5
AJL 2 2 2 2 2
ALU 6 6 6 6 4
ALY 1 1 6 1 5
ANG 6 6 5 6 6
ANO 7 7 7 6 4
ANP 7
APK 7 5 6 6 6  
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APPENDIX 5B 
THE EXCEL FILE OF THE BI-VARIATE PEARSON PRODUCT MOMENT 
CORRELATION OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
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Independent Variable Bi-variate Pearson Product Moment Correlation 
InfoFinD1 InfoFinD2 InfoFinD3 InfoFinD4 InfoFinO5
Pearson Correlation 1 .820** .539** .678** -.467**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
Pearson Correlation .820** 1 .558** .775** -.452**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
Pearson Correlation .539** .558** 1 .715** -.275**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .004
Pearson Correlation .678** .775** .715** 1 -.414**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
Pearson Correlation -.467** -.452** -.275** -.414** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .004 .000
Pearson Correlation -.081 -.095 -.002 -.175 .521**
Sig. (2-tailed) .404 .325 .982 .069 .000
Pearson Correlation -.186 -.137 -.291** -.301** .301**
Sig. (2-tailed) .053 .156 .002 .001 .001
 
InfoFinD1
InfoFinD2
InfoFinD3
InfoFinD4
InfoFinO5
InfoFinO6
InfoFinO7
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APPENDIX 5C 
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE DATA:  
HENDRY AND KIEL’S (2004) TYPOLOGY EXPLORED 
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5C.0 INTRODUCTION 
Hendry and Kiel (2004) developed a typology that classifies a board into four strategic types (refer to 
Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3), which is based on a strategic and financial control role dichotomy. They argue 
that the relative emphasis on either the strategic or financial control role is contingent upon three 
contextual factors: Environmental Uncertainty, Board Power, and Information Asymmetry (refer to 
Figure 5C.1). The purpose of this appendix is to examine this proposition using this study’s data set. This 
appendix proceeds as follows: Section 5C.1 discusses the literature and theory and Section 5C.2 
superimposes this study’s data set into the Hendry and Kiel (2004) typology. Section 5C.3 discusses the 
implications of this study’s data variables in relation to the Hendry and Kiel (2004) typology and Section 
5C.4 develops the data and variables. Section 5C.5 tests the propositions using Pearson Correlation and 
Section 5C.6 presents the findings and discussion. Section 5C.7 summarises the appendix. 
Figure 5C.1 Board Role Contingency Framework (Hendry and Kiel 2004, p. 513) 
 
 
 
 
5C.1 LITERATURE AND THEORY 
Research suggests a shift away from a passive board control role to a more active control role in strategy 
(Hendry & Kiel, 2004) and the board as ‘no more than a sign-off on strategy’ appears to be rare (Stiles, 
2001) . In addition, organisational behaviour suggests that strategic advice and counsel are essential in the 
running of modern corporations and are critical of ‘rubberstamp’ boards (Finegold et al., 2001). In 
recognising the board as a control mechanism, Hendry and Kiel (2004) draw on both Organisational 
Board Strategy 
Role 
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Information 
Asymmetry 
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Performance 
Strategic 
Control 
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Theory and Control (Ouchi, 1979) and Economic (Agency Theory) Control (Eisenhardt, 1985) and 
introduce a board typology (refer to Figure 5C.2) where it is possible to establish an association between 
aspects of the Board’s Control Role in strategy. 
Figure 5C.2 Board Control Role Typology (Hendry and Kiel 2004, p. 512) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By recognising a board’s ‘passive (rubber stamp)/active (board as management) control continuum’ in 
strategy, Hendry and Kiel (2004) characterise a board’s control role based on a financial control and 
strategic control dichotomy. Boards that emphasise both strategic and financial controls are regarded as 
‘board as management,’ while boards that place low emphasis on either control are considered 
‘rubberstamp’ boards.  
5C.2 SUPERIMPOSING THIS STUDY’S DATA SET INTO THE HENDRY AND KIEL 
(2004) TYPOLOGY 
The survey collected responses to six questions, sourced from Hendry and Kiel (2004), to determine the 
Board’s Strategic and Financial Control Roles. Questions 25-27 (refer to Table 5C.1) relate to the board’s 
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strategic control role and Questions 28-30 (refer to Table 5C.1) relate to the board’s financial control role. 
Table 5C.1 Survey Questions to Determine the Board’s Control Role in Strategy 
Question 
Number Survey Question 
Named in 
SPSS Source 
Section D 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following 
statements: 
 
  
Q25 
The board shapes the context of strategy by setting the 
conditions under which the strategy process happens in the 
organisation. BrdStrt25 Hendry, K. and G. C. Kiel (2004) 
Q26 
The board shapes the content of strategy by requiring that 
management justify their intentions, by evaluating 
alternatives and by continuously monitoring progress 
during formulation and assessment stage. BrdStrt26 Hendry, K. and G. C. Kiel (2004) 
Q27 
The board shapes the conduct of strategy by continuously 
monitoring implementation and results and by making 
changes where appropriate. BrdStrt27 Hendry, K. and G. C. Kiel (2004) 
Q28 
The board sets financial targets only and takes strategic 
decisions relative to these financial targets by approving, 
rejecting, or referring strategic proposals back to 
management. BrdFin28 Hendry, K. and G. C. Kiel (2004) 
Q29 
The board exerts influence over management at formal 
board meetings after resources have been committed and 
spending approved. BrdFin29 Hendry, K. and G. C. Kiel (2004) 
Q30 
The board evaluates management on the financial results of 
the firm. BrdFin30 Hendry, K. and G. C. Kiel (2004) 
 
As the Hendry and Kiel (2004) strategic and financial control typology (refer to Figure 5C.2) can be seen 
as the foundation or building block that leads to the contingency framework (refer to Figure 5C.1), two 
variables, ‘Strategic Control’ and ‘Financial Control’, from the six survey question responses are 
determined. By determining the two variables, this research’s data set can be superimposed into the 
Hendry and Kiel (2004) typology (refer to Figure 5C.2).  
‘Strategic Control’: A Pearson Correlation (refer to Chapter 5, page 26) confirmed that significant 
positive correlations (**significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)) exist between the three board strategic role 
variables: BrdStrt25, BrdStrt26, and BrdStrt27. With a reliability analysis Cronbach’s alpha of .803, the 
three variables are averaged to determine the ‘strategic control’ variable. A frequency table of the 
‘strategic control’ variable (refer to Figure 5C.3A) revealed that, based on a Likert scale score above 3, 98% 
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of the boards surveyed (126 out of 129) regard themselves as having strategic control roles. 
Figure 5C.3A Strategic Control Variable Frequency Table 
   
‘Financial Control’: The same Pearson Correlation (refer to Chapter 5, page 26) also confirmed a 
significant positive correlation (**significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)) between two board financial role 
variables: BrdFin29 and BrdFin30. With a reliability analysis Cronbach’s alpha of .5, the two variables 
are averaged to determine the ‘financial control’ variable. A frequency table of the ‘financial control’ 
variable (refer to Figure 5C.3B) revealed that, based on a Likert scale score above 3, 98% of the boards 
surveyed (125 out of 128) regard themselves as having financial control roles. 
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Figure 5C.3B Financial Control Variable Frequency Table 
    
As discussed in Chapter 5, the results suggest that this study’s data set could be considered a ‘Board as 
Management’ control type. The strategic and financial control variables were superimposed (refer to 
Figure 5C.4) into the Hendry and Kiel (2004) typology. With regards to board theory, the ‘board as 
management’ or the active ‘school of thought’ is underpinned by stewardship (Muth & Donaldson, 1998), 
agency (Eisenhardt, 1989) and resource dependence (Zahra & Pearce II, 1989) theories. Stewardship 
theory argues against opportunistic self-interest, claiming intrinsic motivation contributes to the overall 
stewardship of the company. Agency theory argues that the role of the board is to reduce the potential 
conflict of interest between shareholders and management and has clear implications for the monitoring 
and control role of the board. Resource dependence theory argues that boards are a mechanism to access 
important resources, acting as strategic consultants to TMTs. With regards to the normative literature, 
there is a clear convergence, though not empirically established, that boards have a definite role to play in 
strategy (Hendry & Kiel, 2004). Finally, the academic literature over the last 20 years demonstrates a shift 
away from the ‘rubberstamp’ role of the 1970s and 1980s to the ‘board as management’ role (Hendry & 
Kiel, 2004). 
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Figure 5C.4 Strategic and Financial Control Variables Superimposed into the Hendry 
and Kiel (2004) Typology 
 
5C.3 THE HENDRY AND KIEL (2004) CONTIGENCY PROPOSITIONS 
Hendry and Kiel (2004) argue that the relative emphasis on either the strategic or financial control role is 
contingent upon three contextual factors: Board Power, Environmental Uncertainty, and Information 
Asymmetry (refer to Figure 5C.1). Supporting this argument, Hendry and Kiel (2004) suggest that more 
powerful boards are associated with higher levels of involvement in strategy and, as Environmental 
Uncertainty escalates, management becomes more risk averse, therefore placing an emphasis on 
behavioural (strategic) control. However, in the case of incomplete information, principals contract on 
outcomes and, as such, information asymmetry is related to financial control by the board (Hendry & Kiel, 
2004). 
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Based on the three contextual factors: Board Power, Environmental Uncertainty, and Information 
Asymmetry, Hendry and Kiel (2004) propose the following: 
P1: The power of the board is positively (negatively) related to strategic control (financial control) by the 
board. 
P2: Environmental uncertainty is positively (negatively) related to strategic control (financial control) by 
the board. 
P3: Information asymmetry is negatively (positively) related to strategic control (financial control) by the 
board. 
However, based on the Board as Management type in this study’s data set that recognises and includes 
both financial and strategic control roles, it would be expected that correlations between the contingencies 
and board type would be not significant as statistically, the negative and positive relationships will cancel 
out. Further research, with a strategic control and financial control sample, would be required to test the 
positive/negative relationships.    
5C.4 DATA AND VARIABLES 
5C.4.1 Independent Variables 
The independent variables are the balance of the factors determined in Chapter 5 (refer to Table 5.8 below, 
copied from Chapter 5 for convenience) and are: Board Power “power”, Environmental Uncertainty “eu1” 
and “eu2”, and Information Asymmetry “assy”.  
 
 
197 
 
 
Copied from Chapter 5: Table 5.8 - Final Seven-Factor Loading Matrix 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
Variables 
Component 
I assy B eu1 S power eu2 
InfoCstD12 .931 -.004 .003 .042 .088 .017 .028 
InfoCstO13 -.917 .035 -.032 -.046 -.044 -.024 -.028 
InfoCstD14 .898 -.041 -.002 -.005 -.048 .041 .078 
InfoCstO9 -.870 .049 -.078 -.048 -.037 -.021 -.111 
InfoCstO11 -.867 .066 -.084 -.037 .037 -.021 -.043 
InfoFinD2 .794 .009 .009 .158 .138 .168 -.050 
InfoFinD4 .790 -.055 .140 .191 .145 .080 -.001 
InfoFinD3 .678 -.121 .211 .220 .371 -.061 -.035 
BrdIA31 -.084 .919 .078 .076 -.065 -.019 -.080 
BrdIA32 -.107 .910 .108 .048 -.002 -.129 -.046 
BrdIA33 -.039 .827 .213 .111 .068 .097 .053 
BrdStrt27 .133 .153 .853 -.004 .057 -.056 -.089 
BrdStrt25 .018 .013 .821 .021 -.048 .017 .116 
BrdStrt26 .166 .266 .813 -.004 -.107 -.006 .056 
BrdEU24 .097 .126 .046 .837 .157 -.087 .049 
BrdEU20 .305 .104 -.019 .832 -.067 .094 .027 
StrtDC35 .036 -.059 -.173 .084 .821 .104 -.148 
StrtPE36 .252 .068 .061 -.006 .812 .006 .064 
Coopt .120 -.162 -.033 .064 .033 .793 -.115 
TenR .003 .017 .111 -.319 .034 .665 .004 
Comp .102 .143 -.158 .275 .053 .630 .243 
BrdEU23 .011 .049 .035 -.080 .022 .100 .857 
BrdEU16 .120 -.133 .051 .169 -.110 -.079 .783 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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Board Power 
The Board Power variable is named “power” and is measured by CEO duality, relative tenure, co-opting 
(percentage of board composed of outside directors appointed after a CEO), composition 
(independent/dependent boards), and outside share ownership, as proposed by Zajac and Westphal (1996). 
The archival data was sourced from DatAnalysis (Morning Star). Three of the five measures, namely 
tenure, co-opting, and composition, loaded in “power”.  
Environmental Uncertainty 
Environmental uncertainty is measured using the survey questions developed by Gordon and Narayanan 
(1984). Economic, Technological, Competitive, and Customer Aspects are measured in ten survey 
questions (refer to Table 5C.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
199 
 
 
Table 5C.2 Survey Questions to Determine Environmental Uncertainty 
Question 
Number Survey Question Source 
Section C How intense is each of the following in your industry?   
Q15 Bidding for purchases or raw materials 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
Q16 Competition for manpower 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
Q17 Price competition 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
    
Q18 
How many new products and/or services have been marketed during the 
past 5 years by your industry? 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
    
  
How stable/dynamic is the external environment (economic and 
technological) facing your firm? 
Q19 Economic 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
Q20 Technological 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
    
Q21 
How would you classify the market activities of your competitors during 
the past 5 years?     
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
Q22 
During the past 5 years, the tastes and preferences of your customers have 
become 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
Q23 
During the past 5 years, the legal, political and economic constraints 
surrounding your firm have 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
Q24 How often do new technological advances emerge in your industry? 
Gordon, L. A. and V. K. Narayanan 
(1984) 
 
Technological uncertainty (questions 20 and 24 in the survey) loads in “eu1” and economic uncertainty 
(questions 16 and 23 in the survey) loads in “eu2”.  
Information Asymmetry 
The Information asymmetry variable is named “assy” and is measured using the survey questions (refer to 
Table 5C.3) offered by Rutherford and Buchholtz (2007). Three of the four questions (questions 31 to 33 
in the survey) load in the “assy” factor.  
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Table 5C.3 Survey Questions to Determine Information Asymmetry 
Question 
Number Survey Question Source 
Section E 
Q31 In general, the information available to the board is very reliable 
 Rutherford, M. A. and A. K. 
Buchholtz (2007) 
Q32 In general, the available information is relevant to the board’s needs 
 Rutherford, M. A. and A. K. 
Buchholtz (2007) 
Q33 In general, the board receives information in a timely fashion 
 Rutherford, M. A. and A. K. 
Buchholtz (2007) 
Q34 
At a typical board meeting, the board actively probes for information 
necessary to carry out their duties 
 Rutherford, M. A. and A. K. 
Buchholtz (2007) 
 
5C.4.2 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is Variable B determined in Chapter 5 (refer to Table 5.8 above, copied from 
Chapter 5 for convenience), which measures the Board’s Control Role Type in this study’s data set. 
5C.5 TESTING PROPOSITIONS USING PEARSON CORRELATION 
5C.5.1 Normal Distribution Properties and Descriptive Statistics 
After screening the independent variables, two extreme outliers were detected in the “power” variable and 
were deleted. The initial descriptive statistics (refer to Table 5C.4A) reveal moderate negative skewness 
in variables “assy” and “eu2”. After square root transformation, the new variables “SqAssy” and “SqEu2” 
resulted in a more normal distribution (refer to Table 5C.4B), which are also illustrated in the histograms 
(refer to Figures 5C.5A, 5C.5B, 5C.5C, and 5C.5D). 
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Table 5C.4A  Initial Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
eu1 114 -3.07450 1.99711 .0000000 1.00000000 -.239 -.431 
power 112 -1.97376 1.65038 -.0839818 .75884450 .078 -.376 
SqAssy 114 1.46 2.79 1.9858 .23929 .816 1.042 
SqEu2 114 1.48 2.66 1.9851 .24498 .409 .060 
Valid N (listwise) 112 
 
Table 5C.4B  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
assy 114 -3.77854 1.87847 .0000000 1.00000000 -1.220 2.049 
eu1 114 -3.07450 1.99711 .0000000 1.00000000 -.239 -.431 
eu2 114 -3.07045 1.80403 .0000000 1.00000000 -.748 .580 
power 112 -1.97376 1.65038 -.0839818 .75884450 .078 -.376 
Valid N (listwise) 112 
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Figure 5C.5A Power Histogram 
 
Figure 5C.5B Information Asymmetry Histogram 
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Figure 5C.5C Environmental (technological) Uncertainty 1 Histogram 
 
Figure 5C.5D Environmental (economic) Uncertainty 2 Histogram 
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5C.5.2 Pearson Correlation 
The Pearson coefficient of correlation is used to measure the strength of association between the four 
independent variables (eu1, power, SqEu2, and SqAssy) and the dependent variable (B). The results of 
the correlation of the independent variables: eu1, power, SqEu2, and SqAssy, with dependent variable B, 
are not significant.  
Table 5C.5 Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix of ‘eu1’, ‘power’, ‘SqEu2’, SqAssy’, 
and ‘B’  
SqEu2 SqAssy eu1 power B 
SqEu2 
Pearson Correlation 1 .024 .010 .011 -.047 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .803 .913 .909 .622 
N 114 114 114 112 114 
SqAssy 
Pearson Correlation .024 1 -.001 .034 -.134 
Sig. (2-tailed) .803   .988 .725 .154 
N 114 114 114 112 114 
eu1 
Pearson Correlation .010 -.001 1 .287** .006 
Sig. (2-tailed) .913 .988   .002 .949 
N 114 114 114 112 114 
power 
Pearson Correlation .011 .034 .287** 1 -.075 
Sig. (2-tailed) .909 .725 .002   .430 
N 112 112 112 112 112 
B 
Pearson Correlation -.047 -.134 .006 -.075 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .622 .154 .949 .430   
N 114 114 114 112 129 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
5C.6 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Consistent with the literature and board theories (Eisenhardt, 1989; Muth & Donaldson, 1998; Zahra & 
Pearce II, 1989), this study’s data set finds that boards do emphasise a ‘board as management’ role in 
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strategy. Boards which emphasise both financial control and strategic control roles would be classed as a 
‘board as management’ in the Hendry and Kiel (2004) typology. However, this study’s sample considered 
themselves as both financial and strategic control role types. As a result, it would be expected that the 
correlation between the contingencies: Information Asymmetry, Board Power, and Environmental 
Uncertainty and board’s strategic and financial control roles, as proposed by Hendry and Kiel (2004), 
would be not significant. Further research, with a strategic control and financial control sample, would be 
required to test the positive/negative relationships. 
5C.7 APPENDIX SUMMARY 
This appendix tests the propositions that the relative emphasis on the board’s strategic versus financial 
control role is contingent upon Board Power, Environmental Uncertainty, and Information Asymmetry, as 
offered by Hendry and Kiel (2004). This study’s sample is characterised by the ‘board as management’ 
type, which recognises and includes both financial and strategic control roles and, as such, finds no 
correlation between the contingencies and the Board’s Control Role. The ‘board as management’ findings 
are consistent with board theory and both the normative and academic literature. 
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APPENDIX 5D 
THE EXCEL FILE OF THE BI-VARIATE PEARSON PRODUCT MOMENT 
CORRELATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
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Dependent Variable Bi-variate Pearson Product Moment Correlation 
ROA08 ROA09 ROE08 ROE09 EBIT08 EBIT09
Pearson Correlation 1 .639** .966** .574** .144 .089
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .142 .371
N 131 131 130 130 106 103
Pearson Correlation .639** 1 .619** .921** .300** .396**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .002 .000
N 131 137 130 136 106 105
Pearson Correlation .966** .619** 1 .585** .131 .082
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .179 .409
N 130 130 130 130 106 103
Pearson Correlation .574** .921** .585** 1 .197* .279**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .043 .004
N 130 136 130 136 106 105
Pearson Correlation .144 .300** .131 .197* 1 -.001
Sig. (2-tailed) .142 .002 .179 .043 .992
N 106 106 106 106 106 98
Pearson Correlation .089 .396** .082 .279** -.001 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .371 .000 .409 .004 .992
N 103 105 103 105 98 105
 
ROA08
ROA09
ROE08
ROE09
EBIT08
EBIT09
 
 
